Jonathan P.M. Collings

The applicant, as estate trustee, brought a motion for directions seeking an order for a formal passing of accounts by the respondent for his time acting as their mother's Power of Attorney for Property.

The applicant also sought to have issues regarding a mortgage held in the respondent's name tried jointly.

The court dismissed the motion for a formal passing of accounts, finding that the respondent had already provided extensive informal accounting and the applicant failed to raise any significant concern or specific allegations of misfeasance to warrant a formal passing.

A case conference was ordered to address the remaining mortgage issues.

The applicant, a 50% shareholder and director of a restaurant corporation, brought an application for an oppression remedy against his brother (the other 50% shareholder) and his sister-in-law.

The respondents had negotiated a lease buyout without the applicant's knowledge, deposited the proceeds into a separate account, and diverted funds to the sister-in-law under a fabricated security agreement.

The court found that the respondents' actions breached the applicant's reasonable expectations under the unanimous shareholder agreement and constituted oppression.

The court ordered an accounting, the discharge of the security agreement, and the return of diverted funds to a trust account.

The defendant parents sent an email to the local ringette community complaining about the treatment of their daughter by her volunteer coaches and the league.

The plaintiff coaches sued for defamation, seeking $35,000 in damages.

The defendants brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a SLAPP.

The court granted the motion, finding that the email related to a matter of public interest and that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the minimal reputational harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The moving party, a municipal councillor, sought partial summary judgment to dismiss a counterclaim alleging defamation, intentional infliction of mental suffering, harassment, and abuse of power.

The counterclaim arose from a social media post about the responding party's previously withdrawn and vexatious court application.

The court granted partial summary judgment, finding the defamation claim was defeated by the defences of justification and fair comment.

The remaining claims were dismissed due to a lack of evidence and statutory immunity under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The plaintiffs, a mayor and a town councillor, sued the defendant for defamation over several Facebook posts criticizing their conduct in municipal governance.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant's expressions related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant had no valid defence of fair comment for most of the posts, and the court concluded that the public interest in protecting the defendant's political expression outweighed any harm to the plaintiffs' reputations.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover a $340,000 loan secured by a second mortgage on the defendants' home.

The defendants argued the interest rate was ambiguous, the transaction was unconscionable, and one defendant lacked independent legal advice.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no evidence that the loan was excessive or unconscionable, and noting the defendants were represented by counsel during the transaction.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim against him on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant republished a defamatory email by replying to the original sender and potentially blind copying others.

The court held that replying only to the sender does not constitute publication or republication in defamation law.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to plead material facts supporting the bald allegation that the email was blind copied to third parties.

The motion was granted and the claim against the defendant was struck without leave to amend.

The applicant tenant brought an application under Rule 14 for a determination of rights under a commercial lease agreement.

The court held that the tenant was not entitled to a refund of a $24,000 ex gratia payment made to the landlord.

However, the court found the landlord had no grounds to take over management of the building and charge a 15% fee.

The court also determined that under the terms of the lease, the tenant was responsible for paying the depreciation of the HVAC units and the costs of installing roof drains, as these were operating costs and not inherent structural defects.

Claims regarding a breach of the duty of good faith were dismissed.

The plaintiff, as trustee of a living trust, brought an action claiming a constructive trust over a Toronto condominium owned by the defendant, and obtained an ex parte certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The plaintiff moved to amend the claim to add the deceased's estate as a plaintiff, while the defendant moved to discharge the CPL for material non-disclosure and for security for costs.

The court allowed the amendment to add the estate, but discharged the CPL, finding the plaintiff was grossly reckless in failing to disclose the deceased's declaration of trust and will, which did not list the property.

The court also ordered the foreign plaintiff to post security for costs.

The plaintiffs in the Dewan Action brought a motion to adjourn their trial, scheduled for March 24, 2014, until after the completion of an ongoing trial in a related action (the CCC 396 Action).

The adjournment was requested because the plaintiffs intended to call an expert witness whose testimony in the CCC 396 Action had not yet been completed due to repeated delays caused by defence counsel's health issues.

The court granted the adjournment, noting that previous orders indicated the CCC 396 Action should be completed first, as its outcome would impact the Dewan Action.

The court also ordered that all summonses issued for the original trial date remain valid and subsequently set new trial dates for both actions during a case conference.