George D. Finlayson

The appellant was arrested for sexual assault during an undercover police operation targeting public sex in a park.

After the criminal charge was withdrawn, the appellant sued the police for negligence, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting proposed expert evidence, failing to consider his section 15(1) Charter discrimination claim, and dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unnecessary, the trial judge properly considered and rejected the Charter claim, and there was no evidence of malice to support malicious prosecution.

The landlord entered into an agreement to sell a commercial property to a third-party purchaser, subject to the tenant's right of first refusal.

After the tenant indicated it would not pay the proposed price, the landlord and purchaser entered into a second agreement without the right of first refusal condition.

The tenant subsequently exercised its right of first refusal, leading both the tenant and the purchaser to seek specific performance.

The trial judge granted specific performance to the purchaser, finding the right of first refusal void for uncertainty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the tenant's appeal, holding that the right of first refusal was enforceable, converted into an equitable interest when the landlord accepted the purchaser's offer, and was not waived by the tenant's negotiating tactics.

The appellant, a former psychotherapist, appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against five female patients.

At trial, the appellant argued that the sexual acts were either consensual, part of bona fide therapy, or occurred outside the therapeutic relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge fundamentally erred in his jury instructions on consent by conflating medical 'informed consent' with criminal consent and failing to properly put the defence's theory to the jury.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from a prior disciplinary hearing under the principled exception, as the necessity and reliability criteria were not met.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for damages arising from sexual contact in 1972.

The defendant sought to add the plaintiff's parents and former boyfriend as third parties, arguing they were responsible for the plaintiff's damages due to subsequent abuse.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to add the third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that section 1 of the Negligence Act only permits claims for contribution and indemnity between concurrent wrongdoers, not independent tortfeasors whose acts occurred at different times.

The court-appointed interim receiver brought a motion to lift a stay pending appeal of an order approving the sale of the bankrupt companies' assets.

The appellants opposed the sale.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal had questionable merit and that delaying the sale of the business as a going concern would cause manifest prejudice.

The motion was allowed, the stay was lifted, and the receiver was authorized to complete the sale.

The respondent consigned a boat to a marine dealership, which sold it to the appellant for $46,000 without the respondent's authorization.

The dealership went bankrupt without remitting the proceeds.

The respondent sued the appellant for the return of the boat or its value, and was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the appellant was a good faith purchaser without notice of the dealership's lack of authority.

The court held that section 2(1) of the Factors Act protected the appellant, as it does not impose a due diligence requirement on purchasers to inquire into a mercantile agent's authority.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision finding that a solicitor acted for the appellant on the entirety of a single loan transaction and that the solicitor's receipt of $90,000 was on behalf of the creditor.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, noting the single mortgage commitment and letters of instruction.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding costs, finding no justification for the motions judge's award of solicitor and client costs.

The costs order was varied to party and party costs fixed at $5,000.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondents fixed at $5,000.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a trial judgment finding no intention to form a debt between the bankrupt and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings, which accepted the respondent's explanation for questionable book entries, could not be disturbed.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award from a solicitor and client scale to a party and party scale, noting the trustee was justified in being suspicious of the altered accounting records.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping and forcible confinement after holding a family hostage for 22 days to extract a ransom.

They appealed, arguing they acted under duress from the 'Snakeheads', a criminal organization that smuggled them into Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no air of reality to the duress defence because the appellants voluntarily associated with the criminal organization and had multiple safe avenues of escape.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed, reducing the life sentences for kidnapping to 14 years.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum on costs following an appeal.

The court noted that the increase in the monetary award authorized by the court placed the judgment significantly above the appellant's Rule 49 offer to settle.

Consequently, the court varied the trial costs disposition to award the appellant party-and-party costs up to the date of the offer and solicitor-and-client costs thereafter.

The appellant was also awarded the costs of the appeal on a party-and-party basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge regarding post-offence conduct and expert evidence concerning a drug associated with amnesia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the trial was brief, the factual scenario was easy to understand, and defence counsel's failure to object to the charge was significant.

The court found no merit in the other grounds raised and denied leave to appeal the sentence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after a guilty plea to indecent assault arising from historical sexual abuse of a child by an adult in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal held that a community-based sentence could not satisfy denunciation and general deterrence for repeated and escalating sexual assaults of a vulnerable minor.

The sentencing judge was found to have overemphasized the offender's remorse and the delay-related personal consequences while giving insufficient weight to the gravity of the abuse and its lasting harm to the victim.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was increased to twenty months' custody, with credit for time already served on the conditional sentence.

The appellants agreed to purchase a property, but the transaction failed to close after the respondent registered a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against title, claiming a right of first refusal.

A motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed on the basis that there was a triable issue.

The appellants subsequently sued the respondent for damages under s. 103(4) of the Courts of Justice Act for registering the CPL without a reasonable claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, holding that the previous order refusing to discharge the CPL was a decision in rem and rendered the issue res judicata.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a motion to discharge a CPL only determines whether there is a triable issue, not the ultimate merits of the claim, and therefore cannot support a plea of res judicata.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency, arguing errors in the jury charge, improper cross-examination by the Crown, and the improper admission of expert evidence regarding delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge departed from the Lifchus standard, failed to adequately relate the defence's position, and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The Court also found the Crown's cross-examination improper and the expert evidence inadmissible under the necessity requirement.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was charged with extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion, and threatening death.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the appellant by drawing an inference that he was an innocent dupe who merely facilitated a meeting without knowing its purpose.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the motions judge's decision, holding that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, which is the province of the trier of fact at trial.

The appellant appealed two conditions of his 15-month conditional sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal struck the condition requiring him to write a letter of apology to the victim.

The court held that a court-mandated expression of remorse is subjective, fruitless, and diminishes the mitigating effect of genuine remorse.

The court also varied a curfew condition on consent to allow the appellant to work and earn a livelihood.

The appeal was allowed and the conditions were varied accordingly.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question about reasonable doubt and by holding an in-chambers conference regarding the jury's request to clear the courtroom for the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repetition of the original reasonable doubt charge was appropriate.

The court also held that the in-chambers conference was not inappropriate, caused no prejudice, and any irregularity was cured by section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant suffered significant losses in his commodities trading account and successfully sued his brokerage firm for negligent supervision.

The trial judge awarded damages but deducted profits the appellant had made in previous years.

The appellant appealed the quantum of damages and the dismissal of his breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that no fiduciary duty existed, as the appellant was an experienced trader who directed his own account.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on damages, holding that the trial judge erred in deducting past profits, as each trade was a separate transaction and the earlier profitable trades did not constitute an actionable tort.

Damages were increased to $405,741.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that interpreted a share purchase agreement to include an unexpected income tax refund as an 'account receivable' and found them liable for a bankruptcy dividend distribution.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the agreement was unambiguous and did not contemplate the tax refund as an account receivable.

The Court also found that the bankruptcy dividend had been paid in full and that the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim for additional items.

The action was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded punitive damages and solicitor-and-client costs against him arising from a partnership dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding errors.

The Court noted that the trial judge properly distinguished between the appellant's conduct as a partner, which justified punitive damages, and his fraud and deception on the court, which justified solicitor-and-client costs.