R. v. O.M., 2026 ONSC 2073

R. v. O.M., 2026 ONSC 2073

BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00000139-0000

DATE: 2026-05-22

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

O.M.

Defendant

Indy Kandola, for the Crown

Emily Dyer, Counsel, for the Defendant

HEARD: April 8, 2026

J. SPEYER, J.

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Overview

1O.M. was found guilty, after his trial by jury, of sexually abusing M., his de facto daughter, and T., the daughter of his friend. He was found guilty of two counts of sexual interference.

2The Crown seeks a jail sentence of twelve years. The defence submits that a jail sentence of seven years would be appropriate.

3The Crown also seeks ancillary orders: a DNA order, a s. 109 weapons prohibition order for 20 years, a SOIRA order for life, a s. 743.21 order prohibiting contact with M. and T., and a s. 161 order for 20 years. The defence agrees that the ancillary orders sought by the Crown should be made, except as to some aspects of the s. 161 order sought. I will address the ancillary orders at the conclusion of these reasons.

The Facts

(a) The circumstances of the offences

4Section 724(2) of the Criminal Code provides that where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the sentencing judge shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty and may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by the evidence at the trial to be proven. Any aggravating facts must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing judge may not find as a fact anything rejected by the jury: R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, 2008 SCC 96, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 17-18; R. v. Roncaiolo, 2011 ONCA 378, at para. 59; R. v. Moreira, 2021 ONCA 507, at paras. 45-47; R. v. Aragon, 2022 ONCA 244, at paras. 104-107.

5The facts essential to the jury’s verdict are: 1) that between October 2, 2018 and December 31, 2022, O.M. intentionally touched M., who was under sixteen years of age, for his sexual gratification or for the purpose of violating her sexual integrity, directly with a part of his body; and, 2) that between January 1, 2017 and December 20, 2021, O.M. intentionally touched T., who was under sixteen years of age, for his sexual gratification or for the purpose of violating her sexual integrity, directly with a part of his body.

6In addition to those basic facts, I find the following facts to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

7O.M. moved to Canada in 2002 with his wife and three children. He and his wife have two daughters and one son.

8The O.M. family adopted, or took in, three orphaned children from Zimbabwe and Botswana. A boy, S., joined the family in 2010, when he was eight years old. A girl, the victim M., and her older brother, E., joined the family in 2015, when she was about six years old. O.M. had made a promise to M.’s father (his wife’s brother) that he would look after M. and her brother if her father died. M.’s mother had died giving birth to M.

9T., and her father, mother, and sister came to Canada in 2013. O.M.’s wife helped them to find accommodation. The two families became close and saw each other frequently. T.’s family often visited O.M. and his family at O.M.’s house. O.M. was like a grandfather to T., and she addressed him as a grandfather. It was customary for her to hug him as a form of greeting when the families visited together.

10The offence in relation to M. took place between October 2018 and December 2022. At the time, M. was between nine and thirteen years old.

11O.M. touched M. in a variety of ways that amounted to an egregious violation of her sexual integrity. Over a period of several years, beginning when she was nine years old, he touched her with his hands in her vaginal area in her pants, and moved his hand around. He kissed her on her mouth, using his lips, mouth and tongue. He once asked her if she could come and she did not know what that was and she was confused by this. He also touched her chest area and her buttocks. When M. was 11 years old, O.M. asked her if she knew what a penis looks like and whether she knew what sex was. He then took off his pants, opened her legs, and put his penis inside her. O.M. had penetrative intercourse with M. about three times. When M.’s period started when she was twelve years old, O.M. no longer put his penis inside her, but rather put it on top of her, with his testicles against her vagina. He told her that she was pretty and that he loved her.

12During an incident in the bathroom O.M. asked M. if she knew what sperm looked like, and he masturbated into a Kleenex and showed it to her. During another incident, he put his mouth on her vagina, moved his tongue around, and said that it was beautiful. He put his mouth on her vagina many times. Another time, while they were riding in a golf cart on a golf course, O.M. put his hand on M.’s vagina and moved his hand in a circular motion. He stopped when someone came by, and then did it again.

13When M. was 13 years old, on New Years Eve, O.M. told her that what they were doing was wrong. He said that she was 13 years old and that he was 64 years old. He told M. that they would have to stop. He said that he felt guilty, was sorry for loving her in that way, and that the devil made him do it and that he had asked God for forgiveness. A short while later, O.M. touched M. in a sexual manner again. After that, M. realized that it was not going to stop, and told her older brother, E., what happened. Other family members became involved, and the police were contacted.

14On many occasions, usually when he greeted her when she went to his house, O.M. hugged T. and kissed her with an open mouth, forcing his tongue into her mouth. This behaviour started when T. was seven or eight years old. If T. tried to keep her mouth shut, O.M. would push through to get his tongue into her mouth. After T. moved to Nova Scotia, on an occasion where O.M. and his family visited with her family, O.M. hugged T. as he was leaving and touched her buttock and squished or groped it.

(b) The circumstances of O.M.

15O.M. is 68 years old. He was between 60 and 64 years old when the offences occurred.

16O.M. and his six siblings were raised by his parents. He grew up in a large city in Zimbabwe. He has a large extended family. His childhood was positive. He was educated in an international schooling program that provided a curriculum from the United Kingdom. He completed high school and obtained a degree from a technical college. He has been a licenced electrician since 1985.

17After O.M. and his family immigrated to Canada in 2002, he became a Canadian citizen.

18O.M. has been employed throughout his adult life, first as a customs officer, and then as an electrician. He has worked as an electrician at a car manufacturing plant since 2005.

19O.M. married 42 years ago. His wife remains supportive of him. He has three children, aged 42, 40 and 38, and they, together with his wife, remain close to him. His adopted son, S, is estranged from the family. M. and her brother, E., resided with O.M. and his family until 2023, when O.M. was charged with the offences before the court.

20O.M. is described by his eldest daughter as a caring, loving, protective and responsible man, who provided her and her sister and brother with a positive childhood filled with stability, guidance and love. He worked hard to support his wife and children and others.

21When he is not working, O.M. enjoys playing golf. He also creates music and plays a variety of musical instruments. He is actively involved in his church.

22O.M. has no criminal record.

23O.M. does not abuse substances. He does not experience any mental health challenges. He is physically healthy.

(c) Impact on the victims

24The impact of O.M.’s crimes on the two girls has been profound. I cannot express the magnitude of that impact any better than the words of M. and T. and their families, but will provide a brief summary of what they have been, and continue to go through.

25In her victim impact statement, M. eloquently describes how her childhood was stolen from her. She was a child not fully aware of what was happening in the moment. She has experienced shame, anger, self blame, numbness, anxiety, depression, betrayal, confusion and suicidal thoughts. Instead of learning what healthy love is like, she learned to associate love, as expressed to her by O.M., with fear, secrecy and silence. In her incredibly articulate victim impact statement, M. revealed that the abuse did not just harm her body. It changed the way that she understands trust, and her ability to feel safe.

26M.’s guardian says that she had nightmares almost every night for the first year and a half after she disclosed what happened to her. It sometimes took hours for her to calm down enough to sleep again. She was afraid and confused. She has found it difficult to trust family members and keeps an emotional distance from them. She is guarded and cautious, even at home. Her education suffered as she missed a significant amount of school after leaving the O.M. home, though she has made substantial strides to advance her education since then. She fears being abandoned.

27T. struggles with nightmares. She is often on edge and afraid. She struggles to trust people. She finds it difficult to make friends or to connect with other people.

28T.’s father’s victim impact statement provides cogent evidence that the impact of sexual abuse of children extends beyond the abused child, to their families. Like his daughter, his trust in others has been shaken. He is very suspicious of the people he allows into his life, and his relationships with others have suffered. He feels guilty because he failed to protect his daughter and feels that he has failed as a parent. He feels responsible for her pain. He has become overprotective of her.

The positions of the parties

29The Crown relies on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, and decisions from this court since Friesen was decided, in support of its position that a sentence of twelve years is required. The Crown notes that this case involved multiple incidents of sexual abuse of two young children over a long period of time by a person in a position of trust who committed offences that resulted in significant harm to the children and that reflect significant moral culpability.

30The defence acknowledges that Friesen and sentencing decisions post-Friesen support a significant mid-single digit penitentiary sentence in the circumstances of this case. The defence submits that post-Friesen decisions suggest that a sentence of seven years would balance the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. The defence notes that O.M. is a 68-year-old first offender who has lived a productive life, employed and active in his church and community. A seven-year long sentence would be very impactful for this offender.

Analysis

31The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. To that end, sanctions for criminal behaviour can denounce criminal conduct, deter it both by deterring the particular offender before the court, and by generally deterring others who might choose to do the same thing, separate the offender from society where necessary, foster rehabilitation and promote a sense of responsibility in offenders: Criminal Code, s. 718.

32The paramount principle that governs sentencing is that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility in the unique circumstances of each case: Criminal Code, s. 718.1; Friesen, at para. 30. “The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction”: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, at paras. 10, 12.

33The principles of parity and individualized sentencing also govern the imposition of a fit sentence, but they are secondary to the principle that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The parity principle, which is codified in s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires that similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances should receive similar sentences. The parity principle helps courts to impose a proportionate sentence. Individualized sentencing also furthers the search for a proportionate sentence: Parranto, at paras. 11-12.

34Offences against children are particularly grave. Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code states that when dealing with offences against children a court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code specifies that the following factors are aggravating factors that elevate the gravity of an offence:

(i) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years,

(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,

(iii) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation.

35Each of the offences of which O.M. has been convicted has a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment.

36The sentencing of offenders convicted of sexual offences against children has been comprehensively considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen. In Friesen, the unanimous Supreme Court, at para. 5, was clear that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase:

[W]e send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children's vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament's sentencing initiatives and by society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

37I have considered, as I determine a fit sentence for O.M., the following directions provided by the Supreme Court in Friesen:

(a) Sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm caused by sexual offences against children and the profound inherent wrongfulness of sexual violence. The sentence must fully reflect the “life-altering consequences” that can and often do flow from the sexual violence. I must weigh the harm done to M. and T. and to their community in a manner that reflects society’s deepening and evolving understanding of that harm. The sentence must recognize the inherent wrongfulness of O.M.’s conduct, which impacts both the gravity of the offence and O.M.’s degree of responsibility: Friesen, at para. 74-75.

(b) It is necessary to properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that they cause. Properly understanding the harmfulness will help bring sentencing law into line with society’s contemporary understanding of the nature and gravity of sexual violence against children. Specifically, the sentence must recognize and give effect to both the actual and potential harm to M. and T.: Friesen, at para. 50.

(c) I must consider forms of potential harm that have not yet materialized but that are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offences against M. and T. and may in fact materialize later as they grow up and become adults. To do otherwise would falsely imply that these children will simply outgrow the harm of sexual violence: Friesen, at para. 84.

(d) Sexual violence against children can cause serious emotional and psychological harm that may often be more pervasive and permanent in its effect than any physical harm: Friesen, at para. 56.

(e) Any physical contact of a sexual nature with a child always constitutes a wrongful act of physical and psychological violence even if it is not accompanied by additional physical violence and does not result in physical injury: Friesen, at para. 77.

(f) Where sexual violence against a child is committed by a family member who breaches a trust relationship, that breach of trust can damage a child’s relationships with their families, caregivers and other social relationships: Friesen, at paras. 60-61.

(g) The ripple effects of sexual violence against children can make the child's parents, caregivers, and family members secondary victims who also suffer profound harm because of the offence. Sexual violence can destroy parents’ and caregivers' trust in friends, family, and social institutions and leave them feeling powerless and guilty. Parents and caregivers may also bear financial, personal, and emotional costs as they help their children recover and cope with their trauma: Friesen, at para. 63.

(h) Sexual violence against children also harms the communities in which children live and society as a whole. The costs are profound: Friesen, at para. 64.

38Sentencing ranges, which are summaries of sentences imposed in the past, are guidelines, not hard and fast rules.

39The sentencing range for sexual offences against children was specifically addressed in Friesen, at para. 114: mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances.

40Counsel have helpfully provided me with cases decided since the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Friesen. Those cases consider circumstances with varying levels of similarity to this case. Of course, no two cases are alike, and sentencing is an individualized process. I have considered the many cases provided to me by Crown and defence counsel. These cases inform my application of the parity principle, in aid of determining a sentence that is proportionate to the harm done by O.M. and the inherent gravity of his conduct. In addition to the cases provided by counsel, I have considered the decisions of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Khawaja, 2026 ONCA 304; R. v. M.W., 2026 ONCA 301; R. v. Vannoordennen, 2026 ONCA 236; R. v. L.B., 2025 ONCA 187, all of which support the imposition of a sentence within the range between the 7 years proposed by counsel for O.M. and the 12 years sought by the Crown.

41There are many aggravating factors in this case:

(1) O.M. abused a position of utmost trust. He was in the position of father to M., and grandfather to T. and took advantage of his time alone with them when they were in his care. He breached his duty to protect and care for the victims and this enhances his moral blameworthiness.

(2) The sexual violence against M. and T. occurred frequently and over a period of years. This increases the severity of the offence and O.M.’s moral blameworthiness. His actions were not isolated. His actions reflected a pattern of conduct that persisted over several years and involved repeated victimization of children.

(3) The degree of physical interference in this case is high. It involved several forms of sexual contact with two victims. O.M. violated the bodily integrity of M. and T. to a significant degree. In particular, he forcibly penetrated M. three times before her period started, and then continued to simulate intercourse with her without penetration. He performed oral sex on her. His abuse of M. was of the utmost gravity.

(4) The children were very vulnerable. They depended on O.M. to care for them when the assaults occurred. M. was completely dependent on him, having been brought to Canada by O.M and his wife.

(5) The children were young and therefore their understanding of what was being done to them was incomplete, and that diminished their ability to report what O.M. did to them. O.M. exploited this vulnerability.

(6) The offences occurred in M.’s home. Sexual violence against children that takes place in their home is particularly harmful, because it damages the child’s sense of security in the home.

(7) The harm suffered by M. and T. and their families cannot be over-stated. The effects of O.M.’s offence have been devastating.

(8) The reasonably foreseeable future harm to the children is substantial. They have learned that an adult male cannot be trusted, and that will continue to affect their lives in the future.

(9) O.M. was or ought to have been aware of the harm his wrongful exploitation of the vulnerable children could cause and his moral blameworthiness is high.

42There are some, though few, mitigating factors present in this case:

(1) O.M. has support in the community from his wife and adult children. This enhances the prospects for his rehabilitation.

(2) O.M. is 68 years old, and apart from the present offences, has been a pro-social, contributing member of the community. This also enhances his prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentence

43An appropriate sentence for O.M. must reflect the primary considerations of denunciation and deterrence. The appropriate sentence in this case should specifically deter O.M. and generally deter other adults who contemplate sexual abuse of a child. As well, the appropriate sentence must reflect society's revulsion and unequivocal disapproval of O.M.’s conduct, which involved multiple instances of sexual violence against two young girls who were in his care and who viewed him as a parent and grandparent.

44The general rule is that offences that are so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure may, but are not required to, receive concurrent sentences, while all other offences are to receive consecutive sentences: Friesen, at para. 155.

45The offences against M. and T. require consecutive sentences because they are not linked to each other at all. Rather, the offences reflect O.M.’s decision to violate the sexual integrity of two victims.

46The principle of totality requires that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the court must ensure that the total sentence is not unduly long or harsh and does not exceed the offender's overall culpability: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(c); Friesen, at para. 157; R. v. Ahmed, 2017 ONCA 76, at para. 79. To achieve this, I must determine an overall fit sentence and then impose individual sentences that add up to that total.

47In Friesen, the Supreme Court directed that courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In this case, a total sentence of nine years imprisonment is necessary to adequately reflect the gravity of O.M.’s offences and the harm he has caused. The sentences will be broken down as follows:

48Count 1: Sexual Interference in relation to M., contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code of Canada: eight years imprisonment.

49Count 4: Sexual Interference in relation to T, contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code of Canada: One year imprisonment, consecutive to Count 1.

50In addition to the custodial sentence, the following ancillary orders are made:

(1) O.M. is prohibited pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code from contacting M. or T., directly or indirectly, while he is serving his sentence;

(2) Section 161 of the Criminal Code requires the court to consider prohibiting the offender from attending various locations where persons under 16 years of age can reasonably be expected to be present, obtaining or continuing employment that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under 16, or having any contact or communicating with persons under 16, or using the internet.

In R. v. M.W., 2026 ONCA 301, at paras. 25-26, the Court of Appeal described the purpose of, and pre-requisites to, the making of a s. 161(1) order:

25Prohibition orders under s. 161(1) of the Criminal Code serve to protect children from sexual offenders. These orders are discretionary and entitled to substantial deference on appeal, absent error in principle or overriding and palpable error: R. v. J.B., 2022 ONCA 214, at para. 52, citing R. v. Durigon, 2021 ONCA 775, at para. 5. I see no reversible error here.

26I would reject the appellant’s argument that the s. 161(1)(a) order is overly broad. The appellant’s index offences did not have to occur in the physical areas covered by the prohibition order to warrant it. As this court explained in J.B., at para. 56:

Related convictions are not prerequisites to an order under s. 161(1). Nor must the offender have committed the offence in the circumstances contemplated by the order. A finding of pedophilia is not necessary either. A sentencing judge need only have an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a serious risk to young children and be satisfied that the terms of the order are [a] reasonable attempt to minimize it[.]

In R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598, leave to appeal denied 2020 CanLII 27703 (SCC), the Court of Appeal held that:

The overarching protective function of s. 161 of the Criminal Code is to shield children from sexual violence: R. v. J. (K.R.), 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.), at para. 44. An order under s. 161 constitutes punishment and is not available as a matter of course: there must be an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children; the specific terms of the order must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk; and the content of the order must respond carefully to an offender's specific circumstances: J. (K.R.), at paras. 48-49.

I find that O.M. poses a risk to children to whom he is a position of trust, and that the following terms are necessary to minimize that risk. Given that O.M.’s children are adults, the following conditions are directed to protection of any grandchildren he may have, or other children to whom he would stand in a position of trust. O.M. is prohibited pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years, as follows:

(i) From attending a public park or public swimming area, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre, in the company of any grandchildren, except when he is in the direct company of an adult who is aware of the circumstance of his conditions;

(ii) From being within two kilometres of any place where M. or T. ordinarily reside, attend school, attend a place of worship, or is known by O.M. to frequent, or where O.M. knows any of them to be present;

(iii) From seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in any capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years of age;

(iv) From having any contact, including communicating by any means, with any grandchildren unless he is in the direct company of an adult who is aware of the circumstance of his conditions.

(3) The offences of which O.M. has been convicted are designated offences under s. 490.011(1) of the Code for the purposes of the provisions dealing with sex offender information. Pursuant to ss. 490.012(1) and 490.013(2.1) of the Code, I order that O.M. shall be subject to the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for life.

(4) The offences of which O.M. has been convicted are primary designated offences under s. 487.04 of the Code for the purposes of DNA collection and storage, and a DNA order is mandatory. Accordingly, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Code, I order that O.M. provide samples of his bodily substances for the purposes of forensic DNA analysis.

(5) O.M. is prohibited from possessing firearms and other weapons and devices specified in the order I am making pursuant to s. 109 (1)(a) of the Criminal Code for 20 years.

The Honourable Mdm. Justice J. Speyer

Released: May 22, 2026

CITATION: R. v. O.M, 2026 ONSC 2073

BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-00000139-0000