dangerous driving

The court sentenced Cyrus Jaison, a youthful first offender, for causing bodily harm while driving with excess blood-alcohol and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the profound impact on the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

After reviewing the applicable sentencing principles and ranges, the court concluded that a conditional sentence would be inadequate to achieve denunciation and deterrence, imposing a 16-month custodial sentence on each count, to be served concurrently, along with a five-year driving prohibition and victim surcharges.

This decision addresses a Charter application challenging the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence and other related evidence in a case involving impaired driving, operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml, and dangerous driving.

The court carefully analyzed the issues of identity of the driver, the reliability of the alcohol screening device (ASD) fail result considering residual mouth alcohol, the lawfulness of detention in the police cruiser during the alcohol screening demand, and the timing of the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter but did find a minor breach of section 10(b) due to a brief delay in providing the right to counsel.

The breathalyzer evidence was admitted, and the accused was found guilty of the "80 plus" offence but not guilty of impaired driving or dangerous driving.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence from Cara Shepard, a forensic toxicologist, in the trial of Aysar Younes for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that while Ms. Shepard’s evidence regarding cocaine use was necessary and within her expertise, it lacked probative value on the issue of impairment or crash phase at the time of the collision and was therefore inadmissible for that purpose.

However, the court allowed the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing continuity of the blood sample.

The court sentenced Renzo Gomez for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following his guilty plea.

The facts established that Mr. Gomez drove at excessive speed, under the influence of alcohol, and with a history of prior driving offences, resulting in a fatal collision and serious injuries.

The court reviewed the impact on the victims and their families, the offender’s personal circumstances, and the applicable legal framework.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6 years for causing death (with a 16-year driving prohibition) and 4 years for causing bodily harm (with a 14-year prohibition), to be served concurrently, along with a DNA order.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Rubens de Oliveira Henderson after his conviction for Dangerous Driving, Refusal of Roadside Testing, and Assaulting a Police Officer.

The court detailed the facts of the incident, including Mr. Henderson's erratic behavior and use of racial epithets during the roadside sobriety test.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the dangerous manner of driving and belligerence toward officers, while noting Mr. Henderson's dated criminal record and parole status.

The sentence included 40 days jail (to be served intermittently), a one-year driving prohibition (adjusted for pre-sentencing prohibition), probation with conditions, and ancillary orders.

The accused, Paul Greenberg, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after a collision on the Don Valley Parkway.

The Crown relied on dash-camera footage and police testimony, while the accused testified in his defence, claiming he was driving marginally above the speed limit and was cut off by another vehicle.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of his speed and driving, finding that he drove at an excessive speed, repeatedly overtook vehicles by changing lanes, and failed to adjust his driving despite the presence of another speeding vehicle.

The court concluded that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver and endangered the public, leading to a conviction.

The applicant, charged with dangerous driving, brought a Garofoli/Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his dash-camera and EDR, alleging a violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The challenge focused on the facial and sub-facial validity of the search warrant.

The court found that while a dash-camera may attract a reasonable expectation of privacy, the warrant was validly issued based on sufficient grounds regarding the applicant's dangerous driving preceding the collision.

The court also found no material non-disclosure or bad faith by the police.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Corey Parnell was found guilty of dangerous driving and flight from police.

The court addressed the appropriate sentence and a Charter remedy for a two-day overhold in custody.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of three to four months and a driving prohibition, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a global custodial term of 120 days, reduced to 60 days as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the overhold, and a two-year driving prohibition in addition to the custodial term.

The accused, charged with dangerous driving, brought a motion seeking leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The warrant was used to seize and analyze dash cam and Event Data Recorder (EDR) data from his vehicle following a collision.

The accused intended to challenge the sub-facial validity of the warrant, alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter due to material omissions and ambiguities in the ITO regarding the collision's circumstances, including the potential involvement of a third vehicle and the basis for inferring dangerous driving.

The court granted leave to cross-examine, finding a reasonable likelihood that such examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Gurlal Dhillon pleaded guilty to charges of robbery, dangerous driving, and breaching a youth sentence, arising from an armed robbery spree involving multiple vehicle thefts at gunpoint using an imitation firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors including the use of a realistic imitation firearm, the defendant's prior youth sentences, the prevalence of car thefts, and the significant trauma inflicted on victims.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and the defendant's age.

The Crown sought a five-year jail sentence, while the defence proposed three years.

The accused, TP, faced five criminal charges: assault, mischief to property, dangerous operation of a conveyance, uttering threats, and failing to comply with an undertaking, stemming from a tumultuous separation from her partner, CR, and a house fire.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility and reliability of the key witnesses, including TP and CR, finding both generally unreliable due to inconsistencies and animosity.

Ultimately, TP was convicted of mischief for intentionally breaking a door at a neighbour's residence while attempting to retrieve her children.

She was acquitted of the remaining four charges, as the Crown failed to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt, often due to uncorroborated testimony or reasonable doubt regarding the exact words of the threat and authorship of messages.

The appellant, Jamil Ahmad Qureshi, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death, arguing the trial judge erred in her legal analysis of the mens rea element.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied principles regarding momentary lapses and conflated civil and criminal negligence standards by failing to adequately explain how the appellant's conduct constituted a "marked departure" from the standard of care.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, but declined to order an acquittal, finding the verdict was not otherwise unreasonable.

The plaintiff, Old Republic Insurance Company of Canada, initially sued the defendants for $60,000 under simplified procedure and noted them in default.

The plaintiff subsequently moved for default judgment and to amend its Statement of Claim to increase the claim to $200,000.

Upon being served with the motion to amend, the defendants brought a cross-motion to set aside the noting of default.

The court granted both motions, allowing the plaintiff to amend its claim to the higher amount and setting aside the default, thereby permitting the defendants to defend the action on its merits.

The accused faced multiple Criminal Code and Provincial Offences Act charges arising from an incident during the "Rolling Thunder" event in Ottawa.

Charges included dangerous operation of a conveyance, flight from police, failing to stop after an accident, resisting arrest, refusing a breath demand, and breaching release conditions.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous operation, flight from police, resisting arrest, refusing a breath demand, and breaching a geographical release condition.

The accused was found not guilty of failing to stop after an accident and breaching a release condition related to participating in "Freedom Convoy" events, as the court found "Rolling Thunder" to be a distinct event.

Provincial offence charges for driving without an ignition interlock device and without insurance were dismissed, while charges for failing to obey police directions and having open liquor in a vehicle resulted in convictions.

A young person, J.S., was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a single-vehicle rollover collision.

The court first addressed a Charter challenge regarding the admissibility of Airbag Control Module (ACM) data, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the limited data extracted, thus admitting it.

On the merits, the court found that while J.S. drove too fast for the conditions and made poor decisions (e.g., too many passengers, no seatbelts, alcohol), the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her driving constituted a "marked departure" from the standard of a reasonable driver.

This was due to significant uncertainties in interpreting the ACM data, the unknown impact of a faulty brake, and the unpredictable nature of the road and vehicle modifications.

J.S. was acquitted of all charges.

The accused, François Gauthier, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 17.

The court found Gauthier's testimony regarding mechanical issues and controlled maneuvers to be incredible, concluding that his driving was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver, largely due to his excessive speed and unsafe lane changes.

However, the court acquitted Gauthier on the impaired driving charges, finding that the expert toxicological evidence, while showing the presence of drugs, could not definitively establish impairment at the time of driving due to individual variability and lack of specific testing.

The defendant, Jason Lusted, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a preliminary inquiry into a second-degree murder charge.

The victim, Earl Clapp, died after being dragged under Lusted's vehicle during an attempted trailer theft.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Lusted's extensive criminal record, history of dangerous driving, and high moral blameworthiness, alongside mitigating factors such as a difficult childhood and drug addiction.

The judge imposed an 18-year prison sentence, with deductions for pre-trial custody (Summers and Duncan credits), resulting in an additional 14 years to serve.

The defendant, a Type-1 diabetic, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a head-on collision.

The defense argued that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk due to severe hypoglycemia (neuroglycopenia) and was in a state of automatism.

The court found that the defendant was in a state of neuroglycopenia when he began driving erratically and lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk, distinguishing the case from R. v. Elson where the driver was aware of dropping blood sugar.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal.

The automatism defense was not fully analyzed but the court was not satisfied it was proven on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant, Wilfredo Hernandez, faced multiple criminal charges, some of which he pled guilty to (dangerous driving, driving while prohibited, evading police) and others proceeded to trial (uttering threats, break and enter, taking a child in contravention of a custody order, threat to cause death to child).

The court assessed witness credibility, including the complainant's attempt to influence another witness.

The defendant was found not guilty of taking a motor vehicle without consent and break and enter a dwelling house.

He was found guilty of uttering threats to the complainant, taking the child in contravention of a custody order, and threatening to cause death to the child.

The court emphasized the intent to deprive the custodial parent of possession of the child.

The defendant, Giuseppe Galati, facing a dangerous driving charge, brought an application for disclosure of the York Regional Police's (YRP) Suspect Apprehension Pursuit (SAP) policies and procedures.

The Crown and YRP opposed the request, arguing it was a speculative fishing expedition.

The court, applying the 'obviously relevant' test from R. v. Gubbins, found that the SAP policy was relevant to the credibility of the central Crown witness (PC Skelly) and the defence's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the YRP to disclose the SAP policy created pursuant to O. Reg. 266/10, but declined to order a broader disclosure of all pursuit-related policies as overly vague.