Child protection

The applicant brought a motion for a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching a court order that prohibited their daughter from being in the presence of Jake Isenor, who had a history of mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence.

The court found the respondent intentionally breached the order on multiple occasions in July and December 2023, by arranging for the child to be in Isenor's presence and attempting to conceal these breaches.

The respondent's testimony regarding her lack of awareness of Isenor's presence was found to lack credibility.

The court concluded the respondent was in contempt of court and directed the parties to arrange a penalty hearing.

The Children's Aid Society sought leave to withdraw its child protection application concerning two children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) and the father opposed the withdrawal, arguing that live protection concerns and parental alienation issues required adjudication.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that the children's best interests required a full factual record and timely determination of outstanding issues.

The court ordered that the child protection application and the parents' Children's Law Reform Act application proceed to a combined trial, ensuring OCL involvement and preserving the option of continued society involvement.

M.R. and D.R., former customary caregivers, brought a motion to be added as parties to a child protection proceeding concerning the child R.S.V.B. Batchewana First Nation brought a cross-motion to dismiss M.R. and D.R.'s motion.

The court dismissed M.R. and D.R.'s motion, finding they did not meet the statutory criteria for party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, nor did they demonstrate a legal interest or a viable plan in the child's best interests under the Family Law Rules.

The court noted significant concerns about their care and cooperation with the Agency and First Nation.

The Batchewana First Nation's motion to dismiss was granted.

This is a ruling on a section 715.1 application by the defendant A.T. to admit a child victim's videotaped statement as evidence in a trial involving allegations of assault.

The Crown opposed, arguing the child did not "describe the acts complained of" as required by the section, as the child denied the alleged assault (hair pulling) in her statement.

The court found that a non-verbal denial (shaking head "no") constitutes a "description" under section 715.1, and that the section does not require an affirmative or guilt-consistent description.

The application was granted, emphasizing the section's purpose to preserve the child's earliest recollection and aid truth discovery, regardless of whether the statement supports the prosecution's theory.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add a maternal aunt as a party to a child protection proceeding, arguing that a Court of Appeal decision made it mandatory.

The child had been placed in the maternal aunt's temporary care.

The child's mother opposed the motion, expressing concerns about family division.

The maternal aunt tearfully withdrew her consent, stating she had not received independent legal advice and felt pressured by the Society.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society's application of the cited case could have constitutional implications and that the process for adding parties must ensure procedural fairness, including proper notice, opportunity to respond, and independent legal advice for the proposed party.

The court also rejected the Society's argument that the temporary order should be deemed "with prejudice" due to the passage of time.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to sever the case involving the child Z.O. from an existing child protection application and transfer the matter to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, an Indigenous child welfare agency.

Z.O.'s father (J.K.) and Serpent River First Nation, along with Nogdawindamin, consented to the motion.

The mother (A.B.) and step-father (M.O.) opposed the transfer, arguing that Z.O.'s half-sibling (A.O.) should also be transferred to keep the siblings together, or that the severance should be denied if A.O. was not included.

The court granted the severance and transfer of Z.O. to Nogdawindamin, emphasizing the legislative purpose of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, which support Indigenous child welfare agencies providing culturally appropriate services.

The court declined to transfer A.O., as she was not identified as First Nations, Inuit, or Métis, but noted the importance of reciprocating sibling access.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Dryden Police Services Board and Anishinaabe Abinoojii Family Services and their employees.

The action stemmed from a warrantless entry into their home by a child protection worker and police officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of claims against the Society defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

However, it set aside the summary judgment dismissing claims against the Dryden Police related to the lawfulness of the entry, including negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, trespass, invasion of privacy, and Charter breaches (ss. 7 and 9), finding the motion judge erred in concluding the entry was lawful under the CFSA without sufficient evidence of statutory preconditions.

The Court also reinstated Mr. Land's claims for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution, while dismissing Ms. Henry's similar claims due to her participation in a diversion program.

The Child and Family Services of Grand Erie applied for a warrant under section 81(2) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act to apprehend four children from their mother, S.S. This was the second such application, the first having been denied.

The court denied the application again, finding that the Society failed to establish imminent risk, explore less restrictive alternatives, or provide full and fair disclosure of the previous denial and its reasons.

The court emphasized the parent's right to refuse ongoing services and cautioned against the Society's practice of re-litigating the same issue without substantially new evidence, bordering on res judicata.

In a child protection proceeding, foster parents T.O. and M.L. brought a motion for party status concerning the child A.L., who had been in their care since early 2020.

The biological parents, A.H. and D.L., opposed the motion, arguing that the foster parents' input could be obtained through the Children's Aid Society, which took no position.

The court applied a five-factor test to determine if party status should be granted, considering the foster parents' ability to present a plan in the child's best interest, their legal interest (long-term adoption objective), the necessity of their direct evidence given the child's young age and lack of OCL involvement, potential for delay, and the child's best interests.

The motion for party status was granted, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, real-time evidence from primary caregivers.

This protection application concerned three children whose mother was murdered.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection and final custody to their maternal aunt, with whom they had resided since their mother's death.

The respondent father (MH) of two of the children sought custody of his daughters.

The court found the children in need of protection due to physical harm (dental neglect), risk of physical harm (neglect of immunizations, exposure to domestic violence), risk of emotional harm (domestic violence, housing instability, risk of removal from long-term caregiver), and inadequate provision for care after the mother's death.

The court dismissed the father's bid for custody, finding his plan not viable and his credibility lacking, and granted final custody of all three children to the maternal aunt, emphasizing the children's best interests, continuity of care, and the aunt's demonstrated ability to meet their needs.

The father (K.C-P.) brought a motion to change the child's placement from temporary joint care with non-biological paternal grandparents (the S's) to his sole care, supported by the paternal grandmother.

The court considered the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (FNIM Act), emphasizing the priority of placement with an Indigenous parent for an Indigenous child.

Despite the S's providing good care, the court found it was in the child's best interests, particularly given her Indigenous heritage, to be placed with her father, with a transitional period.

The motion was granted, and the S's request for costs was denied.

The court ruled that a child who is an access holder under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, is not limited to seeking an openness order only with persons explicitly named in an existing access order.

Instead, such a child may seek openness with any person with whom they have a beneficial and meaningful relationship, provided it is in the child's best interests.

This interpretation aligns with the plain language and purposeful approach of the CYFSA, as well as Canada's obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer's argument on jurisdiction for inter-sibling openness was affirmed.

The Family and Children Services of St. Thomas and Elgin brought a summary judgment motion to terminate an existing supervision order for the child, T., arguing she was no longer in need of protection.

Both parents, B.M. and D.O., opposed the termination, each seeking primary decision-making authority for T. The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding T.'s continued need for protection due to the parents' ongoing high conflict and its negative emotional impact on the child, as evidenced by T.'s distress and withdrawal during parental arguments.

The court emphasized that the Society's withdrawal would likely exacerbate parental conflict over major decisions, such as T.'s schooling and medication, which would not be in the child's best interests.

This motion for summary judgment concerned the placement of A.M., an Indigenous child, in extended society care.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended care, while the biological mother opposed it, advocating for A.M.'s return to her care.

The court emphasized the "last resort" nature of extended care, particularly for Indigenous children, and the statutory priority for family and community placements under federal legislation.

The Society failed to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue for trial, specifically lacking evidence of exhaustive efforts to find permanent family or community placements.

The motion was dismissed, preserving the possibility of A.M.'s return to her mother's care after a full trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the children were in need of protection and a final custody order under s.102(1) of the CYFSA in favour of the maternal grandmother, T.K., with access to the parents.

The father, J.P., opposed the custody order, seeking a further supervision order, while the mother, V.B., did not oppose the children remaining with T.K. The court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to the parents' substance use and instability, and granted the summary judgment, terminating the supervision order and placing the children in T.K.'s sole care and custody, with supervised parenting time for both parents.

The Applicant, Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child J.M.C. was in need of protection and an order for supervision of the Mother with supervised access for the Father.

The Mother consented to the relief, while the Father opposed, seeking custody or alternative placement.

The court found the child in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, citing ongoing parental conflict and the Father's history of domestic violence and anger management issues.

The Father's opposition was dismissed, and the court granted a six-month supervision order for the Mother and specific terms for the Father's supervised access, rejecting the Applicant's request for discretionary access.

The Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services brought a child protection application and a motion for temporary care and custody concerning three children.

The court critically reviewed the society's procedural haste in bringing the application and motion on short notice, noting it circumvented standard Family Law Rules for respondent reply times and motion notice periods.

The judge emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, particularly given the power imbalance between societies and parents in child protection cases.

The court dismissed the society's motion for temporary care and custody and access claims, instead making a temporary care and custody order keeping the children in their current customary and kinship placements without society supervision, adjourning the society's motion for a proper hearing.

The applicant sought an interim restraining order against a respondent, Christopher Lee Sommerville, under the Children's Law Reform Act, alleging sexual abuse of children and criminal ties.

The court dismissed the request for a restraining order, finding insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for fear for safety.

However, the court, in the children's best interests, issued a contact order under s. 28(1)(c)(i) of the Act, prohibiting the respondent from direct or indirect contact with the children or the applicant, while an investigation by the Children's Aid Society was ongoing.

This motion, brought by the father (K.J.) within a child protection status review application, sought to change the temporary care and custody of two children, J. and K., from the mother (C.B.) to himself, subject to society supervision.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto supported the father's motion, while the mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed it.

The court applied subsection 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, adopting a flexible and liberal interpretation of the "best interests" test, rather than requiring a "material change" in circumstances.

The court found a significant change in circumstances, primarily due to the mother's repeated frustration of access between the children and the father/sibling, her inconsistent compliance with supervision orders regarding school attendance and mental health treatment, and her poor judgment.

The father presented a suitable care plan.

The motion was granted, placing J. and K. in the father's temporary care and custody with society supervision and specified access for the mother.

This is the second appeal concerning the protection of a four-year-old child.

The Ontario Court initially found the child in need of protection but issued a one-year supervision order.

The Society successfully appealed to the Superior Court, which substituted a protection order placing the child with his grandmother and uncle.

The parents (J.C. and J.C.) then appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal.

However, during the appeal process, the matter returned to the Ontario Court for a Status Review, where the parents consented to an order for the child to reside in the grandmother's home.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the parents' appeal as moot, as the underlying issue had been resolved by consent.