T.P. Waltenbury

The applicants sought to quash subpoenas issued by the respondent, Laura Pinkerton, for her criminal trial on a charge of forcible entry.

Pinkerton intended to call witnesses to support her claim of entitlement to the property, arguing a long-standing conspiracy to divest her of it.

The court found that a person's entitlement to property is immaterial to a forcible entry charge under Section 72(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which focuses on preserving public peace and actual peaceable possession.

Furthermore, the evidence sought would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders establishing possession.

As the proposed witnesses could not provide material evidence, the Justice of the Peace exceeded jurisdiction in issuing the subpoenas.

The subpoenas were quashed.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine.

The court considered a joint submission on sentencing, which included a further two years less one day incarceration (resulting in an effective five-year sentence with pre-trial custody credit), a ten-year firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The primary dispute was the Crown's application for a fine in lieu of forfeiture under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code, for the $64,850 received by the accused from an agent in four drug transactions.

The defence argued the fine should be less, as the accused was merely brokering and did not retain the full amount.

The court, relying on the broad definition of "property" in s. 2 of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court jurisprudence, ruled that possession and control of the money, even if transferred to a supplier, was sufficient to impose the full fine.

A fine of $64,850 was imposed, with five years to pay.

The applicant, facing drug trafficking charges, brought a Garofoli application alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter and seeking to quash a wiretap authorization.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that police were grossly negligent or deliberately misleading in their presentation of a police agent's reliability and information.

The court reviewed the ITO, excising inappropriate material and amplifying it with evidence from the hearing.

The court found that the police agent was not a confidential informant at the time the ITO was considered, and his information, corroborated by other sources, provided sufficient grounds for the authorization.

The court concluded there was no police misconduct or gross negligence, and the ITO was facially valid.

The application was dismissed.

The accused applied for leave to cross‑examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain supporting a Part VI authorization, intending to challenge the authorization through a Garofoli application.

The accused argued that the police agent’s reliability problems and alleged investigative failures undermined the grounds relied upon in the ITO.

The court reviewed the governing principles from Garofoli and subsequent authorities requiring a reasonable likelihood that cross‑examination would elicit evidence capable of undermining a precondition to the authorization.

After reviewing numerous proposed areas of questioning relating to the agent’s credibility, background, and post‑authorization conduct, the court concluded they concerned minor matters, speculative issues, or information arising after the authorization was granted.

The court held that cross‑examination would not assist in discrediting the grounds for the authorization.