Michael Moon

The accused, charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 1,427 days (approximately 47 months).

The primary issue was whether certain periods of delay should be attributed to the defence, including adjournments for bail, a change of election to the Ontario Court of Justice, and a subsequent re-election to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court found that while the defence was responsible for some delay, the net delay was 1,027 days (approximately 34 months), which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

As the Crown did not rely on any exceptional circumstances, the court found a violation of s. 11(b) and entered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, charged with armed robbery and related offences, brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The anticipated delay to the end of trial was 34 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the delay was caused by the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and periods of defence delay.

The court also found that the Crown acted reasonably in refusing to sever the accused's trials.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder after stabbing his grandfather to death and severely injuring his grandmother.

The accused admitted to the acts but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

While the court accepted expert evidence that the accused suffered from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder at the time of the offences, it rejected the defence experts' opinions that he was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that the accused's post-offence conduct, which included fleeing the scene, hiding, and attempting to destroy evidence, demonstrated a rational capacity to appreciate that his actions were wrong according to societal standards.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.

The applicant, an innocent bystander injured during a police shooting, sought an order of mandamus to compel the Director of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to conduct a proper investigation and lay charges against the officers.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that because the SIU is a creation of a provincial statute (the Police Services Act), the application must proceed by way of judicial review before the Divisional Court under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The application was dismissed without prejudice.

The respondent, facing a first-degree murder charge, subpoenaed a federal Crown counsel who had previously stayed a drug charge against him.

The respondent sought to question the Crown counsel about his reasons for staying the charge to support an abuse of process argument regarding the admission of disreputable conduct evidence.

The Crown counsel brought a certiorari application to quash the subpoena.

The Superior Court held that while the court clerk properly issued the subpoena based on defence counsel's representations, the subpoena must be quashed because the respondent failed to establish that the Crown counsel likely had material evidence to give, as prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be exercised properly absent evidence of bad faith.