Stay of proceedings

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's action based on a mandatory arbitration clause in the base trade credit insurance policy.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, relying on a Canadian endorsement that permitted an action against the insurer in Canada and stated that endorsements prevail in the event of a conflict.

The court found that the contract, read as a whole, provided alternative methods for dispute resolution and that the endorsement prevailed over the base policy's arbitration clause.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the statement of defence and dismiss the counterclaim of the subject defendants due to their failure to pay prior costs awards and answer undertakings from discoveries.

The court declined to strike the pleadings immediately, opting instead to give the defendants one final opportunity to comply.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings until the defendants pay the outstanding costs and answer the undertakings by specified deadlines, failing which their pleadings will be struck without further notice.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the applicant's oppression application and to release funds held in trust from the sale of a corporate property.

The parties were bound by a shareholder agreement containing a broad arbitration clause.

The applicant argued the dispute involved fraud and third-party creditor claims that fell outside the arbitration clause.

The court found the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the disputes, including allegations of oppressive conduct and fraud, and stayed the application.

The court also ordered the release of $150,000 from the trust funds to the respondents for living expenses and arbitration funding, plus an amount to cover capital gains tax.

The applicant, charged in 2013 with a 1976 murder, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence.

The lost evidence included the notes of thirteen police officers, an audiotaped confession by a third-party suspect, a videotaped recantation by that suspect, and various occurrence reports.

The court found that the deliberate destruction of police notes and the unexplained loss of the recordings constituted unacceptable negligence, breaching the applicant's section 7 Charter rights.

Concluding that the cumulative prejudice irreparably harmed the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 51 months.

After deducting 15.5 months of delay attributable to the defence, the net delay was 35.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or justify the delay based on reasonable reliance on the previous state of the law.

The court found the delay unconstitutional and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, charged with production and possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total time from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was over 54 months.

Applying the transitional framework from R. v. Jordan, the court deducted significant periods of defence delay caused by the applicant repeatedly changing counsel, waiving s. 11(b) rights, and re-electing his mode of trial.

The net delay was calculated at approximately 24.5 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The bankrupt, a lawyer, made an assignment in bankruptcy but concealed it for years while an estate trustee sued him for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation, eventually obtaining a default judgment.

The bankrupt later sought to rely on the automatic stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to avoid the judgment and subsequent costs orders.

The court dismissed the bankrupt's motion and granted the estate trustee's motion, finding that the claim was too remote and speculative to be a provable claim in bankruptcy.

Alternatively, the court held the debt would survive bankruptcy under s. 178 due to the bankrupt's misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, and that it would be equitable to lift the stay under s. 69.4 given the bankrupt's egregious conduct.

The applicant commenced a civil application seeking to stay ongoing criminal charges against him, alleging violations of his Charter rights.

The respondents requested the court review the application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that seeking to stay ongoing criminal proceedings via a civil claim appears to be an abuse of process on its face, as the applicant could seek relief within the criminal proceedings.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice that it is considering dismissing the application and stayed the proceeding pending the applicant's written submissions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to stay the defendant's motion to set aside a default judgment until the defendant paid outstanding costs orders and posted security for costs.

The defendant had made an assignment in bankruptcy, staying the enforcement of pre-bankruptcy costs orders.

The only remaining costs order, made by a registrar in bankruptcy, was under appeal.

The court held that the appeal automatically stayed the registrar's costs order under Rule 63.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

As no costs were currently payable, the plaintiff's motion for a stay and security for costs was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with trafficking methamphetamine, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

The court found that the Crown's decision to prosecute the applicant jointly with other co-accused in a larger investigation unnecessarily complicated and delayed his straightforward case.

Applying the frameworks from both Morin and Jordan, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and directed a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with fraud, uttering forged documents, and falsifying employment records.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to an infringement of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of the trial was 45.5 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 38 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found no exceptional circumstances or transitional exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The applicant, charged with child pornography and luring offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay was approximately 43 months.

After deducting defence delay and discrete events, the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, applying the transitional exceptional circumstances framework, the court found the delay was justified under the previous Morin guidelines.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and four counts of breaching a recognizance.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary arrest, unreasonable search, and seeking a stay of proceedings based on the cumulative effect of 25 prior police contacts.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the prior contacts unrelated and the arrest and search lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The accused was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of breaching a recognizance (driving while suspended).

He was acquitted of the remaining charges as his testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a young child.

The police videotaped the initial interviews with the child complainants but negligently failed to record the audio.

The defence brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing the lost evidence impaired the accused's right to make full answer and defence under s. 7.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police resulting in a s. 7 breach, but denied the stay as the defence failed to show irreparable prejudice.

At trial, the court found significant inconsistencies and credibility issues in the children's evidence, raising a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The respondent, facing a first-degree murder charge, subpoenaed a federal Crown counsel who had previously stayed a drug charge against him.

The respondent sought to question the Crown counsel about his reasons for staying the charge to support an abuse of process argument regarding the admission of disreputable conduct evidence.

The Crown counsel brought a certiorari application to quash the subpoena.

The Superior Court held that while the court clerk properly issued the subpoena based on defence counsel's representations, the subpoena must be quashed because the respondent failed to establish that the Crown counsel likely had material evidence to give, as prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be exercised properly absent evidence of bad faith.

The applicants, charged with break and enter, were discharged at a preliminary inquiry, terminating their bail.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, reviving the charges.

To address the outstanding issue of bail, the Crown sought and obtained arrest warrants for the applicants.

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging the Crown's conduct in seeking the warrants was an abuse of process and breached their rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the Crown's conduct did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process and the arrests were lawful under section 507(8) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime after selling drugs to an undercover police officer.

He brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing entrapment.

The undercover officer had called a phone number provided by a confidential informant and, after a brief initial exchange, asked to purchase drugs.

The court found that the police were conducting a bona fide investigation and had reasonable suspicion before presenting the opportunity to commit the offence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with break and enter and other offences, sought a stay of proceedings or a reduction in sentence under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging that police used excessive force during his arrest in violation of ss. 7 and 12.

The applicant fled the scene, ran through fences and trees, and actively resisted arrest when tackled.

The court found that the police officers' use of pepper spray, distractionary strikes, and baton strikes was a proportionate, necessary, and reasonable response to the applicant's resistance and potential threat.

The application was dismissed as no Charter breach occurred.