Jocelyn Speyer

The applicant sought a 10% share interest in a corporation that owned a property, alleging an oral agreement with one of the respondents in exchange for services related to financing, soil remediation, permits, and finding buyers for the property.

The respondents denied any such agreement or authority to bind the corporation.

The court found no credible or reliable evidence to support the applicant's claims, noting the absence of any documentation for a significant business transaction and the applicant's evasiveness during cross-examination.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued their title insurer, FCT, after being denied coverage for alleged construction deficiencies.

FCT brought a third party claim against the tort defendants (the sellers/builders and municipality) for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to strike FCT's third party claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that FCT had not settled the plaintiffs' claim and therefore could not rely on the Negligence Act, common law, equity, or subrogation rights to claim contribution and indemnity.

The court also granted FCT's motion on consent to have the title insurance action and the tort action heard together or consecutively to avoid duplication.

This judgment addresses the costs awarded in relation to applications concerning the appointment of an umpire under the Insurance Act.

Wawanesa's application was dismissed due to the respondent's reasonable apprehension of bias caused by Wawanesa's conduct in the umpire selection process.

The respondent's cross-application for umpire selection was successful.

The court awarded the respondent full indemnity costs, finding Wawanesa's conduct "high-handed and oppressive" demonstrating bad faith and disregard for proper procedure.

Despite the respondent's separate application being deemed unnecessary, the court fixed the full indemnity costs at $35,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff, Penalta Group Ltd., brought a motion to extend deadlines for serving expert reports and setting the action down for trial, following a previous order that set aside an administrative dismissal for delay.

The defendant American Buildings Company opposed the motion, arguing for automatic reinstatement of the dismissal.

The court granted the extension for setting the action down for trial to November 3, 2022, and partially granted the extension for expert reports, specifically for Mr. Hartog's report to July 30, 2022.

However, a further extension for an additional expert report was denied due to insufficient evidence that an expert had been retained or how long it would take.

The court also granted leave for the plaintiff to continue the motion after serving the trial record.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court applied the five-factor test from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, assessing promptness, plausible excuse for default, arguable defence, prejudice, and integrity of justice.

The court found the defendants' explanation for default incredible and their proposed defence lacking an air of reality, particularly regarding the Construction Act claims and personal guarantees.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the default judgment.

Cory Trunks applied under the Criminal Code for access to $167,000 in seized cash to cover his legal expenses for defence against charges including drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that Trunks had other available means.

The court found that while Trunks had an interest in the funds, he failed to demonstrate that he had no other assets or means, specifically noting that he had been granted Legal Aid.

The application was dismissed, as the availability of state-funded legal assistance meant Trunks was not in the narrow category of accused persons needing access to potentially forfeited funds.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

The parties disagreed on the value of a fire loss and proceeded to an appraisal under s. 128 of the Insurance Act.

The insurer nominated a single candidate for umpire and refused to consider any alternatives proposed by the insured.

The insurer brought an application to appoint its nominee, while the insured brought a cross-application seeking an order that the parties agree on an umpire or the insurer select from her list.

The court dismissed the insurer's application, finding that its refusal to collaborate and insistence on its sole nominee created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the insured's cross-application.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action after a seven-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs of $26,010.98.

The plaintiff argued for reductions based on an unsuccessful Wagg motion, alleged duplication of work, late disclosure, and financial hardship.

The court deducted $1,500 for the unsuccessful Wagg motion but rejected the other arguments, noting the defendant's claim was already modest and hardship is not an enumerated factor under Rule 57.01.

Costs were fixed at $24,500.

The plaintiff business owner sued his commercial property insurer for failing to pay two claims for water damage to his inventory caused by a leaking roof.

The insurer denied the claims because the plaintiff failed to provide reliable proof of the value of the damaged goods, submitting invoices that were found to be inauthentic and for counterfeit products.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the first claim was barred by a valid one-year contractual limitation period.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his losses on a balance of probabilities and was not entitled to relief from forfeiture due to his unreasonable conduct in providing fake invoices.

The applicants, federal inmates, sought a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) refusal to reclassify them to minimum security, which prevented their transfer to lower-security institutions.

The core legal question was whether such a refusal constitutes a "deprivation of liberty" reviewable by habeas corpus.

The court, applying the principle of judicial comity and reviewing extensive jurisprudence, concluded that maintaining an existing security classification does not amount to a deprivation of liberty, as it does not impose new or additional constraints on residual liberty.

Consequently, habeas corpus was not an available remedy, and the applications were dismissed.

Following convictions after trial for multiple sexual offences against two young children in the offender's care, the court imposed sentence.

Applying the Supreme Court's guidance in child-sexual-offence sentencing, the court emphasized denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, the profound actual and potential harm to the children and their caregiver, repeated abuse, grooming conduct, and breach of trust.

The court conditionally stayed overlapping counts under the Kienapple rule, imposed consecutive sentences across the two victims subject to totality, and fixed a global sentence of six years' imprisonment.

Ancillary no-contact, child-protection, SOIRA, DNA, and weapons prohibition orders were also made.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused on multiple sexual offences against two child complainants living in his household.

The court carefully assessed child-witness evidence using principles recognizing children's developmental stage while maintaining the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Videorecorded statements admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code were treated as important contemporaneous evidence.

Alleged inconsistencies, possible influence, and suggested collusion were rejected as immaterial, and the accused's denial was not believed and did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff, David Westlake, sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add a new cause of action related to alleged deficiencies in the construction of a roadway, beyond the initial claim concerning a cul-de-sac.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing the limitation period had expired and that they would suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was reasonably discovered in January 2019, when a geotechnical report revealed the extent of the roadway damage, and that the delay in seeking amendment was not exceptional.

The court also found no actual non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, including due to the death of a key individual for one defendant, as the roadbed remained available for inspection and no procedural steps had been taken.

The motion for leave to amend was granted, without prejudice to the defendants' ability to raise a limitation defence at trial.

The defendant applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence seized from his car and home pursuant to search warrants.

The defendant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misrepresentations and omitted material facts, specifically a failed undercover drug buy.

The court found the affiant's misrepresentation of surveillance events was egregious and not in good faith.

After excising the inaccurate information and amplifying the ITO with the omitted facts, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrants, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the police conduct and the significant impact on the defendant's privacy interests.

The plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's large dog, resulting in a torn left rotator cuff and permanent impairment of her left shoulder.

Liability was not disputed under the Dog Owner's Liability Act.

The trial focused on the assessment of damages.

The court found that the dog bite caused the shoulder injury and awarded $100,000 in general damages.

The court also awarded $59,818.90 for past loss of income, but denied future loss of income as the plaintiff had reached typical retirement age and had other unrelated health issues.

Future care costs were assessed at $197,712.00, out-of-pocket expenses at $21,036.91, and OHIP's subrogated claim at $7,866.96, for a total judgment of $386,434.77.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking 18 forms of relief, primarily an interlocutory injunction to stay the power of sale of her commercial condominium unit by the defendant condominium corporation.

The corporation had registered a lien and initiated power of sale proceedings due to the plaintiff's failure to pay common element fees.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction as no permanent injunction was sought in the underlying action.

Furthermore, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction, and dismissed her claims for Mareva and Mills injunctions, as well as her requests to strike the defendants' pleadings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim due to severe trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to bring the motion after the action was set down for trial, finding the pandemic constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

The court provisionally struck the jury notice to prevent prejudice to the 83-year-old plaintiff, ordering that the trial proceed by judge alone unless civil jury trials have resumed when the case is called.

The offender, a transport truck driver, pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death after rear-ending a stopped vehicle in a highway construction zone, killing two young men.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families, the offender's prior driving record, and his status as a Convention refugee facing potential deportation.

The court found that the proposed sentence of five months to avoid immigration consequences was entirely inadequate given the gravity of the offences.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The self-represented plaintiff moved under Rule 63.02 to stay a previous order denying her motion for the appointment of amicus, pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court found that Rule 63.02 did not empower it to stay the action and that there was nothing in the previous order that needed to be stayed.

However, recognizing the plaintiff's disability and the practical difficulties of pursuing matters in two courts simultaneously, the court dismissed the motion to stay the order but directed under Rule 1.05 that no further steps be taken in the action until the Divisional Court determines the appeal.