Timothy Ray

The parties in a family law matter submitted costs submissions several months after the extended deadline ordered by the court, without providing any explanation for the delay.

The judge, who was in his final sitting week before retirement and had already disposed of his notes, refused to consider the late submissions.

The judge directed counsel to take the matter up with the Local Administrative Judge for Family or the Regional Senior Judge if they wished to pursue it further.

The defendant brought an application to stay his convictions for fraud and related offences, arguing that the delay from the date of charge to sentencing violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan and calculated the net delay to the end of trial, deducting periods of defence waiver and defence-caused delay.

The court found the net delay was below the 30-month ceiling, and even if it exceeded the ceiling, the delay was justified by the exceptional circumstances of a key Crown witness's illness and the particular complexity of the case.

The court also analyzed the delay during the sentencing phase, concluding it was primarily requested by the defence to obtain a mental health assessment and caused no prejudice.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty of ten counts of fraud and fraud-related offences involving approximately $8 million, the largest commercial fraud in Ottawa's history.

The defendant used his company as a vehicle to defraud subcontractors, creditors, and financial institutions before absconding to Lebanon.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the size of the fraud, the high degree of planning, and the profound impact on victims.

The defendant was sentenced to 7 years in penitentiary, ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1.7 million, and ordered to pay restitution of $488,057.48.

The offender, a 26-year-old member of the Canadian Forces, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and methamphetamine, and breach of recognizance.

Despite the usual range for such offences being a penitentiary term, the court emphasized the offender's severe lifelong addictions, his efforts at rehabilitation, and the potential loss of his military career.

The court imposed a sentence of 60 days intermittent custody followed by a 12-month conditional sentence to allow the offender to maintain his employment and continue treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the forfeiture of his shotgun and imposing a one-year firearms prohibition.

The police had seized the weapons after responding to a call about the appellant's suicidal Facebook posts, finding him intoxicated and combative.

The hearing judge found on a balance of probabilities that the appellant posed a risk to himself and the public.

On appeal, the court found that the hearing judge's decision was supported by the evidence of the appellant's ongoing depression, alcohol abuse, and chronic pain.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but because the one-year prohibition period had expired by the time of the appeal, the court ordered the firearm returned to the appellant or that he be given 60 days to sell it.

Following a summary judgment dismissing the claim against the individual defendants and a corporate defendant, and the dismissal of the defendants' motion for security for costs, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the individual defendants defeated the claim by reviving a corporate defendant late in the proceedings, making them liable for the plaintiff's thrown-away costs.

However, the defendants were successful on their summary judgment motion.

Balancing the relative success and the respective costs incurred, the court ordered that the costs be set off against each other, resulting in no order as to costs.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from a one-party consent wiretap authorization that was previously found to violate s. 8.

The court first determined that viva voce evidence of the conversation between the police agent and the defendant was inextricably linked to the recording and must be considered in the s. 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach was not at the higher end of the continuum, the defendant's expectation of privacy in a public restaurant was low, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court concluded that excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore admitted the evidence.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through a series of wiretap authorizations, arguing the initial Information to Obtain (ITO) was inadequate and misleading.

The court reviewed the ITO, noting material omissions regarding the police agent's criminal record and financial compensation agreement.

After editing and amplifying the ITO, the court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been or would be committed, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that information relating to the offences would be obtained through the interception sought.

The initial authorization was set aside, rendering the evidence obtained a presumptive violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover the balance owing on a loan agreement.

The defendants argued the agreement was unenforceable, claiming they lacked independent legal advice and that the arrangement was actually a partnership where losses should be shared.

The court found no evidence of a partnership and noted the loan agreement explicitly remained in force if no partnership agreement was executed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs for the agreed outstanding amount.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against the individual defendants and a related corporate entity, and sought security for costs.

The plaintiff's action sought to enforce an arbitral award against a corporation that was discovered to have been dissolved, prompting claims against its principals.

The court found no cause of action pleaded against the related corporate entity.

Because the primary corporate defendant was recently revived under the Canada Business Corporations Act, its acts during dissolution were cured, negating the basis for personal liability against the individual defendants.

The court dismissed the action against the individuals and the related corporation, but denied the defendants' request for security for costs as inequitable.

The defendant Ministry of the Environment moved to strike the plaintiff's negligence claim arising from an oil spill clean-up, arguing it owed no private law duty of care.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that once the Ministry chose to exercise its discretionary powers under the Environmental Protection Act and became involved in the remediation, it was obliged to do so without negligence.

The court held that the pleaded facts established sufficient proximity under the Anns test and that no policy reasons negated a duty of care at the pleadings stage.

The applicant tenant brought an application under Rule 14 for a determination of rights under a commercial lease agreement.

The court held that the tenant was not entitled to a refund of a $24,000 ex gratia payment made to the landlord.

However, the court found the landlord had no grounds to take over management of the building and charge a 15% fee.

The court also determined that under the terms of the lease, the tenant was responsible for paying the depreciation of the HVAC units and the costs of installing roof drains, as these were operating costs and not inherent structural defects.

Claims regarding a breach of the duty of good faith were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision in which the trial judge rejected a joint submission to include the Partner Assault Response (PAR) program as a condition of the respondent's probation for domestic violence offences.

The trial judge provided no reasons for rejecting the joint submission and did not invite submissions from counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The PAR program was added as a condition of probation.

The parties filed costs submissions following an interim spousal support motion.

The party seeking support sought $15,000 in costs, claiming 68 hours of work at $350 per hour, while the opposing party argued each side should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found the party seeking support was the successful party but noted the issues were not complex and the time claimed was disproportionate to the amounts in issue and the parties' financial means.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the costs award at $4,500 inclusive of disbursements.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on a $70,000 promissory note assigned to him by his wholly-owned corporation.

The defendants opposed, arguing the assignment was invalid and raising a limitation period defence.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a full trial but adjourned the motion for further submissions on specific legal issues, including whether the action was statute-barred and the effect of a subsequent assignment executed after the action commenced.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside the administrative dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The court applied the two-part test for leave to appeal under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the Reid principles.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 after the complainant's bank accounts were used in a scheme involving counterfeit cheques.

The complainant alleged the accused manipulated her into opening accounts and withdrawing money, while the accused denied any involvement.

Although the trial judge found the complainant credible and disbelieved the accused, the lack of independent confirmatory evidence due to an inadequate police investigation left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The moving party father brought a motion to vary a 2006 order to terminate his child and spousal support obligations following his job loss.

The court found that the 23-year-old daughter was no longer a child of the marriage as she was independent and had withdrawn from parental care, terminating child support.

However, the court dismissed the motion to vary spousal support as premature, noting the father's severance package and the lack of financial disclosure from both parties, requiring a better evidentiary record.