Jocelyn Speyer

The Town of Wasaga Beach applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain Lake Simcoe Jet Ski Rentals from operating a business without a licence in contravention of municipal By-law 2019-26.

The respondent's business licence was revoked on July 3, 2025, but the respondent continued operations, claiming it no longer carried on business within the Town's jurisdiction.

The respondent argued its operations were limited to the Nottawasaga River and Georgian Bay, which are federally regulated waterways beyond municipal jurisdiction.

The court found that the respondent carried on business partly within the Town, as renters accessed the dock via property at 72 Main Street, Wasaga Beach, and the Town's geographic limits extend to the middle of the river under the Territorial Division Act, 2002.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, finding a strong prima facie case of by-law breach with no exceptional circumstances warranting denial.

The appellant, Jack Stelwagen, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that comments made by the trial judge during scheduling proceedings about his ability to hear a section 11(b) Charter application gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that a mistrial should have been declared.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the history of the case, including prior applications and appeals, and concluded that the trial judge’s comments did not demonstrate bias or a closed mind.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court considered whether Seedjan Sulaiman Khail, who stabbed his father to death, was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The only issue in dispute was whether the accused’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his actions were wrong.

After reviewing the psychiatric evidence and the accused’s history, the court found that while Mr. Sulaiman Khail suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the offence, he did not lack the capacity to know that his actions were wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of society.

The court found him guilty of second-degree murder.

The decision addresses three main issues: (1) the application to re-open the trial to reconsider the s. 24(2) Charter analysis in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, (2) the application for a stay of proceedings due to delay in conducting the accused’s bail hearing, and (3) the appropriate sentence for the accused, Ivor Shawn Young, following his conviction for unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm in a motor vehicle, and possession of cocaine.

The court found a breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter rights but concluded that exclusion of the evidence was not warranted.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and a sentence of three years’ imprisonment (less credit for pre-sentence custody and Downes credit) was imposed.

The applicants sought the return of their $80,000 deposit after a failed real estate transaction in which the respondent could not provide clear title.

The deposit was returned before the hearing.

The respondent agreed to pay pre-judgment interest and costs but requested several years to pay and sought to join her former lawyer as a third party, alleging the lawyer was responsible for the failed transaction.

The court dismissed the motion to join the lawyer, finding it unrelated to the application, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs and interest within 60 days.

This decision addresses the application of section 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the right to the benefit of the lesser punishment when sentencing a young person for offences committed as a juvenile under the now-repealed Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA) versus the current Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The court found that although the YCJA allows for custodial sentences including adult facilities, the JDA's provisions, which focused on treatment rather than punishment and allowed for committal to industrial schools, provide the lesser punishment.

Given the absence of industrial schools today, the maximum sentence under the JDA is probation.

The court ordered sentencing under the JDA, applying the lesser punishment principle.

This trial concerned charges of unauthorized possession of a restricted firearm, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, unauthorized possession of a restricted firearm in a motor vehicle, and possession of cocaine against two defendants.

The court applied principles of constructive possession and circumstantial evidence.

Ivor Shawn Young was found guilty of all charges, as the court concluded that the black backpack containing the gun and cocaine was between his legs, readily accessible, and the presence of a large amount of cash on him supported the inference of drug trafficking.

Justin Dyer was found not guilty of all charges, as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the cocaine or the gun in the black backpack, despite his possession of cannabis in a separate backpack.

A York Regional Police officer, Jordan Nesbitt, was charged with breach of trust, fabricating evidence, and attempting to obstruct justice following a vehicle search.

The Crown alleged he planted cocaine and falsified reports to justify an unlawful search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, citing issues with witness credibility, the integrity of the scene, and plausible alternative explanations for the presence of substances.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought a judicial sale of the defendant's property to satisfy a default judgment for unpaid credit card bills.

RBC moved for the appointment of a referee under Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing this process would yield a better price than a sheriff's sale.

The defendant did not appear.

The court dismissed RBC's motion, finding that a judicial sale is a cumbersome and expensive process that should only be ordered in "special circumstances" where there is an impediment to a sheriff's sale and a clear benefit to an equitable receiver.

The court concluded that such special circumstances, particularly regarding PIPEDA issues, no longer exist following the Supreme Court's decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Trang.

The court emphasized that the Execution Act provides the primary statutory vehicle for enforcing writs of seizure and sale against real property, and the judicial sale process is an inefficient use of court resources given current backlogs.

No order as to costs was made.

The Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC") sought a judicial sale of the defendant's jointly owned property to satisfy a default judgment for unpaid credit card bills.

RBC moved for a reference under Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as a prerequisite to an order for sale under Rule 55.06, arguing it would yield a better price than a sheriff's sale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no "special circumstances" to justify deviating from the statutory sheriff's sale process under the Execution Act.

The court also noted the cumbersome and expensive nature of judicial sales and the strain on court resources, and rejected the attempt to indirectly sever a joint tenancy to facilitate the sale of jointly owned property where the co-owner was not a debtor.

This decision addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of Mr. Fiorini's application, which sought an interest in a property but was found to be devoid of credible evidence.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the application was meritless, abusive, and retaliatory.

The court agreed, finding Mr. Fiorini's conduct reprehensible and deserving of sanction, including harassment and unnecessarily lengthening proceedings.

While the respondents requested $80,000, the court awarded $70,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, adjusting for an element of "over-lawyering" by the respondents in having two lawyers attend certain proceedings.

Joshua Burton was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother and grandmother to death.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically determining the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 18 years, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the nature of the offences, the circumstances surrounding their commission (including the brutality, disposal of bodies, and impact on victims), the offender's character (lack of prior record, but also lack of insight and empathy), and the divided jury recommendations.

The judge imposed a concurrent parole ineligibility period of 17 years for each count, along with ancillary orders.

The defendants moved for an interim stay of the plaintiff's mortgage enforcement actions, arguing that the plaintiff acted in bad faith and fraudulently, and that they could secure refinancing within four weeks.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding no credible evidence of bad faith or fraud by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles for restraining a mortgagee's rights and the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay, the court concluded there was no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm to the defendants, and that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favoured the plaintiff.

The applicant sought a 10% share interest in a corporation that owned a property, alleging an oral agreement with one of the respondents in exchange for services related to financing, soil remediation, permits, and finding buyers for the property.

The respondents denied any such agreement or authority to bind the corporation.

The court found no credible or reliable evidence to support the applicant's claims, noting the absence of any documentation for a significant business transaction and the applicant's evasiveness during cross-examination.

The application was dismissed.

This judgment addresses the costs awarded in relation to applications concerning the appointment of an umpire under the Insurance Act.

Wawanesa's application was dismissed due to the respondent's reasonable apprehension of bias caused by Wawanesa's conduct in the umpire selection process.

The respondent's cross-application for umpire selection was successful.

The court awarded the respondent full indemnity costs, finding Wawanesa's conduct "high-handed and oppressive," demonstrating bad faith and disregard for proper procedure.

Despite the respondent's separate application being deemed unnecessary, the court fixed the full indemnity costs at $35,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff, Penalta Group Ltd., brought a motion to extend deadlines for serving expert reports and setting the action down for trial, following a previous order that set aside an administrative dismissal for delay.

The defendant American Buildings Company opposed the motion, arguing for automatic reinstatement of the dismissal.

The court granted the extension for setting the action down for trial to November 3, 2022, and partially granted the extension for expert reports, specifically for Mr. Hartog's report to July 30, 2022.

However, a further extension for an additional expert report was denied due to insufficient evidence that an expert had been retained or how long it would take.

The court also granted leave for the plaintiff to continue the motion after serving the trial record.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court applied the five-factor test from Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, assessing promptness, plausible excuse for default, arguable defence, prejudice, and integrity of justice.

The court found the defendants' explanation for default incredible and their proposed defence lacking an air of reality, particularly regarding the Construction Act claims and personal guarantees.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the default judgment.

Cory Trunks applied under the Criminal Code for access to $167,000 in seized cash to cover his legal expenses for defence against charges including drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that Trunks had other available means.

The court found that while Trunks had an interest in the funds, he failed to demonstrate that he had no other assets or means, specifically noting that he had been granted Legal Aid.

The application was dismissed, as the availability of state-funded legal assistance meant Trunks was not in the narrow category of accused persons needing access to potentially forfeited funds.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

The applicants, federal inmates, sought a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) refusal to reclassify them to minimum security, which prevented their transfer to lower-security institutions.

The core legal question was whether such a refusal constitutes a "deprivation of liberty" reviewable by habeas corpus.

The court, applying the principle of judicial comity and reviewing extensive jurisprudence, concluded that maintaining an existing security classification does not amount to a deprivation of liberty, as it does not impose new or additional constraints on residual liberty.

Consequently, habeas corpus was not an available remedy, and the applications were dismissed.