G. Zoppi

The court imposed sentence after guilty pleas to impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from a high-speed single-vehicle crash with severe, life-altering injuries to the passenger.

Applying Criminal Code sentencing principles, including proportionality, parity, denunciation, and general deterrence, the court emphasized Parliament’s enhanced approach to dangerous and impaired driving offences and rejected a conditional sentence as unfit.

Aggravating factors included statutorily aggravating blood-alcohol levels, dangerous operation on a 400-series highway, a recent speeding record, and lasting victim harm, while mitigation included youth, no prior criminal record, guilty plea, employment, and community support.

The court found limited insight and gave tempered weight to late rehabilitative efforts.

A penitentiary sentence of 24 months was imposed concurrently, with a five-year driving prohibition and DNA order.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, sought to use Facebook messages between himself and the complainant at trial.

The messages had been provided to the police by the complainant and disclosed to the defence by the Crown.

The court held that the s. 278.1 regime does not apply to Crown disclosure, as the Crown's disclosure implies a waiver of privacy by the complainant.

Furthermore, the court found that the complainant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, given they were voluntarily sent to the applicant, a former intimate partner, during an acrimonious period.

The messages were deemed not to be 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused to RCMP officers while he was in custody in Bermuda awaiting trial for importing fentanyl.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions, inducements, and police trickery.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the RCMP officers made no threats or promises, the conditions were not oppressive, and the accused maintained an operating mind throughout the interview.

The statement was ruled voluntary.

The respondent, a young person, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from the Danzig Street mass shooting.

The Crown applied under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to have an adult sentence imposed.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's background and progress in custody, and the societal interest in accountability and public protection.

Finding that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the respondent accountable, the court imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for seven years.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

During a trial for second-degree murder and other offences arising from a block party shooting, the Crown brought an application to admit an intercepted statement of a witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who had previously described the shooting and his subsequent attempt to murder the accused in retaliation, claimed at trial that he had fabricated the story to impress other youths in detention.

The court found that the statement met the criteria for threshold reliability, given the availability of the witness for cross-examination, the video recording of the statement, and substantial corroborative evidence.

The necessity criterion was also met because the witness effectively disavowed his earlier statement.

The application was granted.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert on Toronto street gangs and to opine that the young person was a member of a specific gang.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for expert evidence.

The court found that the officer lacked the necessary specialized knowledge, experience, and validated methodology to be qualified as an expert, particularly regarding the identification of specific individuals as gang members.

The application to qualify the officer as an expert was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit three statements made by the young person to police following two separate shooting incidents, including a mass shooting where the young person was a victim.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statements, arguing they were involuntary due to the young person's medical condition and alleged police oppression, and that the police failed to provide a caution under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the young person had an operating mind, was not subjected to threats or oppression, and was interviewed as a victim rather than a suspect or detainee.

All three statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.