John S. Fregeau

The applicant sought spousal support following the breakdown of a long-term common law relationship.

The respondent failed to file financial disclosure or participate in the proceeding, resulting in an uncontested hearing.

The court found the applicant had been financially dependent during the relationship and that the respondent had the ability to pay support.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and s. 34(1)(c) of the Family Law Act, the court ordered lump sum spousal support equivalent to the respondent’s share of equity in the jointly owned home.

A vesting order transferred the respondent’s interest in the property to the applicant in satisfaction of the support obligation.

The offender pleaded guilty to incest contrary to s. 155 of the Criminal Code for engaging in a prolonged sexual relationship with his adult granddaughter, whom he had raised since childhood.

The conduct occurred over several years and involved repeated sexual intercourse while the victim remained emotionally and financially dependent on the offender.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including abuse of a position of trust, grooming behaviour, and attempts to intimidate the victim after disclosure.

Although the offender was an Indigenous residential school survivor with no criminal record and a Gladue report was considered, the court held that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence.

A conditional sentence was rejected as inconsistent with the seriousness of the offence.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking temporary custody of the parties’ four‑year‑old child, child support, contribution to section 7 daycare expenses, and orders relating to the jointly owned matrimonial home pending trial.

The parties had been following a temporary “2‑2‑3” shared parenting arrangement which had resulted in ongoing parental conflict and police involvement.

Applying the best interests of the child factors under s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the arrangement unworkable and determined that the child should primarily reside with the mother, who had historically been the primary caregiver and could provide greater stability and routine.

The court granted the mother temporary custody with defined access to the father, ordered guideline child support and contribution to daycare expenses based on the father’s income, and directed the father to maintain and clean the jointly owned home pending sale.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order following a reverse-onus bail hearing on firearm-related charges.

The accused proposed release to reside with his mother as surety, a cash deposit, strict curfew, and participation in a substance abuse treatment program.

The Crown opposed release, relying on the accused’s criminal record, outstanding arrest warrant in another province, alleged involvement in a pharmacy break and enter, and the discovery of a loaded restricted firearm while he was subject to weapons prohibitions.

The court held the accused failed to show cause why detention was not justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10).

Concerns included risk of flight, likelihood of reoffending linked to addiction and criminal history, and the seriousness of the firearm offences.

The accused was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code arising from an alleged non‑consensual sexual encounter in the accused’s residence.

The complainant testified that the accused forced intercourse after preventing her from leaving, while the accused maintained the encounter was consensual.

Evidence revealed inconsistencies in the complainant’s prior statements and testimony, particularly regarding the presence of a third party in the small residence during the alleged assault.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court rejected the accused’s evidence but found that the totality of the evidence, including the third‑party witness testimony, left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought declarations that funds advanced under a provincial training funding agreement were held in trust and should be returned following the insolvency of the recipient limited partnership.

The court considered whether the funds were impressed with a Quistclose trust and whether a receiver’s charging order nonetheless had priority over those funds.

Applying authorities including Quistclose and Twinsectra, the court held that the agreement restricted the use of funds to a specific training project and required repayment of unspent funds, demonstrating the necessary intention to create a trust.

The court found the remaining funds held by the receiver were impressed with a trust in favour of the applicant but concluded they were subject to the receiver’s previously granted charging order.

The funding agreement was declared terminated.

The accused was tried on multiple counts of sexual assault and assault arising from incidents occurring in October and December 2010 within an intimate relationship.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault arising from a later incident but contested the remaining charges.

The court found the complainant’s evidence regarding the alleged sexual assaults unreliable due to significant inconsistencies, contradictions with other witnesses, and post‑incident communications between the complainant and the accused that undermined her credibility.

Forensic evidence showing the accused’s DNA on vaginal and rectal swabs did not assist the Crown because it could not exclude consensual intercourse in the days preceding the examination.

The court convicted the accused of one count of assault but acquitted on the sexual assault counts and a further assault charge due to reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and a sentence of 60 days’ intermittent incarceration.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.) and provided insufficient reasons for rejecting defence evidence.

The court held that the trial judge considered the whole of the evidence and did not shift the burden of proof, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the sentencing judge failed to conduct a Gladue analysis despite the offender being Indigenous, contrary to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was therefore set aside and the matter remitted for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed a final order of the Ontario Court of Justice requiring payment of child support and ancillary relief.

He argued that the trial was unfair because certain documents were introduced without advance notice and that the family court lacked jurisdiction due to alleged fraud relating to conception.

The Superior Court held that the appellant failed to request an adjournment at trial to address the documents and therefore could not rely on that complaint on appeal.

The court further held that once paternity was established, the trial judge had jurisdiction to order child support and was not required to refer allegations of fraud to a criminal court.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The court granted a motion to change a child support order after finding a material change in circumstances caused by the moving party's workplace injury and resulting income shift.

The variation was made retroactive to January 1, 2006.

Income for support purposes was recalculated using allocated WSIB loss-of-earnings benefits, a 30% gross-up for non-taxable amounts, and limited inclusion of repayment shortfalls.

No additional income was imputed after April 19, 2011.

For the adult children's post-secondary costs, the court required each child to contribute 50% of available employment income and student loan resources, with the moving party responsible for the remaining balances and specified guideline support periods.

The court also ordered payment of historic section 7 dental expenses and left costs for further written submissions if not agreed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired operation of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had accepted evidence that the accused displayed typical indicia of impairment but framed the legal issue as whether the accused’s conduct represented a marked departure from that of a normal person.

The appeal court held this was an error of law because the correct standard is whether the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired to any degree, ranging from slight to great.

The trial judge also erred by treating a First Nations peacekeeper as a peace officer and drawing adverse inferences from the absence of an immediate arrest.

Applying the correct legal test, the court concluded the necessary factual findings had been made and substituted a conviction.

The moving party brought a motion for interim relief within a motion to change a final order, seeking an increase in spousal support from $590 per month to approximately $1,500 per month pending determination of the variation application.

The moving party, suffering from advanced Parkinson’s disease and unable to work, argued that the responding party’s increased income and his ongoing need justified an interim increase.

The court reviewed the governing principles for interim variation of final support orders, including the requirement to establish a prima facie case for variation together with hardship or urgency.

Although the responding party’s income had increased modestly, the court found no evidence of increased expenses or uncovered medical costs and concluded that the threshold test was not met.

The motion for interim variation was therefore dismissed.

Following dismissal of a motion challenging confirmation of a case management master's report, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on an earlier offer to settle under Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that although the offer technically met Rule 49.10 requirements, it lacked meaningful compromise and therefore declined to strictly apply the rule’s presumptive cost consequences.

Considering the principles of reasonableness, the complexity of the motion, the volume of materials, and factors under Rule 57.01 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed costs at a global amount.

Costs were awarded on a discretionary basis rather than strictly under the offer‑to‑settle regime.

The appellant father appealed a child protection disposition order granting Crown wardship with no access regarding two children.

He argued the trial judge erred in fact by ignoring evidence that parental substance abuse and domestic violence had ceased and erred in law by placing undue emphasis on continuity of care under s. 37(3)7 of the Child and Family Services Act while failing to properly balance other statutory factors, including cultural identity considerations for Indigenous children under s. 37(4).

The court held that no palpable and overriding factual error or legal error was demonstrated and that the trial judge had properly considered the relevant statutory factors.

The court found that the evidence regarding the harm of disrupting the long‑term foster placement supported the disposition.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.