Right to counsel

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol level of 80 milligrams or greater following a motor vehicle stop at a roadblock in Caledon, Ontario.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging a breach of his right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant was properly advised of his right to counsel both at the roadside and at the police station, and that any implementation issues were not communicated to police or were resolved to the defendant's satisfaction.

The court rejected the defendant's credibility as unreliable and found him guilty on both counts, staying the over-80 charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" following a RIDE stop in Mississauga where he registered a fail on an approved screening device.

At trial, the Crown sought to rely on breath samples showing readings of 130 and 120 mg/100mL.

The defence raised three Charter arguments: (1) that the Crown failed to establish the concentration of the alcohol standard solution for the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) was breached by failing to facilitate his request to contact a friend to obtain his lawyer of choice and by "funnelling" him toward duty counsel; and (3) that the accused's right to be free from arbitrary detention under s. 9 was breached by being held for approximately two hours after the breath tests without a timely assessment of his suitability for release.

The court found breaches of s. 10(b) and s. 9, and excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate the vehicle, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that the accused drove erratically, veering into oncoming traffic on multiple occasions.

His partner called 911 reporting suspected impairment.

Police attended and the accused was transported to the hospital.

An approved screening device test was administered en route, which the accused failed.

Formal breath tests at the hospital yielded readings of 280 milligrams.

The accused challenged the legality of the police conduct, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected all Charter challenges and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours after ceasing to operate a conveyance, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand and alleged breaches of his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to demand a roadside sample based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's dazed appearance, slow and deliberate movements, and apparent hand-eye coordination difficulties following a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court also found no breach of the accused's s. 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated understanding of his rights and provided cogent responses to questioning.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine (2 counts), possession of marijuana, failure to comply with recognizance – curfew condition, and failure to comply with recognizance – possession of drugs.

The accused was self-represented at trial after multiple counsel withdrew or were removed.

The Crown's case relied on surveillance evidence, the discovery of a kilogram brick of cocaine in the vehicle and four baggies of cocaine on the accused's person, and expert evidence regarding drug trafficking.

The court addressed multiple Charter issues including searches incident to arrest, right to counsel, and change in jeopardy.

The court found all searches lawful, no Charter breaches, and convicted the accused on all counts based on circumstantial evidence establishing knowledge and control of the cocaine.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood within two hours of operating a motor vehicle, arising from erratic driving on Bathurst Street.

The Crown called civilian witnesses and police officers.

The accused challenged identification as the driver, the sufficiency of evidence of impairment, and raised multiple Charter violations.

The court found the accused was the driver beyond a reasonable doubt and that his breath readings exceeded the legal limit.

However, the court found insufficient evidence of impairment without expert evidence relating breath readings to impairment.

All Charter applications were dismissed.

The accused was convicted on the over-80 count and acquitted on the impaired count.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a trial on December 19, 2019, the court reserved judgment.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The court also raised concerns about section 7 and 11(d) Charter violations based on the credibility and reliability of the police officer's testimony.

The section 10(b) application was dismissed, but the court found that the officer's misleading and evasive testimony during trial constituted an abuse of process violating sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

As a result, the breath evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples showing blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

However, the court found that the arresting officer lacked objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, breaching the accused's rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Additionally, the police failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) by ignoring his explicit request to call his mother to obtain his lawyer's contact information.

The court excluded the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breaches were serious and the impact on the accused's rights was significant.

Both the impaired operation and excess blood alcohol charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (driving with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood) on December 17, 2017.

The defence raised Charter arguments alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and challenged the constitutional validity of the presumption of identity in transitional cases when paired with the new presumption of accuracy.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and the constitutional challenge, finding no violations of the defendant's rights and that the presumptions of identity and accuracy operate on parallel tracks without conflict in transitional cases.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample after police responded to a noise complaint at her residence.

The accused was found sitting in the driver's seat of a van in her driveway with the keys in the ignition and beer cans in the centre console.

The trial judge found that while the accused was in the driver's seat and had consumed alcohol, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was impaired or that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The judge also found that the breath demand was not made in unequivocal terms and therefore did not constitute a valid demand.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The Crown established that the accused was the driver of the damaged vehicle through circumstantial evidence, including possession of car keys, proximity to the vehicle, and flight from the scene.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding sections 8, 9, and 10(b), finding that the 13-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel was a technical breach with no serious impact.

The court also rejected the defence argument that the accused's subsequent offer to provide a breath sample after being charged negated the refusal offence, finding the offer was not genuine and the officer was justified in declining it.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed all Charter applications and found the breath samples admissible and reliable.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the approved screening device demand, the officer's misstatement regarding calibration did not undermine reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, there was no realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the ASD arrived, and the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 mgs following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated when police offered duty counsel in Mandarin rather than permitting the defendant to use his cell phone to search for a lawyer of his choice; and (2) whether the arrest and approved instrument demand violated sections 8 and 9 Charter rights due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The defendant's primary concern was obtaining legal advice in Mandarin, which was satisfied by duty counsel.

The officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious accident, evidence of alcohol consumption, and observable signs of impairment.

The defendant was convicted of both offences.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in a parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results.

The defendant, self-represented, raised a Charter breach under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant had clearly requested to speak to his counsel of choice, Reid Rusonik of the Reid Pinkofsky firm, but the officer failed to adequately facilitate this request.

Although the defendant eventually spoke to duty counsel, the officer's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact the defendant's counsel of choice constituted a serious Charter violation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown obtained a roadside breath sample via an Approved Screening Device following a traffic stop.

The defence challenged whether the demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code and whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were violated.

The trial judge found that an informal demand was made within seconds of the officer forming reasonable suspicion, followed by a formal demand minutes later.

The delay in administering the test was found to be reasonably necessary given the time required to obtain the screening device.

The accused's right to counsel was not violated as there was insufficient time to realistically consult counsel before the test.

The trial judge convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in his body and breaching a release condition prohibiting alcohol consumption.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) was breached.

The officer detained the accused following a traffic stop for excessive speeding and, upon discovering the smell of alcohol on his breath, requested an Alcohol Screening Device.

The officer did not inform the accused of his right to counsel during the approximately 8-9 minute wait for the device to arrive, despite the accused having a cell phone with his lawyer's contact information.

The court found that a realistic opportunity existed for the accused to consult counsel before providing a breath sample, and that the officer failed to comply with his implementational obligation under section 10(b).

Consequently, the breath sample results were excluded as evidence obtained in violation of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol after being stopped leaving a licensed establishment in Markham in the early morning hours of October 23, 2014.

The accused failed a roadside screening device test and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 153 and 139 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing breaches of section 10(b) (right to counsel) and section 9 (protection against arbitrary detention).

The court rejected both Charter applications and found the accused guilty of the offence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and sexual touching of a person under 16 years contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, alleged to have occurred in January 2013.

The trial proceeded over multiple court appearances spanning 17 months.

The accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The court further found that the accused's rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated due to abuse of process resulting from the Crown's breach of undertakings given at the judicial pre-trial and the failures of Legal Aid Ontario.

The court also found a violation of section 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay caused by the actions of the prosecuting Crown and Legal Aid Ontario.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied to exclude the results of a breath analysis on Charter grounds.

The court found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter in two respects: (1) the arresting officer failed to advise the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying seven minutes to conduct other investigative steps; and (2) the breath technician failed to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel after the accused expressed mistrust of the duty counsel he had consulted.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing systemic problems within the Peel Regional Police regarding compliance with the immediacy requirement of section 10(b).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a motor vehicle collision on February 8, 2012.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial involved Charter voir dire issues regarding the lawfulness of the breath demand and the accused's right to counsel.

The court found violations of the accused's rights under sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the breath sample evidence.

On the merits, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving but convicted him of dangerous driving based on evidence of cell phone use while driving.