R. Parsons

The applicant brought a pre-trial change of venue application before the Regional Senior Judge.

A temporary publication ban was imposed, and the court invited submissions on whether section 648(1) of the Criminal Code automatically bans publication of information regarding pre-trial applications heard before a jury is chosen.

The court held that section 648(1) does not apply to applications heard before a jury is empanelled, nor to change of venue applications, nor to applications heard by a judge other than the trial judge.

Instead, publication bans for such pre-trial applications must be determined using the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder in a 1998 cold case, applied to change the venue of his trial from Sudbury to Toronto, arguing that extensive pre-trial publicity and public support for the victim made it impossible to empanel an impartial jury in the Northeast Region.

The court reviewed the extent and content of the media coverage, social media commentary, and a public opinion survey.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish a fair and reasonable likelihood of widespread partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by the safeguards of the jury system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the trial might still be moved within the region due to COVID-19 constraints, and imposed a publication ban on specific portions of the reasons.

The Crown brought an application to remove the accused's defence counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest.

One of the defence counsel had previously represented a former suspect who was initially charged with the same murder in 1998 before being cleared by DNA and fingerprint evidence.

The Crown argued counsel would be unable to effectively challenge the forensic evidence or advance a third-party suspect defence without implicating the former client.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a third-party suspect defence pointing to the former client was not realistically available and that counsel could effectively challenge the forensic evidence without implicating him.

The accused's right to counsel of choice was upheld.

The accused, driving a tractor-trailer southbound on a snow-covered highway, attempted to pass another vehicle in poor visibility and whiteout conditions.

He collided with a northbound tractor-trailer, resulting in the death of the other driver.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he lost control due to an unexpected whiteout, finding instead that he deliberately initiated an unsafe pass without checking for oncoming traffic.

The court concluded this manoeuvre was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver and found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

The appellant appealed her conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her parked, running vehicle facing oncoming traffic.

The trial judge found she rebutted the presumption of care and control by proving she did not intend to drive, but convicted her on the basis that the vehicle's position posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof and requiring the appellant to prove on a balance of probabilities that she did not present a realistic risk of danger.

A new trial was ordered.