Ian Paul

The applicant brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging her rights were violated because a search warrant for her residence was issued after the justice of the peace received unsworn, unrecorded clarification from the affiant over the phone.

The court found that the affiant only reiterated information already contained in the sworn Information to Obtain (ITO) and did not provide any new information.

The court concluded that the warrant could have been issued based solely on the sworn ITO, and therefore no s. 8 Charter breach occurred.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of production of cannabis, possession of psilocybin for the purpose of trafficking, and multiple firearms offences, including possession of restricted firearms and breaching a lifetime prohibition order.

The offences arose from a commercial drug operation on his rural property where police found a large quantity of drugs and 12 operable firearms.

The court declined to reduce the sentence for technical Charter breaches but granted credit for restrictive pre-sentence bail conditions.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 5 years in custody, comprising 12 months for the drug offences and 4 years consecutive for the firearms offences.

The accused was charged with manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and conspiracy to smuggle humans into the United States after his overloaded Sea-Doo capsized in the St. Lawrence River, resulting in the drowning deaths of two Indian nationals.

The court acquitted the accused of the conspiracy charge, finding insufficient evidence that he knew or was wilfully blind to the human smuggling operation, as he likely believed he was transporting marijuana.

However, the court found the accused guilty of two counts of criminal act manslaughter and breach of probation, concluding that operating an overloaded vessel without life jackets or proper training constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person.

In a pre-trial application, the accused challenged the admissibility of several statements and the validity of a search warrant for hospital records following a fatal Sea-Doo accident.

The court ruled that the accused's initial statement to a police officer and a subsequent statement to a paramedic were admissible, finding no Charter breaches or reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, a later statement to a police corporal was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police failed to inform the accused of a new conspiracy charge and denied him a second opportunity to consult counsel, breaching his s. 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court upheld the search warrant for the accused's hospital records, finding sufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain even after excising the excluded statement.

The Crown applied to admit into evidence the out-of-court statements of an absconding witness and the maximum capacity limits section of a Sea-Doo owner/operator manual for the truth of their contents.

The charges involved criminal negligence causing death and human smuggling after a Sea-Doo capsized, resulting in two drownings.

The court dismissed the application to admit the witness statements, finding that while necessity was met due to the witness's unavailability, threshold reliability was not established because the inability to cross-examine the witness resulted in significant prejudice to the accused.

The court also dismissed the application to admit the manual, ruling it was hearsay and lacked evidence of reliability.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion seeking to exclude firearms and drugs seized from his rural property during a police search.

He argued that the search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations in the ITO and that police breached his Charter rights by trespassing on a neighbour's property to conduct surveillance.

The court found no material misrepresentations in the ITO and held that the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy on the neighbour's property.

Although the court found minor s. 8 breaches regarding a late report to a justice and a defective copy of the warrant, it concluded under s. 24(2) that the evidence should be admitted.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with fraud, uttering forged documents, and falsifying employment records.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to an infringement of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of the trial was 45.5 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 38 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found no exceptional circumstances or transitional exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after striking her ex-partner in his left eye during an argument.

The complainant had a pre-existing condition that caused his left eye to bulge and required him to wear protective glasses.

The blow ruptured the eye, ultimately necessitating its surgical removal and replacement with a prosthetic.

The court found that the accused intentionally applied force without consent, that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of bodily harm, and that the resulting loss of the eye constituted permanent disfigurement.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to adduce evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The proposed evidence concerned a previous incident of consensual “rough sex,” including biting and scratching, which the defence argued was relevant to credibility and necessary to understand the nature of the parties’ relationship in support of a consent defence.

The court held the proposed evidence effectively relied on the prohibited inference that because the complainant previously consented to similar activity, she was more likely to have consented on the charged occasion.

The court further found the evidence lacked sufficient relevance and significant probative value under s. 276(2) and that the factors in s. 276(3) weighed against admission.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought release pending trial on a charge of second degree murder under s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered detention under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds in s. 515(10) following a reverse-onus bail application under s. 522.

Evidence included the applicant’s extensive criminal record for breaches, her presence at the homicide scene, forensic evidence linking her footwear and clothing to the victim’s blood, and her conduct before and after the alleged offence.

The proposed release plan involved residence at a supervised disability facility with her brother acting as surety.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to discharge her onus on all three grounds, finding a significant risk of non-attendance, public safety concerns, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offence and strength of the evidence.