T.M. (Self-represented)

This motion for summary judgment concerned the placement of A.M., an Indigenous child, in extended society care.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended care, while the biological mother opposed it, advocating for A.M.'s return to her care.

The court emphasized the "last resort" nature of extended care, particularly for Indigenous children, and the statutory priority for family and community placements under federal legislation.

The Society failed to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue for trial, specifically lacking evidence of exhaustive efforts to find permanent family or community placements.

The motion was dismissed, preserving the possibility of A.M.'s return to her mother's care after a full trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two Indigenous children were in need of protection and an order for their placement in the care and custody of their father, with discretionary access for the mother.

The mother conceded the protection finding but opposed the summary judgment, arguing for joint custody and a shared parenting regime.

The court granted the Society's motion in part, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the children's primary placement with the father, due to the mother's lack of insight into past protection concerns and ongoing conflict.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the mother's access, determining it should not be left to the father's discretion and required judicial determination.

The Applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking findings that three children (K.M., M.B., and J.B.) were in need of protection and should be placed in the Society's extended care.

The children's mother opposed, proposing a customary care agreement.

The court found ample evidence of the children being in need of protection due to physical and emotional abuse and sexual assault.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue for trial, and ordered the children into extended Society care, rejecting the customary care agreement as it could not be coercively imposed and was not agreed upon by all parties.