Jane Hegney

This decision addresses the issue of costs between parents in a child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The father, J.N., sought partial indemnity costs from the mother, J.M., arguing that he was successful and that J.M. acted unreasonably and prolonged the matter.

The court reviewed the high threshold required for awarding costs between parents in protection cases, emphasizing that costs should only be awarded for extreme unreasonable conduct or bad faith.

The court found that although J.M. initially resisted conceding primary residence, she acted reasonably in later efforts to resolve the matter, and no findings of fact or breach of court orders were made against her.

The protection application was withdrawn on consent, and the court declined to order costs, highlighting the importance of good faith and proportionality in such proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the children were in need of protection and a final custody order under s.102(1) of the CYFSA in favour of the maternal grandmother, T.K., with access to the parents.

The father, J.P., opposed the custody order, seeking a further supervision order, while the mother, V.B., did not oppose the children remaining with T.K. The court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to the parents' substance use and instability, and granted the summary judgment, terminating the supervision order and placing the children in T.K.'s sole care and custody, with supervised parenting time for both parents.

A child protection trial involving three children where the Children's Aid Society sought findings that the children were in need of protection due to physical harm and risk of physical harm.

The respondent father (M.A.R.) and his partner (T.E.) were alleged to have exposed the children to excessive alcohol use, domestic violence, and inappropriate physical discipline.

The mother (E.M.T.) was aware of the abuse but failed to disclose it in prior custody proceedings.

The court found the children had suffered actual physical harm and were at risk of further physical harm, but dismissed the claim for risk of emotional harm.

The children were placed in the mother's care subject to supervision with discretionary access to the father through the Society.

A motion for recusal brought by respondent M.A.R. during a child protection trial.

M.A.R. alleged that the judge's examination of a Children's Aid Society worker regarding her training during a voir dire on the admissibility of children's statements, and the incorporation of two answers into the ruling, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that the judge's questions were appropriate, routine, and consistent with the expanded role judges have in child protection proceedings where the best interests of children are at stake.

A voir dire on threshold necessity was held to determine whether out-of-court statements made by three children to third parties could be admitted as hearsay evidence in a child protection proceeding.

The applicant sought to tender the statements for the truth of their content.

The court heard expert evidence from a forensic and clinical psychologist regarding the children's ability to testify and the potential impact of doing so on their mental health.

The court found that reasonable necessity was established for the two younger children based on evidence of emotional harm and developmental limitations, but not for the older child who was capable of testifying with appropriate accommodations.