Jordan Rowland Douglas Lester

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied to displace an individual as guardian for property of an elderly person and to compel the individual to repay substantial funds transferred from the elderly person.

The elderly person, suffering from cognitive impairment, had appointed the individual as her attorney for property.

Shortly after, the elderly person transferred significant sums to the attorney and another individual.

The court found that the attorney failed to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the funds she received and breached her fiduciary duty by not acting in the elderly person's best interests.

The PGT's application was allowed, terminating the attorney's power of attorney, appointing the PGT as permanent guardian, and ordering the attorney to repay over $334,000.

The Plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully proving copyright infringement and being awarded statutory damages.

The Defendants argued for no costs or their own costs due to the Plaintiff's limited success and failure to accept their settlement offer.

The court awarded the Plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $30,000, finding that neither party's settlement offer triggered Rule 49.10 consequences and adjusting the Plaintiff's claimed costs for reasonableness and proportionality.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay against two respondents under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge found the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for a four-year delay, rejecting their "wait and see" approach tied to another delayed action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretionary decision and reiterating that failure on the first part of the two-part test (acceptable explanation) is sufficient for dismissal.

The defendant, John Harold White, brought a motion for leave to issue a writ of possession or, alternatively, an interim order for the preservation and custody of a property.

White was the registered owner, but the plaintiff, Yvan Gauthier, was in possession following an oral agreement to purchase the property, having paid $40,000.

A dispute arose regarding the total purchase price, with Gauthier claiming it was $40,000 (already paid) and White claiming it was $80,000.

The court dismissed both requests.

It held that a writ of possession requires an underlying order for possession, which was absent, and that an interlocutory order for possession was not warranted given the serious issue to be tried, the irreparable harm Gauthier would suffer if forced to vacate, and the balance of convenience favouring Gauthier.

The request for a preservation order was also denied, as it was sought to obtain possession for White's personal use, not for the actual preservation of the property.

The appellants sought a declaration that a 99-year lease registered against their property in 1972 was void, alleging it violated the Planning Act's subdivision prohibition.

The lease was entered into in 1968 between the respondent and the appellants' predecessor in title.

The application judge found that an oral lease agreement existed with part performance before the relevant statutory exemption was removed on May 2, 1968, thereby validating the lease.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: procedural fairness, lack of evidentiary support for part performance, and misapplication of the part performance test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge denied procedural fairness by raising the oral lease and part performance issues only at the conclusion of argument and then refusing to permit the appellants to file further evidence to address these issues.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favor of Copperfin Credit Union against Rosalba Cupello on a personal guarantee of corporate indebtedness.

The appellant argued that Copperfin materially varied the loan agreement by advancing funds before obtaining all security documentation, thereby releasing the guarantor from liability.

The appellant also claimed a collateral agreement limited advances to $200,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the guarantee expressly protected the lender from liability variations, that no evidence supported the alleged collateral agreement, and that the entire agreement clause and parol evidence rule precluded such modifications.

This decision addresses the costs of a passing of accounts application for Irmgard Burgstaler, a person under a disability.

Erwin Burgstaler, the Attorney for Property, was found to have breached his fiduciary duties by misusing funds, leading to an order for him to repay approximately $127,000 to the estate.

The Objectors, Barbara Morison and Peter Burgstaler, were substantially successful in their objections.

The court applied the "loser pays" principle in estate litigation, balanced with public policy considerations for proper estate administration.

A blended costs order was issued, requiring Erwin Burgstaler to personally pay partial indemnity costs, with the estate covering the difference to full indemnity costs for the Objectors.

The appellant sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated November 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the proposed appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for wrongful (constructive) dismissal and related relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employment agreement was frustrated, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding workplace harassment and his inability to return to work within a reasonable time.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that he was constructively dismissed due to termination of employment benefits, finding that the benefits terminated on the same date the employment contract was frustrated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant brought four related actions against various respondents arising from dealings that occurred primarily in the United States between 2001 and 2016.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a real and substantial connection to the province.

The motion judges granted the motions and dismissed all actions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether Ontario jurisdiction existed based on: (1) consulting contracts allegedly entered into at Toronto airport; (2) products being advertised, marketed, and distributed in Ontario; and (3) respondents carrying on business in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissals, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario and affirming that mere advertising or distribution through third-party retailers does not constitute carrying on business in the jurisdiction.

An employee with a disability developed arm and hand problems due to work demands and was placed on medical leave, then terminated.

The employee sued for wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code violations.

The trial judge awarded 15 months' pay in lieu of notice and $10,000 in damages, finding the employer had accommodated the disability to the point of undue hardship and that disability was a factor in termination.

On appeal, the employee sought additional damages for lost income during the leave period, while the employer cross-appealed arguing the employment contract was frustrated.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with the court finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code claims, and alternatively, a motion to transfer the proceeding from Thunder Bay to Kenora.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's developmental limitations and the fairness of the termination investigation.

The court also dismissed the venue transfer motion, affirming the plaintiff's prima facie right to choose venue and finding the defendant did not demonstrate Kenora was significantly better than Thunder Bay.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, arguing no real and substantial connection existed between the litigation and Ontario.

The plaintiff, a Canadian citizen residing in California at the material time, sued the California-based defendant for torts and breach of contract related to bail bonds posted in San Francisco.

The court applied the Van Breda test, finding none of the presumptive connecting factors (defendant's domicile/business in Ontario, tort in Ontario, contract in Ontario) were present.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his sister's indemnitor role in Ontario or foreseeable damages in Ontario established jurisdiction.

The motion was granted, and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff, a salesman with over fifteen years of service, claimed damages for wrongful or constructive dismissal, workplace harassment, and discrimination based on disability under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The defendant denied the allegations, arguing the contract was abandoned or frustrated, and that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.

The court found no objective basis for the plaintiff's harassment claims, no constructive dismissal, and concluded that the employment contract was frustrated due to the plaintiff's inability to return to work.

All claims were dismissed.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to answer undertakings and re-attend for examination.

The motion was dismissed due to its late timing and the defendant's counsel's delay and discourteous conduct.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motion was brought inappropriately late.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's counsel's conduct inappropriate but not rising to the level warranting substantial indemnity, and applied the principles of reasonableness and access to justice under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to answer undertakings from an examination for discovery and re-attend for further examination.

The undertakings concerned financial records for the plaintiff's business, which the plaintiff deemed irrelevant, having provided Canada Revenue Agency notices of assessment.

The defendant delayed over a year in bringing the motion, despite repeated attempts by the plaintiff's counsel to arrange for continuation of examinations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant's delay inappropriate and noting the significant potential for trial delay.

The court emphasized that the defendant had ample opportunity for discovery and was not precluded from cross-examining on financial records at trial, applying principles of proportionality and orderly progress of the action.