Human trafficking

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of a complainant who relocated to the United States and refused to testify at trial.

The statements included a sworn video statement to police and testimony from a preliminary hearing.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that necessity was established due to the witness's unavailability and refusal to testify.

The court held that the sworn video statement met the threshold for reliability based on procedural and substantive factors, including extensive corroborative evidence.

The video statement was admitted for the truth of its contents, while the preliminary hearing testimony was ruled admissible only at the instance of the defence to challenge credibility and reliability.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, applied for a bail review to vary his release conditions to allow him to work in the music business.

The court found an error of law in the lower court's imposition of the strictest form of release, including full house arrest and electronic monitoring, despite finding the primary ground was not a concern and the Crown's case was only moderately strong.

The court varied the conditions to add a third surety, allow exceptions to the curfew for work in Ontario, and deleted the electronic monitoring requirement.

The two accused were found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

Augustin was also found guilty of receiving a material benefit from human trafficking and procuring.

The accused exercised significant control over the complainant, forcing her to provide sexual services to numerous men in inhumane conditions and taking all her earnings.

The court sentenced Augustin to 8 years imprisonment (less 11 months credit) and St. Armand to 5 years imprisonment (less 6 months credit), noting the severe impact on the victim and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including human trafficking, assault, theft of a motor vehicle, and firearms offences.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of a single complainant, a sex trade worker with a severe cocaine addiction.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be riddled with internal and external inconsistencies, largely due to her admitted drug intoxication and trauma.

Text messages between the complainant and the accused contradicted her claims of fear and control.

Consequently, the court found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and reliability, resulting in an acquittal on all counts.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and prostitution-related offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of sections 286.3 and 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision that declared the provisions unconstitutional.

The court declined to follow the prior decision, finding it plainly wrong in its conclusion that Parliament allowed the sale of sexual services.

Instead, the court followed other concurrent decisions upholding the provisions, ruling that the trial would proceed and the constitutional challenge would be fully litigated after the evidence is called.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code to access approximately $133,000 in restrained funds held in their corporation's bank account to pay for living and legal expenses.

The court found the applicants had an interest in the funds and lacked sufficient other means to pay their legal fees, though they did not need the funds for living expenses.

However, because the corporation owed approximately $67,000 in unremitted HST, which is deemed to be held in trust for the Crown under the Excise Tax Act, the court only released the remaining $66,000 to the applicants' counsel to fund their defence.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with human trafficking, sexual assault, and domestic assault, sought a bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new culturally appropriate supervision plan and an error in law by the initial justice who failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

Applying the ladder principle and considering the applicant's Indigenous background, the court found the proposed plan, which included residence at a Native men's shelter and supervision by the Toronto Bail Program, sufficiently addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

The appellant renewed his application for release pending appeal based on a material change in circumstances.

He raised a new ground of appeal arguing the trial judge erred in applying s. 276 of the Criminal Code to prevent cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior experience as a sex worker in a human trafficking prosecution.

The motion judge found this new ground had a realistic prospect of success, elevating the importance of reviewability.

The appellant was granted release on conditions including house arrest and electronic surveillance.

The applicant, having been convicted of human trafficking and obstruction of justice, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds but contested the tertiary ground.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his release would not harm public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the offences, the weakness of the proposed grounds of appeal, his prior breach of bail conditions, and an inadequate release plan.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in persons and theft, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the definition of exploitation, prior inconsistent statements, and psychological safety, and erred by amending the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the amendment caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent to credit the appellant for 14 days of pre-trial custody, reducing his sentence to 29 months and 7 days.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, sexual assault, assault, and drug trafficking offences involving a 16-year-old complainant and her friends.

The Crown alleged the accused groomed the complainant to become her pimp.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove the accused exercised control or direction over the complainant's movements for the purpose of exploitation, resulting in acquittals on the human trafficking and related prostitution charges.

However, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, assault, trafficking in cocaine, and trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, procuring, unlawful confinement, and assault relating to her relationship with a 20-year-old woman with an intellectual disability.

The Crown alleged the accused forced the complainant into prostitution, controlled her finances, and physically assaulted her.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be internally inconsistent and unreliable.

The court concluded the complainant voluntarily engaged in prostitution and was not controlled or threatened by the accused.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

On an application to exclude an accused's police statement in a prosecution involving alleged human trafficking and sexual offences against underage complainants, the court found breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

Although the accused had been advised he was under arrest for human trafficking and had spoken with counsel, police later questioned him extensively about sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching without advising him that those offences were under investigation or renewing his right to counsel in relation to that changed jeopardy.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the breach was serious, significantly impaired the accused's informed choice and right against self-incrimination, and exclusion would not undermine adjudication on the merits because other evidence remained available.

Specified portions of the statement were excluded.

The Crown applied to introduce expert opinion evidence and discreditable conduct evidence at the accused's trial for human trafficking and prostitution-related offences.

The court admitted the expert evidence of a police detective regarding the prostitution subculture, finding it necessary to assist the jury in understanding the complainant's behaviour.

However, the court excluded evidence of the accused's prior convictions for similar offences, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value due to a lack of distinctive similarities.

The court delivered a mixed ruling on the admissibility of various pictures and social media posts found on the accused's devices, admitting those directly relevant to the charges while excluding those that merely suggested a bad character.

The court convicted the accused of multiple human trafficking, procuring, sexual assault, assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and recognizance breach offences arising from a prolonged exploitative relationship in which the complainant was groomed, controlled, prostituted, and physically abused for the accused's financial benefit.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory account as unbelievable and found the complainant credible and reliable notwithstanding her traumatic background, substance abuse history, criminal record, and delayed disclosure.

The court held that exploitation under the trafficking provisions includes psychological harm and that consent was no defence to the trafficking-related charges.

External corroboration from photographs, video surveillance, police observations, and medical evidence strongly supported the complainant's account of the final assault.

The accused was acquitted only on the animal injury count due to evidentiary uncertainty.

The accused was convicted of human trafficking, assault, uttering death threats, and related offences involving a young woman.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record, particularly concerning violence against women, and his lack of respect for court orders.

Applying the Tang factors, the court noted the accused exerted control through violence and financial dependency, though the operation was small.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years, granting 25 months of credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 35 months to serve.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

The accused stood trial on multiple charges including human trafficking, sexual assault, and prostitution-related offences involving three young women.

The Crown alleged the accused exploited the complainants' drug addictions to force them into prostitution.

The court found the evidence of the two adult complainants unreliable due to severe crack cocaine addiction and inconsistencies, and accepted the accused's evidence that he was merely their drug dealer, resulting in acquittals on those counts.

However, the court convicted the accused of attempting to procure a 16-year-old complainant into prostitution and breaching his recognizance by being alone with her.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay 17 charges, including human trafficking, against the respondent.

The trial judge found that police had fabricated evidence by planting false identification in the respondent's wallet and that an officer lied about it in testimony, constituting an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his conclusion that the egregious police conduct warranted a stay of proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.