Karen Simone

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included the accused's prior possession of a firearm, threats made against the deceased, and participation in a prior shooting incident.

The court found that the evidence was relevant and material to the issues of identity, animus, and motive.

Applying the framework for prior discreditable conduct, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the evidence admissible with certain edits.

The respondent, Hassan Jarrar, was found guilty of multiple sexual and child pornography offences.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court found a pattern of repetitive violent and sexual behaviour targeting young vulnerable females, demonstrating a failure to restrain behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

Despite the respondent's lack of cooperation with assessments and treatment, the court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence or a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

Consequently, the respondent was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms for the serious personal injury offences, along with other prohibitions and orders.

The applicant, Charles Mustard, charged with first-degree murder from a 1993 cold case, sought judicial interim release (bail) under s. 522(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed his release.

The court assessed the three grounds for detention under s. 515(10): primary (attendance in court), secondary (public protection), and tertiary (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice).

While the applicant satisfied the primary and secondary grounds, the tertiary ground was a significant consideration due to the gravity of the offence and the apparent strength of the Crown's DNA evidence.

However, the court also considered the applicant's age (65), health conditions (borderline diabetes, arthritis, hearing/eyesight loss), and the heightened risk of COVID-19 transmission in detention facilities.

Despite a "porous" release plan involving the Toronto Bail Program and a shelter, the court found that the public, properly informed of Charter values and the pandemic crisis, would not lose confidence in the administration of justice by granting bail.

The application for bail was granted with specific conditions.

Sarai Lopez Iglesias, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown opposed, citing the strength of the case, the gravity of the offence, and concerns on primary and secondary grounds.

The applicant proposed a robust bail plan including house arrest with sureties (her mother and step-father), electronic monitoring, and a substantial pledge.

The court, while acknowledging the strong Crown case and serious nature of the charge, found that the proposed plan, particularly the full-time supervision by the mother, was sufficient to address the concerns on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, and granted bail.

The accused, Shou Chen, was convicted of second-degree murder.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and jury recommendations, as required by the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown seeking a 12-year parole ineligibility period, the court found a compelling causal link between the accused's late-onset schizophrenia and the offence.

This mental disorder, combined with the accused's lack of prior record and the jury's recommendation for the minimum, led the court to impose the mandatory minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA databank submission were also made.

The accused, Shou Chen, facing a second-degree murder charge, brought a mistrial application after his forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Mark Pearce, revised his opinion, no longer supporting a "not criminally responsible" (NCRMD) defence on a balance of probabilities.

The defence sought a mistrial to find another expert psychiatrist and secure Legal Aid funding.

The court dismissed the application, holding that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort and was not warranted.

The judge found that the change in expert opinion, partly attributable to defence counsel's delay in providing relevant reports, did not cause actual prejudice or unfairness, as the defence retained strategic options for presenting its case.

The court also noted the case's long history of defence-related delays.

The accused, Shou Chen, facing a second-degree murder charge, objected to the admissibility of recognition/identification evidence from a Crown witness, Mr. Wan Peng Mei.

The Crown sought to have Mr. Mei identify the accused from surveillance video footage based on his prior acquaintance.

The defence argued that the witness was in no better position than the jury due to poor image quality.

The court applied the "prior acquaintance/better position" test, finding that Mr. Mei had significant prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the jury to identify him from the video, despite the image quality.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice, with appropriate jury instructions to mitigate risks of unreliability.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to obstruct justice by lying to police about the identity of the person who killed her ex-boyfriend.

The accused was assaulted by her ex-boyfriend with a knife, and her current boyfriend shot and killed him in defence.

When police arrived, the accused gave false statements claiming she did not know who the shooter was, and she attempted to persuade a witness not to mention her boyfriend to police.

The accused maintained this lie for seven and a half months before finally admitting the truth.

The court imposed a nine-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, balancing her youth, guilty plea, and lack of criminal record against the serious nature of obstructing justice in a homicide investigation.

Judge-alone criminal trial on historical allegations of sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 16 arising from alleged incidents in a shared household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's blanket denial, but nonetheless found that the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt, particularly given the circumstances of the alleged incidents, the prior partial disclosure evidence, and reliability concerns arising from the complainant's later use of the allegation during a separate confrontation.

The Crown therefore failed to prove either count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

Hassan Jarrar was charged with three counts of breaching a section 810.2 recognizance.

The Crown withdrew one count.

The court found Jarrar guilty on two counts: having contact with a female under 16 years of age (K.S.) and breaching curfew.

The court rejected the defence of mistake of fact regarding K.S.'s age, finding Jarrar knew she was 14 and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The court also found Jarrar breached his curfew by staying at a motel with K.S. instead of his designated residence.

The accused, a paediatrician, faced multiple historical sexual assault and indecent assault counts arising from alleged misconduct during medical examinations of young female patients over several decades.

The court applied the frameworks in W.(D.), Chase, and Handy, and separately assessed each count rather than relying on similar fact reasoning to cure evidentiary frailties.

Convictions were entered on two hospital-related indecent assault counts and one home-visit indecent assault count where the court found the complainants credible and reliable, the accused not credible, and the impugned touching clearly outside any legitimate medical purpose.

The remaining counts resulted in acquittals because reasonable doubt arose from evidentiary inconsistencies, parental presence during examinations, lack of expert evidence on standard of care and propriety of certain examinations, and concerns about memory contamination or parental influence.

The court sentenced an offender convicted of multiple sexual assaults against three young complainants who were between six and nine years old and were entrusted to his care through a tutoring business operated from his home.

Applying the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for offences involving abuse of persons under eighteen, the court treated the offender’s position of trust, the age and vulnerability of the complainants, the grooming-like social activities, and the ongoing psychological harm as aggravating factors.

The court stayed the sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching counts under the Kienapple principle, imposed a seven-year global sentence, and granted pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5:1 for 886 days.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, lifetime sex offender registration, and a two-year prohibition under s. 161.

The applicant, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced as a youth to ten years, applied for an annual review of his sentence under s. 94(6) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He sought to serve the remaining two years of his custodial sentence in open custody to attend college, rather than being transferred to an adult provincial facility upon turning twenty-one.

The court found that the applicant had made tremendous rehabilitative gains, including completing high school despite a learning disability, and demonstrated significant maturity.

The application was granted, and the sentence was varied to open custody to reward his progress and further his rehabilitation.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual assault, sexual touching of a person under 16, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

At sentencing, the court imposed a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order for ten years.

The Crown subsequently brought an application to correct the order to life, as mandated by the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding it was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to correct the error.

The court held that while judges may correct errors in expressing their manifest intention, they cannot simply correct manifest errors where the original decision was one of commission rather than omission.

Following convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against young children, the Crown brought an application to designate the offender a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, historical youth offences, and the offender’s conduct in grooming and repeatedly abusing two victims.

Although aspects of the psychiatric risk assessment were treated with caution due to reliance on unproven allegations, the court found overwhelming evidence of entrenched pedophilia, denial of responsibility, and refusal to engage in treatment.

These factors demonstrated a high likelihood of future sexual recidivism and severe psychological harm to potential victims.

The court concluded that neither a determinate sentence nor long‑term offender supervision would adequately protect the public and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused, Leon Alexander and Edmund Benjamin, were charged in relation to the stabbing deaths of Andy James and Brandon Ramdeen following a boat cruise.

The Crown alleged that Alexander stabbed James or was a party to the stabbing, and that both accused participated in a group assault on Ramdeen during which he was fatally stabbed by another individual.

The trial judge found that while Alexander assaulted James, he did not stab him and his actions were not a significant contributing cause of death.

The judge also found the identification evidence regarding the assault on Ramdeen to be unreliable.

Both accused were acquitted of all charges.

During a murder trial, the applicant sought to introduce the police statement and examination-in-chief of an unavailable witness from a previous related trial under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The applicant did not seek to introduce the cross-examination from the previous trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that without the cross-examination or an adequate substitute, the threshold reliability of the statements was not established due to significant inconsistencies and credibility issues.

In a homicide prosecution arising from two fatal stabbings following a boat cruise event, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased identifying the assailant and statements of unidentified bystanders overheard during a related fight.

The court considered the res gestae exception and the principled approach to hearsay under authorities including Starr, Mapara, and Khelawon.

Although necessity was established for the deceased’s statements, the court found reliability lacking due to contradictory identifications, the dark and chaotic conditions of the incident, and the declarant’s misidentification of another individual.

The court also rejected the admission of anonymous bystander statements because their circumstances did not demonstrate spontaneity or reliability and carried a high risk of prejudice.

Only the deceased’s initial spontaneous exclamations describing the stabbing, but not identifying an assailant, were admitted.

Following convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two young victims, the Crown initiated a dangerous offender application.

Prior to the hearing, the court ruled on the admissibility of documentary records from multiple agencies relating to the accused’s youth criminal history, probation supervision, psychiatric treatment, and counselling.

The court held that hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing proceedings, including dangerous offender hearings, provided it is credible and trustworthy and subject to the Crown’s burden to prove disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the records were prepared contemporaneously by professionals performing public duties and were therefore sufficiently reliable.

The documents were admitted, with certain limitations on their use and with the possibility that their authors could be called for cross-examination if accuracy were seriously challenged.