Abuse of process

Ten days after the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment authorizing the responding party to enforce its mortgage, the moving parties brought a motion seeking to declare the enforcement proceedings null and void.

The moving parties argued they were commercial farmers and had not received the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving parties were barred from raising the issue at this late stage since mortgage enforceability was squarely at issue on the appeal.

The court found no credible evidence that the moving party was a commercial farmer and deemed the motion an abuse of process intended to delay creditors.

The respondents sought costs following the dismissal of the moving party's motion to extend time.

The respondents claimed costs on a substantial indemnity basis, including fees for new counsel necessitated by the moving party commencing an action against the respondents' original counsel.

The court found the motion was an abuse of process and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

After adjusting the hours and rates to reflect a fair and reasonable amount, the court fixed costs at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed an order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The motion judge had found the claim, which alleged conspiracy, deceit, negligence, and professional misconduct, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and was an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the pleading was irreparably deficient for failing to plead material facts in support of the serious allegations advanced.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing their application as an abuse of process.

Although the moving parties formed an intention to appeal within the time limit and adequately explained their delay, the court found no merit to the proposed appeal.

The claims related to an oil reserve had already been litigated and finally determined in British Columbia, rendering the Ontario application an attempt to relitigate.

Furthermore, the limitation period had expired several years prior.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss the Registrar's orders dismissing his previous motions for delay.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to refer the proceeding to a panel of the Court of Appeal for a determination under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and to stay the plaintiff's motions pending that determination.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that the plaintiff's repeated motions appeared to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and stayed the plaintiff's motions pending the panel's determination.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to France for attempted murder.

The applicant argued that the Minister lacked authority to order surrender for attempted murder because the Authority to Proceed was limited to aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's decision was reasonable and that the Minister is not required to align the surrender offence with the offence listed in the Authority to Proceed.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment.

The moving party conceded that the order did not preclude the responding party from advancing its arguments regarding s. 36(4) of the Competition Act or abuse of process as substantive defences at trial, and agreed not to advance an argument of res judicata.

Based on this concession that the order was interlocutory rather than final, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the moving party.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Crown and members of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on several grounds, including judicial immunity, improper notice, non-compliance with the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, and improper collateral attack, characterizing the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellants could have raised their allegation of being specifically targeted in prior judicial review proceedings regarding the FIT program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to issues that could have been determined in earlier administrative processes, and found no error in the motion judge's refusal to exercise her discretion to allow the action to proceed.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against multiple defendants under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal issued a notice under Rule 2.1 indicating the appeal itself may be dismissed on similar grounds.

The Court found the appellant's pleading contained no intelligible claims against the respondents and sought non-justiciable relief regarding the redesign of Ontario's social welfare and legal services systems.

The appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim, which sought to challenge a prior order directing that proceeds from the sale of his son's house be paid into court pending a priorities dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim was an attempt to relitigate issues already determined.

The court also denied leave to amend, finding that no amendment could remedy the fundamental flaw in the claim.

The appellants sued the respondent physicians for damages, including the difference between their actual legal fees and the costs awarded in prior proceedings regarding the withdrawal of life support, as well as damages for various torts based on a pre-litigation letter sent by the respondents' counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the claim for legal fees was barred by issue estoppel and the tort claims were barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege, as the letter was intimately connected to contemplated judicial proceedings.

The appellant clients appealed a judgment that severely limited the assessment of accounts rendered by their former solicitors, Bennett Jones LLP.

The application judge had ruled that because the clients previously relied on the accounts to seek party-and-party costs in an underlying action, seeking to assess those same accounts constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of abuse of process does not prevent a client from having a solicitor's bill assessed even if the costs were previously fixed by a trial court, as the interests and considerations in the two contexts are distinct.

The appellant appealed a decision striking her statement of claim as an abuse of process.

The underlying action was an attempt to re-litigate a boundary dispute that had been resolved by minutes of settlement and mutual releases in 2006.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and unlawful confinement.

During the investigation, police officers subjected the appellant and his co-accused to deliberate, prolonged, and violent beatings to extract confessions.

The trial judge found egregious Charter breaches but refused to grant a stay of proceedings, opting instead to reduce the appellant's sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the systemic ramifications of the police misconduct and its impact on the integrity of the justice system.

The Court concluded that the state misconduct was so egregious that carrying the prosecution forward would be offensive to society, warranting a stay of proceedings under the residual category.

The appellants, two former doctoral students, appealed an order striking their 187-page Statement of Claim as an abuse of process without leave to amend.

They conceded the original claim was properly struck but argued they should have been granted leave to file a narrower amended claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision, as the proposed claims were an indirect attempt to appeal internal academic decisions that should be addressed through judicial review.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board (ORB) disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appellant argued that CAMH's request for an early review of his previous conditional discharge was an abuse of process, and that the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in imposing a detention order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the early review was permitted under the Criminal Code, the ORB applied the correct legal test, and the detention order was the least onerous disposition necessary to ensure CAMH had adequate control over the appellant's housing in the community.

The appellants, medical residents, sued the university and several individuals in contract and tort after being dismissed or not promoted in their programs.

The motion judge struck their statement of claim as an abuse of process, finding it was an attempt to relitigate facts already determined through the university's internal academic appeal process and upheld on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to prevent relitigation of issues determined in administrative proceedings where the process directly affected the appellants' academic and professional standing.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay 17 charges, including human trafficking, against the respondent.

The trial judge found that police had fabricated evidence by planting false identification in the respondent's wallet and that an officer lied about it in testimony, constituting an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his conclusion that the egregious police conduct warranted a stay of proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out portions of his amended Statement of Claim and Defence to Counterclaim that challenged the validity of a prior judgment.

The motion judge found that the appellant's attempt to relitigate the issue, after declining to participate in a previous motion where he had notice and an opportunity to be heard, constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.