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Motion to vary interim relocation order dismissed; children's untested views insufficient to change status quo.
The respondent father brought a motion to vary an interim parenting order that permitted the applicant mother to relocate with their three children from Oxford County to Windsor.
The father relied on the views and preferences of the two eldest children, obtained through the Office of the Children's Lawyer, who expressed a desire to return to Oxford County.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the untested views and preferences of two of the three children did not constitute exceptional or compelling circumstances to vary the status quo on an interim basis.
The court ordered a section 112 clinical investigation to provide a comprehensive assessment for trial.
The court imputed income to both parties and ordered the father to pay temporary child and spousal support.
The applicant mother sought temporary spousal and child support.
The respondent father sought ongoing disclosure of the mother's income and job search efforts, and an order for the sharing of daycare costs.
The court imputed income to both parties, allowing a 50% deduction for rental expenses from gross rental income.
The mother established a prima facie case for spousal support based on compensatory and non-compensatory grounds due to income disparity and her role as primary caregiver.
The court ordered child support of $902 per month and spousal support of $600 per month, commencing January 1, 2021.
The father's cross-motion for disclosure and daycare sharing was consented to by the mother.
The court granted temporary care and custody to the father with supervised maternal access.
A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning three children.
The Children's Aid Society sought placement of the children with their father, citing protection concerns related to the mother's partner's history of sexual offences against children and the mother's failure to protect the children from this risk.
The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her care.
The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm and that they could not be adequately protected through supervision orders while in the mother's care.
The court ordered temporary placement with the father, subject to Society supervision, with supervised access to the mother.
The court permitted the mother to temporarily relocate with the children, finding the move beneficial and minimally disruptive to the father's parenting time.
The applicant father sought to prohibit the respondent mother from relocating with their two young children from Woodstock to Port Stanley, or alternatively sought custody.
The respondent mother sought permission to relocate and sought sole custody with access to the father.
The court considered the principles established in Plumley v. Plumley and Gordon v. Goertz regarding temporary relocation of children.
The court found that the mother had compelling reasons for the move, including a significant reduction in her commute to work and reduced childcare needs.
The court determined that the proposed relocation would not materially interfere with the father's access arrangements as outlined in the parties' separation agreement, and that the benefits to the children outweighed any risks.
The court granted the mother permission to relocate on an interim basis while maintaining the father's parenting time.
The court granted an interim interim order allowing the mother to temporarily relocate with the children pending further financial evidence.
The Applicant mother and Respondent father brought motions concerning urgent residential and parenting arrangements for their three children (ages 8, 6, and 2) amidst their separation and the imminent sale of the matrimonial home.
The Applicant sought sole custody and permission to relocate with the children to Windsor, citing financial necessity and her role as primary caregiver.
The Respondent sought joint custody, equal parenting time, and for the children to remain in Oxford County, continuing at their current school, having purchased a new home in the school's catchment area.
The court found the evidentiary record insufficient to make a definitive interim order, particularly regarding the Applicant's financial ability to remain in Oxford County.
The court issued an interim interim order allowing the Applicant and children to temporarily reside in Windsor until October 2, 2020, with specified weekend access for the Respondent, while directing both parties to file supplementary financial and employment-related evidence for a renewed hearing.
The court awarded the applicant costs for a parenting motion but deferred payment until the litigation's conclusion to prevent weaponization.
This is a costs endorsement following motions for divorce and corollary relief, specifically concerning parenting time.
The court reviewed the original decision and offers to settle, applying Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules.
The Applicant was found to be more successful on the parenting motion, as the ordered shared parenting regime more closely reflected his offer.
The Applicant was awarded $1500 plus GST in costs, payable by the Respondent.
However, payment of these costs was deferred until all issues in the litigation are concluded, to prevent the weaponization of interim costs in a high-conflict family case.
The court declined to award costs against the Children's Aid Society upon its withdrawal of a protection application, finding it acted reasonably.
This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.
The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a protection application regarding two children and subsequently sought leave to withdraw the application without costs.
The respondent father opposed the withdrawal on a without-costs basis, seeking costs of $31,870.41 inclusive, arguing the Society had failed to properly investigate and acted incompetently.
The court dismissed the costs claim, finding the Society had conducted an adequate investigation, acted reasonably and with due diligence throughout the proceedings, and appropriately reassessed its position as circumstances evolved.
The court held that the Society's conduct did not meet the threshold for a costs award against a child protection agency.
The successful respondent in an application to prohibit a children's surname change was awarded $11,085 in costs.
A costs decision following a trial on the merits regarding a prohibition on changing children's surnames.
The respondent sought to change the children's surnames from "Schaafsma" to "Schaafsma Eaton" following a prior custody order.
The applicant brought an application seeking to prohibit the name change or, alternatively, to require a hyphenated surname.
The application was dismissed, permitting the respondent to proceed with the name change applications to the Registrar General.
The court awarded costs to the successful respondent in the amount of $11,085 inclusive.
The court dismissed a father's application to prohibit the custodial mother from adding her surname to the children's surname.
The applicant sought an order prohibiting the respondent, the sole custodial parent, from changing the surnames of two children from Schaafsma to Schaafsma Eaton.
The respondent sought to add her surname to the children's existing surname.
The court applied the best interests of the child test and considered factors including the respondent's motivation, the children's existing use of the hyphenated name, the relationship between the children and the non-custodial parent, and the applicant's failure to meet financial support obligations.
The court found that the respondent had no improper motive, that the children already identified as Schaafsma Eaton at school, and that the name change would not harm the children or their relationship with their father.
The application was dismissed, permitting the name change to proceed, with a prohibition on any further name changes.
Hearsay necessity was established for two younger children but not for the capable older child.
A voir dire on threshold necessity was held to determine whether out-of-court statements made by three children to third parties could be admitted as hearsay evidence in a child protection proceeding.
The applicant sought to tender the statements for the truth of their content.
The court heard expert evidence from a forensic and clinical psychologist regarding the children's ability to testify and the potential impact of doing so on their mental health.
The court found that reasonable necessity was established for the two younger children based on evidence of emotional harm and developmental limitations, but not for the older child who was capable of testifying with appropriate accommodations.
The court ordered joint custody of a child in need of protection to the mother and great-grandmother, with primary residence to the great-grandmother to preserve the child's primary attachment.
This is a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child apprehended in November 2015 and placed in the care of her maternal great-grandmother.
The applicant Society initially sought a six-month supervision order with the child remaining in the great-grandmother's care.
The mother sought return of the child to her care, while the great-grandmother sought a custody order.
The court found the child continues to be in need of protection but determined that the child's best interests are served by a joint custody order with primary residence remaining with the great-grandmother, supported by liberal access to the mother.
The court emphasized the importance of continuity of care and attachment, particularly given the child's young age and the length of time spent in the great-grandmother's care.
Sole custody awarded to mother due to high conflict; father's income imputed for undeclared refereeing earnings.
The parties separated after an 11-year marriage, leaving two young daughters in the primary care of the applicant mother.
The respondent father sought joint custody and shared residence, while the applicant sought sole custody.
The court found that the parties' high level of conflict and inability to communicate made joint custody unworkable, awarding sole custody to the applicant.
The court also modified the access schedule to provide more stability for the children.
Additionally, the court imputed income to the respondent based on his undeclared earnings as a sports referee, setting his income for child support purposes at $90,000, and ordered him to contribute to section 7 daycare expenses.