A.D. Kurke

The plaintiff tripped and fell at the defendant hospital, which admitted liability for the hazard.

The plaintiff claimed the physical injuries from the fall prevented her from caring for her terminally ill husband at home, forcing his return to the hospital where he died.

She sought damages for severe psychological injury (PTSD) stemming from her guilt over failing to fulfill his dying wish.

The court dismissed the claim, finding the plaintiff failed to establish factual causation, as her physical pain likely resulted from the unreasonable strain of caring for her husband alone, and her psychological symptoms were more likely attributable to pre-existing depression and complex bereavement.

The court further held that the alleged chain of causation was too remote to establish legal foreseeability.

The applicant, a lawyer, brought an application seeking a judicial inquiry into the conduct of opposing counsel, who had reported concerns about the applicant's mental health and competence to the Law Society of Ontario.

The applicant also sought to stay the Law Society's investigation.

The court summarily dismissed the application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01, finding it had no jurisdiction to order a judicial inquiry and that the Law Society is the proper forum for determining a lawyer's competence.

The appellant, a former police chief, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a subordinate officer.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting defence expert evidence on document sequencing of the complainant's notebook and by misapplying the W.(D.) test when assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to reject the expert evidence as unreliable and had properly applied the W.(D.) framework in finding the complainant's evidence compelling and rejecting the appellant's bare denial.

The applicant mother sought ongoing and retroactive child and spousal support after unilaterally relocating with the children from British Columbia to Ontario.

The respondent father, who incurred extraordinary expenses to exercise parenting time across the country, sought a reduction in support and the imputation of income to the applicant.

The court imputed a minimum wage income to the applicant, terminated spousal support as of December 31, 2022, and capped the respondent's income at $150,000 for child support purposes under section 4 of the Guidelines to account for his high access costs.

The respondent was ordered to pay $103,204 in retroactive child support, while the applicant was ordered to repay $8,645 in overpaid spousal support.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and related offences, brought an application for further disclosure of materials related to the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant.

The accused sought these materials to challenge the grounds for his arrest outside the searched apartment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested materials, including confidential informant notes and database searches, were clearly irrelevant to the grounds for arrest and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking offences, sought standing to challenge a police search of an apartment where he was staying and the seizure of items from his person upon arrest outside.

The court applied the Edwards factors and found the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, as he was merely a houseguest with no control over the premises.

However, the court granted standing to challenge the seizure of drugs and money found on or near his person at the time of his arrest.

The self-represented appellant, an OPCA litigant, was convicted of failing to appear in court.

During his trial, the judge excluded him from the courtroom twice due to his obstructionist and pseudo-legal behaviour, invoking s. 650(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

After the Crown closed its case, the trial judge immediately proceeded to find the appellant guilty without offering him the opportunity to make full answer and defence under s. 650(3).

On appeal, the Superior Court found that while the exclusion was justified, the failure to offer the appellant the opportunity to present a defence constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was tried on a 5-count indictment involving his former intimate partner, including charges of sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, intimidation, and breach of probation.

The court applied the W.(D.) test to assess credibility, finding the accused's evidence unreliable and contrived.

While the court acquitted the accused of sexual assault due to reasonable doubt arising from inconsistencies and lack of detail in the complainant's evidence, it convicted him on the remaining counts.

The court found the accused frequently physically assaulted the complainant, engaged in threatening conduct that reasonably caused her fear, and attempted to intimidate her by threatening to call immigration authorities to have her deported.

The plaintiff corporation brought an action alleging conspiracy, fraud, and negligence against various defendants, including a law firm and the Ontario Provincial Police, arising from the transfer of a property following a power of sale.

The remaining defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court granted the motions, finding that the pleadings lacked the heightened particularity required for allegations of fraud and conspiracy, and failed to establish any duty of care owed by the police or the law firm to the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the claim against the police was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide the mandatory 60 days' written notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

Leave to amend was denied as the fundamental defects could not be cured.

Two applications were brought to determine the boundary between properties in Lot 16, Concessions 9 and 10 in the Township of Gordon.

The applicant Walker claimed ownership based on mathematical survey lines, while the respondents and the applicant Bainborough argued that an antique fence marked the true boundary.

The court applied the hierarchy of boundary evidence, finding that the historical fence, which had been accepted by previous landowners for decades, was the best evidence of the original boundary.

The court also found that Walker's claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

Walker's application was dismissed, and the fence was declared the true boundary.

The moving defendants in a medical malpractice action sought an order compelling the plaintiffs to produce child welfare files from the Children's Aid Society and Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, arguing the plaintiffs undertook to produce them at discovery.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing the undertakings were subject to relevance and privilege, and that the files were highly sensitive and irrelevant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the undertakings were qualified and that production of the entire child welfare files was disproportionate and highly prejudicial given the speculative relevance to the damages claims.

The applicant, charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter, applied for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued there was no evidence proving he was the person who committed the offences.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the identity of the name on the information and the name testified to by the complainant constituted sufficient evidence for committal.

Furthermore, the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant certiorari because defence counsel had tactically failed to raise the identification issue or file a mandatory statement of issues at the preliminary inquiry.

The moving party sought to enforce an unsigned settlement agreement arising from a dispute over the validity of competing wills.

The moving party argued that an agreement on the essential terms had been reached through correspondence between counsel.

The responding parties opposed the motion, arguing that counteroffers were still being made and no final agreement was reached.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no meeting of the minds on all essential terms and that the responding parties never agreed to the terms in the draft minutes of settlement.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased businessman, alleging he made an oral personal promise to pay a $330,432 debt owed to the plaintiff by an insolvent company he controlled.

The plaintiff claimed it provided consideration by forbearing from litigation and continuing to supply parts.

The court dismissed the claim, finding that the deceased only explained his intention to recapitalize the company from the sale of another business, which did not constitute a binding contract or personal guarantee.

Furthermore, the court found no consideration was given, as the deceased never requested forbearance from litigation.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision staying her application for sole custody of an Indigenous child under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The child was placed with the appellant pursuant to a Customary Care Agreement under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The motion judge stayed the custody application under section 103 of the CYFSA, finding that the customary care agreement ousted the custody application.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while section 103 may not strictly apply to customary care agreements, the legislative intent of the CYFSA prioritizes customary care for Indigenous children, and the court's inherent jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act properly supported the stay.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the delay to trial exceeded the 30-month ceiling under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the delay clock started when the information was sworn or seven months later when the applicant was arrested.

The court held that the clock begins upon arrest if the accused is unaware of the charges.

After deducting defence-caused delays, the net delay was under 30 months.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, jointly charged with historical sexual offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 35 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, reasonable judicial reserve time, and exceptional circumstances arising from one applicant's Legal Aid application process.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell well below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

As the applicants failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, the applications were dismissed.

The applicant and respondent separated in 2014 and have twin boys.

The applicant sought retroactive and ongoing child support, arguing the respondent was intentionally underemployed, and requested contribution to the children's rep hockey expenses under section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court imputed income to the respondent for 2016 and 2019, finding he was intentionally unemployed in 2016 to assist a new partner.

The court ordered the respondent to pay child support arrears, ongoing support, and a capped contribution to the children's rep hockey expenses, balancing the children's interests with the respondent's modest means.

The Crown defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's civil claim alleging negligence, Charter breaches, and bad faith arising from the Crown's intervention in a private prosecution and the OIPRD's handling of a police complaint.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion and struck the claims without leave to amend.

The court found the claims against the Crown were barred by issue estoppel and prosecutorial immunity, while the claims against the OIPRD constituted an impermissible collateral attack and were barred by statutory immunity under the Police Services Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing unreasonable delay under s 11(b) of the Charter, lack of consent, and insufficient identification evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the Charter and consent grounds but found that the trial judge erred in relying on DNA evidence because the Crown failed to properly authenticate the hospital records and establish the chain of custody for the rape kit.

As the trial judge relied heavily on this inadmissible DNA evidence to establish identity, the conviction was quashed.

However, because there was other circumstantial identification evidence, a new trial was ordered rather than an acquittal.