COURT FILE NO.: 15-0143
DELIVERED ORALLY: 20161209
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
– and –
BRIAN LADOUCEUR
Applicant
Stephen Dawson, for the Respondent
Brian Ladouceur, Self-Represented
HEARD: November 7, 2016
REASONS FOR RULING ON SECTION 11(B) APPLICATION
MULLIGAN J.
Overview
[1] Brian Ladouceur is charged with two counts under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. The first count relates to production of cannabis marihuana. The second count relates to possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. Mr. Ladouceur was arrested and charged on June 28, 2012. His trial in the Superior Court of Justice is scheduled to begin before a jury on January 9, 2017. His seven-day trial is expected to end on January 17, 2017. He is not in custody.
[2] As a result, the time that would have passed from the date of charge to the completion of his trial is 54 months and 21 days.
[3] Mr. Ladouceur requests a stay of proceedings on the basis that his rights, pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, have been infringed. For the reasons that follow, I find that there has not been a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, an order staying the proceedings will not be granted.
The Application
[4] The grounds for Mr. Ladouceur’s application are “Number 1 – that Jordan decision (July 8, Supreme Court)”. Mr. Ladouceur attached a copy of R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, 398 D.L.R. (4th) 381 to his application but did not include any transcripts or analysis.
The Crown’s Position
[5] The Crown submits that when defence delay is deducted, the delay in this case is below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months. I pause to note that the Crown Prosecutor plays an essential role in the administration of justice. In the absence of fulsome submissions by the applicant, the Crown ordered the relevant transcripts and prepared a chart of three columns setting out the relevant periods, the events, and a suggested assessment of the responsibility for the proceedings. That chart is attached as Appendix ‘A’ to this ruling.
Key Events
[6] It is not necessary to review each and every event which occurred in these proceedings. However, the following key events will provide context for the discussion that follows. Jordan suggests that trial judges take a “bird’s-eye” view of such applications: Jordan at para. 91.
• Between the date of his arrest on June 28, 2012 and August 11, 2014, Mr. Ladouceur retained and subsequently dismissed four different lawyers.
• Between August 14, 2014 and today, Mr. Ladouceur has been self-represented.
• On November 19, 2012, a trial date was set for May 29 and June 3, 2013 in the Ontario Court of Justice. This date was vacated by Mr. Ladouceur’s third counsel on April 17, 2013. Many appearances followed as resolution discussions were underway before an Ontario Court of Justice case management judge.
• On October 8, 2014, Mr. Ladouceur, self-represented, re-elected trial by judge and jury with the Crown’s consent.
• After a preliminary hearing on July 13, 2015, Mr. Ladouceur was committed to stand trial.
• On August 30, 2015, Mr. Ladouceur first appeared in Superior Court and requested adjournments while he explored legal aid issues.
• On February 15, 2016, a judicial pretrial was completed in Superior Court, and a trial date was set for January 9, 2017.
The Jordan Framework
[7] There is no doubt that Jordan changed the landscape with respect to an accused’s right to have charges stayed in the face of unreasonable delays that may have occurred within the Provincial Court or Superior Court proceedings. Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ., speaking for the majority, found that the previous approach in R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC) gave rise to both doctrinal and practical problems, contributing to a culture of delay and complacency towards it: Jordan, at para. 29.
[8] The majority listed four shortcomings with respect to the Morin framework at paras. 32-37, which can be summarized as follows:
• Its application is highly unpredictable;
• The treatment of prejudice is problematic;
• The analysis requires a retrospective inquiry;
• The Morin framework is unduly complex.
[9] The Court established a new framework for s. 11(b) applications. “At the heart of the new framework is a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is set at 18 months for cases going to trial in the provincial court, and at 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court”: Jordan, at para. 46. In setting out the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the majority suggested at para. 91:
Trial judges should not parse each day or month, as has been the common practice since Morin to determine whether each step was reasonably required. Instead, trial judges should step back from the minutiae and adopt a bird’s eye view of the case. All this said, this determination is a question of fact falling well within the expertise of the trial judge.
[10] The majority made it clear in Jordan that defence-waived or –defence caused delay does not count in calculating whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached: para. 49.
Transitional Rules
[11] The Court provided further that there was a transitional exception for cases in the system prior to July 8, 2016, when Jordan was released. For cases coming to trial and completed in less than 30 months (after defence delay is subtracted), there is an onus on the accused to show that the delay is unreasonable. For cases coming to trial after over 30 months, the onus lies with the Crown to prove exceptional circumstances: Jordan, at paras. 47-48. The Morin framework will still be of assistance to cases in this transitional period. “[I]f the delay was occasioned by an institutional delay that was reasonably acceptable in the relevant jurisdiction under the Morin framework before this decision was released, that institutional delay will be a component of the reasonable time requirements of the case for cases currently in the system”: Jordan, at para. 100.
Defence Delay
[12] I am satisfied that defence delay was a significant factor in the slow progress of this matter to its anticipated trial date. Defence delay was a factor to be considered by the courts in Morin and continues to be a factor as set out in Jordan. As Sopinka J. stated in Morin, at para. 39:
In this section I am concerned with the actions of the accused which are voluntarily undertaken…I do not wish to be interpreted as advocating that the accused sacrifice all preliminary procedures and strategies, but simply point out that if the accused chooses to take such action, this will be taken into account in determining what length of delay is reasonable.
[13] The majority in Morin went on to consider R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), where an accused changed his solicitor, and R. v. Bennett, 1991 CanLII 2701 (ON CA), where an accused re-elected the lower court, and it concluded at para. 40: “While the type of action of the accused in both these cases was unquestionably bona fide, each action contributed to the delay and must therefore be taken into consideration in determining whether the overall delay suffered by the accused was reasonable.”
[14] In Jordan, the majority stated at para. 60:
Application of this framework, as under the Morin framework, begins with calculating the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial. Once that is determined, delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted. The defence should not be allowed to benefit from its own delay causing conduct. As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin:
The purpose of s. 11(b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits.
[15] In Jordan, at para. 120, the majority held that the accused waived four months’ delay when he changed counsel shortly before the trial was set to begin and sought an adjournment. In R. v. Picard, 2016 ONSC 7061, 2016 CarswellOnt 18062, the accused fired his first counsel and eight months later, hired another counsel. In her analysis, Parfett J. deducted this total time period from the delay in determining the total delay for her analysis. In R. v. Gandhi, 2016 ONSC 5612, 2016 CarswellOnt 13863, at para. 43, Code J. held the accused caused approximately three months’ delay by rescheduling a judicial pre-trial as a result of discharging her first counsel and retaining new counsel.
[16] I calculate that the total defence delay created by Mr. Ladouceur’s termination of counsel is 205 days or six months and 25 days. Twenty-three days passed after Mr. Bryson was removed from the record. Sixty-five days passed after Ms. Shemesh was removed as solicitor of record. One hundred and seventeen days passed until Mr. Cugelman got off the record and Mr. Ruby went on the record. Mr. Ruby got off the record on August 14, 2014. Mr. Ladouceur re-elected to be tried by judge and jury two months later on October 8, 2014 and proceeded without counsel thereafter.
Section 11(b) Waivers
[17] The applicant, through his then counsel, expressed an s. 11(b) waiver on two occasions, on April 17, 2013 and on June 5, 2013. The issue was first addressed on April 17, 2013 when the original trial dates set for the Ontario Court of Justice were vacated in favour of resolution discussions. At that hearing, defence counsel, Mr. Cugelman, told the court, “It’s a fairly complicated matter. There’s a lot of disclosure and there’s quite a history. But the other thing, Your Honour, is that I have spoken briefly with my friend and I would like to sort of follow the resolution track.”
[18] The Crown consented and stated, “I think it’s in everybody’s best interest that Mr. Cugelman be properly instructed on this matter and perhaps we can try to resolve it. It’s a bit of a difficult issue.”
[19] No new date was set, but numerous appearances followed before the Ontario Court of Justice case management judge. On December 20, 2013, the justice raised the following flag, “So, Mr. Ladouceur, I think probably and the obvious concern is the passing of time.”
[20] On May 6, 2014, the Crown raised the following issue before the pre-trial justice, “My suggestion is we conduct a pretrial on the record and move this matter forward.” But no pre-trial took place on that date.
[21] While Mr. Cugelman was still retained, a number of attendances followed for the commencement of a pre-trial and continuation dates for the pre-trial after that. No new trial date was sought by the defence or the Crown. Mr. Cugelman was removed from the record on February 20, 2014. I am satisfied that the s. 11(b) waiver he requested terminated on that date, some 117 days (or three months and 27 days) after the waiver was requested. He then retained Mr. Ruby but 11(b) was not specifically addressed at the appearances that followed.
Re-election
[22] On October 8, 2014, Mr. Ladouceur re-elected, with Crown consent, to be tried by a judge and jury. The preliminary hearing began May 12, 2015, seven months and four days after the applicant’s re-election decision. In Jordan, the majority considered re-election from a Superior Court to a Provincial Court at para. 62 and noted: “To do so, the Crown’s consent must be obtained. Of course, it would generally be open to the Crown to ask the accused to waive the delay stemming from the re-election as a condition of its consent.”
[23] However, this case was proceeding at that point without the benefit of the guidance in Jordan. As the Crown noted in its factum at para. 17, “In the post-Jordan world, the Crown probably would not have consented to the applicant’s re-election to trial by judge and jury, nor have allowed the resolution discussions to go on as long as they did. But at the time the Crown’s good faith and diligences toward the applicant were a reasonable reliance on the prevailing state of the law.”
[24] I am satisfied that the delay of seven months and four days from re-election to the preliminary hearing should be considered defence delay.
Culture of Complacency
[25] In Jordan, the Court considered the culture of complacency that had arisen as a result of the Morin analysis. Complacency was certainly a factor in this case. Although trial dates were originally scheduled in the Ontario Court of Justice, that court did not attempt to set new trial dates while resolution discussions were ongoing. The defence vacated the trial dates and expressed a s. 11(b) waiver. The Crown was content to follow along with these resolution discussions. At no time did the defence ever seek or request a speedy trial date.
[26] In R. v. Manasseri, 2016 ONCA 703, 2016 CarswellOnt 14830, the Ontario Court of Appeal had an opportunity to review the Jordan analysis with respect to a case where the delay was an issue in a companion case, R. v. George Kenny. Manasseri and Kenny were charged on a joint-indictment. Considerable delay followed and the Crown took no steps to prevent the delay. On the other hand, Mr. Kenny brought two s. 11(b) applications and a severance application. At no time did Mr. Kenny waive any time periods. After considering these factors, the court granted a stay of the proceedings and stated at para. 365, “[t]he total delay in this case should have been found to be unreasonable under a Morin analysis.”
[27] In R. v. Loujack Café, Court File J13-4060, Ramsay J. deal with an application for a stay in circumstances where the accused had changed lawyers. In denying the application, Ramsay J. stated para. 24:
Essentially, then, this trial was delayed because the accused kept changing lawyers. The counsel chosen were all successful lawyers with busy practises. The delay beyond prima facie acceptable limits was solely caused or waived by the defence, as the case may be.
Prejudice to the Accused
[28] Mr. Ladouceur has not been in custody throughout these proceedings. Although inferred prejudice can be assumed for matters that take a long time to come to trial, there is no evidence of actual prejudice in this case.
Delay at the Superior Court
[29] On July 13, 2015, Mr. Ladouceur was committed to stand trial. His first appearance in Superior Court, Assignment Court, was on August 27, 2015, a period of approximately 45 days. In Superior Court before a trial date was set, there were a number of adjournments while Mr. Ladouceur was either seeking a lawyer or trying to deal with legal aid or considering a Rowbotham Application. Once it was clear that his legal aid appeal was not successful, a judicial pre-trial was completed and a trial date was set. However, these adjournments, at his request, delayed the judicial pre-trial and trial date setting by six months from August 27, 2015 to February 26, 2016. Mr. Ladouceur re-elected to be tried by a judge and jury on October 8, 2014. It did not raise any legal aid or Rowbotham issues until his first appearance in Superior Court on August 27, 2015. I therefore hold the applicant responsible for a delay of 180 days, or six months, in connection with his various adjournment requests in Superior Court. I would hold the applicant responsible for these delays while he was pursuing legal aid or pursuing a Rowbotham application. The trial date was set for January 17, 2017, over ten months after the judicial pre-trial. Trial dates that far in advance are not unusual in the Central East Region. There is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Ladouceur was requesting an earlier trial date.
[30] The time periods above noted can be summarized as follows:
(i) Defence delays re-termination of counsel - 205 days
(ii) Defence waiver of s. 11(b) rights - 303 days
(iii) Defence delay by way of re-election to a Preliminary Hearing - 214 days
(iv) Defence Delay in the Superior Court – 180 days
Total: 902 days, equivalent to 30 months.
[31] After consideration of the above noted factors, I would subtract 30 months from the 54 months, 21 days from arrest to trial completion. Therefore, the net time period required from arrest to trial completion is 24 months and 21 days.
A Bird’s-Eye View
[32] In Jordan, the Court suggested that trial judges take a bird’s eye view of cases where applications for a stay are brought. The following facts bear repeating: Mr. Ladouceur was charged on June 28, 2012. A trial date was originally scheduled in the Ontario Court of Justice for May 29 and June 3, 2013, less than one year later. These dates were vacated at his request. By October 8, 2014, he had discharged four counsel and was proceeding without counsel. As Moldaver J. stated in Jordan at para. 60, “The defence should not be allowed to benefit from its own delay causing conduct.” He then re-elected trial by judge and jury, effectively taking the case back to square one. When viewed through the lens of the transitional rules in Jordan, the Crown’s consent to this re-election was reasonable under the circumstances. His trial is scheduled to conclude on January 30, 2017. When all factors are considered, the net time to bring this matter to trial falls well within the Jordan factors.
Conclusion
[33] The defence application for a stay pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is dismissed.
Delivered orally on December 9, 2016
NOTE: This ruling, as delivered orally, is to be considered the official version and takes precedence over these written reasons read into the record. If there are any discrepancies between the oral version and this written version, it is the oral version that is the official record to be relied upon.
Schedule “A”
| Relevant Period | Event | Suggested Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| June 28th, 2012 – August 13, 2012 | Date of Arrest to Date of Disclosure. Disclosure was provided to counsel Thomas Bryson at the first appearance, August 13, 2012 | 1 month, 15 days (intake and initial disclosure) (Inherent – Neutral) |
| August 13, 2012 to September 10, 2012 | First Appearance is August 13, 2012. Applicant informed the Respondent on August 24, 2012 by email that he had fired Thomas Bryson. | 1 month – Inherent, Neutral |
| September 10, 2012 to October 3, 2012. | Bryson is formally removed from the record on September 10, 2012. Applicant requests a postponement to October 3, 2012 to obtain new counsel. | 23 days - Defence Delay |
| October 3, 2012 to October 24, 2012 | On October 3, 2012, Counsel Riley appears for Counsel Leora Shemesh. Postponed to October 24, 2012, TBST. | 3 Weeks (Inherent – Neutral) Unclear when Defence was first retained. |
| October 24, 2012 to November 19, 2012 | On October 24, 2012 counsel Stuffco appeared for counsel Leora Shemesh. Ms. Stuffco tells the court no Crown pre-trial had taken place. She asks to set the matter over to November 19, 2012 for JPT, with a Crown pre-trial to be held in the interim. | 1 Month - Inherent, Neutral |
| November 19, 2012 to February 6, 2013 | On November 19, 2012 JPT held and trial date set for May 29 and June 3, 2013. Set over to February 6, 2013 for status hearing. | 2 Months, 18 days – Inherent, Neutral |
| February 6, 2013 – February 20th, 2013 | On February 6, 2013, Leora Shemesh was removed as solicitor of record, due to a breakdown in the solicitor – client relationship. Postponed to February 20, 2012 for Status Hearing. | 2 Weeks - Defence Delay |
| February 20, 2013 – March 6, 2013 | On February 20, 2013 the Applicant requested a further 2 week postponement. PP to March 6, 2013. | 2 Weeks - Defence Delay |
| March 6, 2013 to March 20, 2013 | The information records that on March 6, 2013 no one appeared for the Applicant and a bench warrant was issued. PP’d to March 20, 2013 to be spoken to. | 2 Weeks - Defence Delay |
| March 20, 2013 to March 22, 2013 | On March 20, 2013 the Bench warrant was extended; PP’d to March 22, 2013, for a Status Hearing. | 2 Days – Defence Delay |
| March 22, 2013 to April 3, 2013 | On March 22, 2013 the matter was postponed to April 3, 2013 for Status Hearing, | 12 Days – Defence Delay |
| April 3, 2013 to April 17, 2013 | On April 13, 2013 the matter was postponed to April 17, 2013 for Status Hearing | 2 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| April 17, 2013 to May 8, 2013 | On April 17, 2013 Mr. Cugelman appeared for the Applicant. At the Applicant’s request the May 29 and June 3, 2013, trial dates were vacated, with a section 11(b) waiver. PP’d to May 8, 2013 TBST. | 3 weeks – Defence Delay |
| May 8, 2013 to June 5, 2013 | On May 8, 2013, Counsel for the Applicant requests 4 weeks to gather information towards a possible resolution. PP’d to June 5, 2013 TBST. | 4 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| June 5, 2013 to June 19, 2013 | On June 5 the matter is PP’d to June 19, 2013 to set a date. Section 11(b) is waived. | 2 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| June 19, 2013 to July 22, 2013 | On June 19, 2013 the matter is PP’d to July 22, 2013 for pre-trial. | 1 month, 3 days - Defence Delay |
| July 22, 2013 to September 12, 2013 | On July 22, 2013 the matter was PP’d to September 12, 2013 for continuation of the pre-trial. | 7 weeks, 3 days – Defence Delay |
| September 12, 2013 to October 17, 2013 | On September 12, 2013 the matter was PP’d to October 17, 2013 for continuation of the pre-trial. | 5 weeks - Defence delay |
| October 17, 2013 to October 28, 2013 | On October 17, 2013 the matter was postponed to October 28, 2013 for pre-trial continuation. The information indicates that the parties were not ready. | 11 days – Defence Delay |
| October 28, 2013 to November 18, 2013 | On October 28, 2013 the matter was postponed to November 18, 2013 to set a date. | 3 weeks – Defence Delay |
| November 18, 2013 to December 20, 2013 | On November 18, 2013 the matter was PP’d to December 20, 2013 to continue the pre-trial. | 1 month, 2 days – Defence Delay |
| December 20, 2013 to January 15, 2014 | On December 20, 2013 Mr. Cugelman told the court that due to some issues between him and the Applicant, he was unsure whether he would continue to represent the Applicant. He asked that he matter be set over to the second week of January in courtroom No. 9 to be spoken to. PP’d to January 15, 2014 TBST. | 3 weeks, 5 days – Defence Delay |
| January 15, 2014 to January 22, 2014 | On January 15, 2014 the matter was postponed to January 22, 2014, to be spoken to. | 1 week – Defence Delay |
| January 22, 2014 to February 20, 2014 | On January 22, 2014 the matter was postponed to February 20, 2014, for continuation of the JPT. | 29 Days – Defence Delay |
| February 20, 2014 to March 19, 2014 | On February 20, 2014 Mr. Cugelman re-confirmed what he had told the court on December 20, 2013, i.e. that there was a breakdown in the solicitor/ client relationship, and that he had no alternative but to ask the court’s leave to withdraw. The request is granted and the matter is set over for four weeks to allow the Applicant to seek new counsel. PP’d to March 19, 2014 in courtroom 9, to be spoken to. | 27 days – Defence Delay |
| March 19, 2014 to March 26, 2014 | On March 19, 2014, the matter was set over to March 26, 2014 for a pre-trial, with or without counsel. | 1 week – Defence Delay |
| March 26, 2014 to March 31, 2014 | On March 26, 2014, the matter was set over to March 31, 2014 for a status hearing or continuation of the pre-trial. The Applicant is assisted by duty counsel. | 5 days – Defence Delay |
| March 31, 2014 to April 7, 2014 | On March 31, 2014, the matter was set over to April 7, 2014, to be spoken to. The Applicant is assisted by duty counsel. | 1 week – Defence Delay |
| April 7, 2014 to May 6, 2014 | On April 7, 2014, the matter was set over to May 6, 2014, for judicial pre-trial. The Applicant is assisted by duty counsel. | 1 month – Defence Delay |
| May 6, 2014 to May 26, 2014 | On May 6, 2014 the Applicant appeared unrepresented. A pre-trial conference was held in the courtroom. The matter was then postponed to May 26, 2014, to be spoken to. In the meantime, the Applicant was to continue to search for a lawyer. | 3 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| May 26, 2014 to June 16, 2014 | On May 26, 2014, the Applicant appeared unrepresented. The matter was set over to June 14, 2014 to set a date for trial. | 3 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| June 16, 2014 to July 15, 2014 | On June 16, 2014, law clerk McKinnon appeared for defence counsel Clayton Ruby. Mr. Ruby had just recently been retained. Matter is set over to July 15, 2014 for new counsel to review disclosure, and for continuation of the pre-trial. | 1 month – Defence Delay |
| July 15, 2014 to August 11, 2014 | On July 15, 2014 the matter was set over to August 11, 2014 for continuation of the judicial pre-trial. | 4 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| August 11, 2014 to August 14, 2014 | On August 11, Mr. Ruby appeared, and both he and Crown counsel indicated to the court that they were waiting to hear from PPSC counsel in London on a possible resolution of the forfeiture issue. The matter is set over to August 14, 2014 for clarification of the forfeiture issue and possible resolution. Mr. Ruby is given leave to withdraw as counsel for the Applicant. | 3 Days – Crown Delay |
| August 14, 2014 to September 17, 2014 | On August 14, 2014 the matter was set over to September 17, 2014 to be spoken to. From the September 17, 2014 transcript it appears that the Crown position on forfeiture had still not been articulated on August 14th. The Applicant continues to be unrepresented. | 1 month, 4 days - Crown Delay |
| September 17, 2014 to October 8, 2014 | On September 17, 2014, the Crown confirmed that it was seeking full forfeiture of the Applicant’s house upon conviction. The Applicant was not in agreement with the proposed forfeiture. The possibility of a plea, with a forfeiture hearing to follow, remained a live issue. The Applicant sought a postponement to discuss it with counsel Mr. Hasan, who was not solicitor of record, but who the Applicant could consult for legal advice. PP’d to October 8, 2014 to be spoken to. | 3 Weeks – Defence Delay |
| October 8, 2014 to May 12, 2015 | On October 8, 2014, with Crown consent, the Applicant re-elected trial by judge and jury with a preliminary inquiry. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 12, 2015. The Applicant was assisted by duty counsel on October 8, 2014, but acknowledged that the preliminary hearing would proceed with or without counsel. | 7 Months, 4 days – The Crown’s position is that this entire time period should be considered Defence Delay. |
| May 12, 2015 to July 13, 2015 | Preliminary hearing does not finish on May 12, 2015. Set over for continuation to July 13, 2015. | 2 Months – Inherent; Neutral |
| July 13, 2015 to August 27, 2015 | On July 13, 2015 the Applicant was committed to stand trial on the counts set out in the Indictment. The matter was set over to August 27, 2015 in Superior Court (Assignment Court). | 1 Month, 2 weeks – Inherent; Neutral |
| August 27, 2015 – October 23, 2015 | At the first appearance in Superior Court on August 27, 2015, the Applicant sought a postponement to seek a lawyer. The matter was postponed to October 23, 2015. | 1 month, 26 days – Defence Delay |
| October 23, 2015 to December 11, 2015 | On October 23, 2015 the Applicant told the court that he had checked all avenues, but was unable to retain counsel due to his financial circumstances. The possibility of another application to Legal Aid was discussed. Justice Fuerst also informed the Applicant that if Legal Aid was denied he had the option to bring a Rowbotham application for state-funded legal representation. The matter was postponed to December 11, 2015 for a status report. | 1 month, 18 days – Defence Delay |
| December 11, 2015 to January 8, 2016 | On December 11, 2015 the Applicant reported that he had contacted Legal Aid, and sent them some information. He was awaiting a decision on representation. The matter was postponed to January 8, 2016 for a status report. | 4 weeks – Defence Delay |
| January 8, 2016 to January 15, 2016 | On January 8, 2016 the Applicant reported that he had had no contact with Legal Aid since the last court appearance. The matter was set over one week to January 15, 2016 for status report. | 1 Week – Defence Delay |
| January 15, 2016 to February 26, 2016 | On January 15, 2016 it was confirmed that the Applicant’s Legal Aid application was rejected, and would not be reconsidered. Fuerst, RSJ told the Applicant that a Rowbotham application was still a possibility. The matter was set over to February 26, 2016 for judicial pre-trial. | 1 Month, 11 days – Defence Delay |
| February 26, 2016 to January 17, 2017 | On February 26, 2016 the judicial pre-trial was completed, and a target date for trial, January 9, 2017, was obtained. (This date was later confirmed). The estimated length of the trial is 7 days, thus the trial is expected to end on January 17, 2017. | 8 months, 3 weeks – Inherent; Neutral |