Jordan Rowland Douglas Lester

The applicant and respondent, father and son, jointly owned a property used for their auto body business.

The applicant sought an unequal distribution of the proceeds from the property's sale, claiming unjust enrichment because his corporation paid all expenses and improvements since 2005.

The court dismissed the application, finding the claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act because the cause of action arose in 2007-2008 when the respondent refused to transfer title.

Alternatively, the court found the applicant failed to prove unjust enrichment, as the corporation, not the applicant personally, incurred the expenses, and there was a juristic reason for the respondent's retention of the benefit.

The appellant challenged only the monetary component of a summary judgment finding of copyright infringement, arguing that the profits award failed to account for expenses such as labour, taxes, and rent.

The court held that under s. 35(2) of the Copyright Act, the defendant bore the onus of proving any deductions from revenues earned through infringing sales.

Because no evidentiary foundation was provided for the claimed expenses before the motion judge, and further calculations were advanced for the first time on appeal, there was no basis for appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive.

The applicant, a school board trustee, brought an application for judicial review of an in-camera decision of the respondent school board.

At the hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary issue that the application was premature because the in-camera decision had not been brought to a public vote as required by the Education Act.

The parties reached an agreement that no decision was made and the matter would not be put to a public vote, leaving only the issue of costs.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicant $10,000 in costs, finding that the respondent failed to communicate its intention not to proceed with a public vote until the hearing, causing the applicant to unnecessarily incur costs.

The applicant, The Corporation of the Township of Nipigon, sought a declaration that its Municipal Accommodation Tax By-law 1940 was properly enacted and that the respondents were in contravention of its terms.

The applicant also sought payment of outstanding municipal accommodation tax amounts.

The respondents argued that they should be compensated for the costs of collecting and remitting the tax.

The court found that the by-law was properly enacted pursuant to the Municipal Act, 2001, and that no statutory provision required the municipality to compensate businesses for tax collection efforts.

The court granted the application and ordered the respondents to pay the outstanding amounts plus costs.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of a school board decision finding she breached the Trustee Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The Divisional Court found the application was not moot despite the sanctions being reduced to time served, as the finding of misconduct remained on her record.

The court quashed the decision, finding the board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant and the trustees with the investigator's report and by failing to commence the inquiry within the required six-month timeline.

The court also found the decision blatantly unreasonable, as the investigator's findings did not support the conclusion that the applicant disclosed confidential information.

The court considered costs following a summary judgment motion in a copyright dispute between the Lakehead District School Board and Anna Mauro o/a 807 ISC Thunder Bay.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing complete success and an entitlement to elevated costs.

The court found the plaintiff was not wholly successful, as punitive damages were not awarded and no valid Rule 49 offer was served.

The court determined the claimed costs were excessive and not proportional, ultimately awarding the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $8,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiff, St. Joseph’s Hospital, commenced an action against the City of Thunder Bay for property damages allegedly caused by the addition of sodium hydroxide to the municipal water supply.

After a parallel class action was certified, the plaintiff decided to join the class proceeding, and the parties agreed to stay the individual action.

The City moved for costs thrown away regarding a document review and cancelled discoveries, while the plaintiff cross-moved for the costs of a prior case conference.

The court dismissed both claims, finding that the City failed to provide a Bill of Costs to support its claims and that the plaintiff's request was barred because the prior case conference endorsement was silent on costs.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by Caroline Manon Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute involving Browns Clearwater West Lodge Inc. and related parties.

The court found that the motion did not meet the criteria for partial summary judgment, as it would not make the litigation cheaper, faster, or avoid inconsistent findings.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce a notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management issues.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment brought by Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute.

The court found that the motion did not advance the litigation and that the issues, including the right to set off and the meaning of the contract, required a trial.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce the notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management going forward.

The appellant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, appealed a summary judgment order that awarded the respondent, Karen Dufault, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was the enforceability of termination clauses in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the "for cause" termination clause was unenforceable because its definition of "cause" was broader than the ESA's narrow exception for "wilful misconduct." Applying the principle from Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., the court held that the invalidity of the "for cause" clause rendered all termination provisions in the contract unenforceable, even though the respondent was terminated without cause.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the original award of damages.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of four decisions by the respondent school board finding she breached the Trustee Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions, finding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the full investigation reports to the applicant and the decision-makers.

The Court also found the decisions unreasonable as they lacked intelligibility, the sanctions were excessive and punitive, and the Board failed to consider the applicant's s. 2(b) Charter rights.

The Lakehead District School Board (the Board) brought a motion for summary judgment against Anna Mauro, operating as 807 ISC Thunder Bay, alleging copyright and moral rights infringement.

The Board claimed Mauro produced and sold clothing featuring names, mascots, logos, and colour schemes of its schools without authorization.

Mauro argued the works were not registered, not original, and her designs were sufficiently different.

The court found that copyright subsisted with the Board, was infringed by Mauro, and granted declarations, a permanent injunction, delivery up of infringing works, and damages representing disgorgement of profits.

The Board's claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Lori Van Santvoort-Jansekovich, sued the estate of her mother's former husband, John ("Jack") Lundstrom, for unjust enrichment, seeking $469,164.05 in restitution for alleged unpaid services.

Lori claimed she provided extensive property management and business services to Jack from 1991 to 2004, based on an oral agreement that she would inherit a quarter of his estate.

The court found Lori's claims of work exaggerated and untruthful, and that she had been adequately compensated by 22 years of rent-free housing, the gifting of a house, and free accommodation and meals.

The court also concluded that no agreement to make Lori a beneficiary was proven, that the claim was statute-barred, and barred by the doctrine of laches due to significant delay and the loss of crucial witness evidence (Jack's testimony).

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $25,358.33 after successfully obtaining a summary judgment of $157,071.57.

The plaintiff had made a Rule 49 Offer to Settle for $120,000, which was less than the judgment amount.

The defendant made no offer to settle and refused mediation.

Despite the plaintiff's entitlement to substantial indemnity costs due to the Rule 49 offer, the court found the plaintiff's bill of costs excessive given the procedural simplicity of the matter, lack of factual disputes, and minimal time required.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $6,500, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant, a school board trustee, brought motions to stay sanctions imposed against her by the respondent school board for violating its Trustee Code of Conduct, pending the hearing of her judicial review applications.

The sanctions included barring her from attending board and committee meetings and a public censure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and granted the stay, finding that there were serious issues to be tried regarding the board's process and jurisdiction, that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if barred from meetings she could never attend again, and that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant as her application would be largely moot if she served the sanctions before the hearing.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal from a fixed-term employment contract, arguing the termination clauses were unenforceable under the Employment Standards Act (ESA).

The court found the 'for cause' clause violated the ESA by using a common law standard broader than the statutory exemption and allowing withholding of statutory pay.

The 'without cause' clause also contravened the ESA by limiting compensation to base salary and asserting absolute termination discretion.

Consequently, the termination clauses were deemed unenforceable, and the plaintiff was awarded damages for the unexpired term of the fixed-term contract, consistent with the principle that fixed-term contracts without enforceable early termination provisions obligate payment for the full term.

The plaintiff contractor brought an action against the defendant owner for extension and delay costs incurred during a construction project governed by a CCDC2 fixed price contract.

The project was delayed by six months due to owner-directed changes and design issues, which were addressed through Change Orders that extended the contract time and increased the price, but did not include the contractor's site and delay costs.

The court dismissed the action, finding that under the fixed price contract, the contractor was required to include all costs associated with a change in the Change Orders, or alternatively, provide timely written notice of a delay claim.

The court also declined to grant relief from forfeiture, concluding that the contractor's failure to follow the contractual notice provisions was unreasonable and undermined the cost certainty intended by the contract.

The applicant, Brown’s Clearwater West Lodge Inc., brought two motions: one to consolidate two related actions (a share purchase action and a mortgage action) and another to set aside default judgments obtained by the respondent, Caroline Manon Labonte, in the mortgage action.

The court granted both motions, finding that the default judgments were irregularly obtained and should be set aside as of right without imposing terms.

The court also found that consolidation was appropriate given the interwoven issues and common questions of fact and law stemming from the same share purchase agreement, promoting judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant, Robert Collette, appealed a motion judge's order that, while striking out most claims under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, allowed a claim for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional harm to proceed.

The core issue on appeal was whether a successful s. 137.1 motion requires dismissal of the entire action or permits dismissal of only specific claims.

The Court of Appeal found that, based on the motion judge's finding that the entire action was motivated to silence public interest expression, the entire action should have been dismissed.

The appeal was allowed, and the entire action was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a dispute over the purchase price of a property.

The appellant (vendor) claimed the agreed price was $80,000, while the respondent (purchaser) asserted it was $40,000, which he had already paid.

The trial judge found in favour of the purchaser, interpreting the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) contextually.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's contextual interpretation of the contract, consistent with the principles set out in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., and deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact and assessment of evidence.