Impaired driving

The appellant was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample after she unequivocally refused a roadside demand.

She appealed, arguing the demand was invalid because the police officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) with him and there was no evidence one could be made available 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code is complete upon an outright refusal to a valid demand.

The Crown is not required to prove that an ASD was present or could have been made available forthwith when the accused has already categorically refused to comply.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The appellant argued the appeal judge made a clear error of law.

The Court of Appeal found no error, agreeing with the appeal judge that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to apply the proper legal principles from Stellato, specifically that any degree of impairment is sufficient and that fatigue does not foreclose the effect of alcohol.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving (care or control).

The trial judge found that the appellant, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle and had control of the keys, repeatedly asked a passerby for a rope to pull his car back onto the road.

The Court of Appeal held there was adequate evidence to support the finding that the appellant created a risk of putting the car in motion while impaired, thereby creating a danger to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge gave insufficient reasons regarding the common sense inference that people consume alcohol at a normal pace.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge had properly considered the inference but found insufficient evidence to assess its implications based on the Crown expert's report.

The respondent was acquitted at trial of having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The trial judge found that the respondent had started his car with a remote starter, was scraping ice off the window, had the keys in his pocket, and intended to drive away, but concluded there was no present danger because he had not entered the vehicle.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact compelled the legal conclusion that the respondent was in care or control, as his conduct created an obvious risk of danger.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm after his truck collided with a van.

He fled the scene and claimed he consumed alcohol only after returning home.

The trial judge rejected his evidence, drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his mother and a friend to corroborate his post-accident drinking, and finding he lied about a conversation based on a misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the evidence and improperly drawing an adverse inference against the accused for failing to call confirmatory evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, while the sentence appeal for failing to remain and public mischief was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and advised of her right to counsel at the roadside, including the right to free legal advice 'right now'.

She declined to call a lawyer and was not re-advised of her rights upon arriving at the police station.

The trial judge convicted her, but the summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal, finding the roadside caution misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the use of the word 'now' properly conveys the immediacy of the right to counsel and does not require the officer to specify that the call will be made from the police station.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The trial judge had found that there was a risk of danger because the respondent might continue her journey once her vehicle was pulled from the ditch.

The Court of Appeal held that this finding was open to the trial judge on the evidence and that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in interfering with it.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

His blood alcohol readings were over three times the legal limit, and this was his third drinking and driving offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and upheld the lifetime driving prohibition, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision regarding an offence for which a stay of proceedings had been entered, leaving an impaired driving conviction untouched.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no legal issue of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave under section 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'blowing over' and his sentence of 3.5 years' imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition.

He argued the breathalyzer tests were not administered 'as soon as practicable' due to a 37-minute delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the delay was reasonably explained by another driver using the machine and that the trial judge made no factual error.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant had thirteen prior drinking and driving convictions, justifying the sentence and lifetime prohibition.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 90 days intermittent, probation, and a five-year driving prohibition for an impaired driving offence.

The trial judge had imposed the 90-day sentence under the mistaken belief that the appellant had two prior qualifying convictions, making 90 days the mandatory minimum.

The Crown acknowledged that the actual mandatory minimum was 14 days but argued the 90-day sentence should be sustained.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the appellant's compliance with strict bail conditions for four years, and reduced the custodial sentence to 20 days intermittent.

The accused appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned her acquittal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the summary conviction appeal court judge's order, and restored the acquittal.

The trial judge had found that the arresting officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights and implicitly found the officer stopped the accused selectively for an improper purpose.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the breath results.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding his convictions for impaired driving and blowing over.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the appellant's evidence regarding the amount he drank and appropriately evaluated the evidence for each charge independently.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', raising two grounds.

First, he argued the roadside demand was invalid because the officer did not use the word 'forthwith', which was dismissed based on recent jurisprudence.

Second, he argued his section 7 Charter rights were violated because the technician failed to keep a printout of an aborted second breath sample analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, a qualified technician may determine in good faith that a sample is unsuitable and demand a further sample.

The results of the aborted analysis of an inadequate sample could not have assisted the defence.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving, obstructing a peace officer, failing to stop, and public mischief after causing a collision on Highway 401 and falsely reporting her vehicle as stolen.

She appealed her convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's prior inconsistent videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, the error did not warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence against her.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the conviction for obstructing a peace officer, as it arose from the same false report as the public mischief charge.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the conviction, including the appellant's admission of drinking and blacking out, the odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of the collision with a bus.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for an impaired driving offence.

He argued that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer articulated grounds that fully satisfied the requirement and that the trial judge reasonably found the officer took into account that the motor was running.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by a summary conviction appeal court on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The respondent had been stopped for erratic driving, admitted to being high on drugs, and gave an ambiguous response when advised of his right to counsel.

He subsequently failed a roadside screening device test and a breathalyzer test.

The Court of Appeal restored the trial judge's conviction on the over 80 charge, finding no breach of the respondent's right to counsel, and conditionally stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle.