Jessica Zita

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to consider all identification evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for the acquittals.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the summary conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the reasons provided a clear analytical path explaining the acquittals based on the complainant's reliability.

The defendant pleaded guilty to break and enter of a dwelling house, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breach of a firearms prohibition order.

The defendant broke into a residence in Markham, was chased by the homeowner's son, and dropped a bag containing stolen wallets and cannabis.

Police subsequently executed a search warrant on the defendant's residence and located a loaded, sawed-off shotgun with the serial number removed in the defendant's bedroom closet.

The defendant was subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition order and a probation order prohibiting weapon possession at the time of the offences.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years in the penitentiary, with credit for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh detention conditions.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's similar fact evidence ruling or credibility assessment.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, deeming the 14-month concurrent sentence fit given the serious nature of the crimes against very young victims.

The appellant, J.C.J., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and incest, and his five-year sentence for incest (concurrent three years for sexual assault).

The conviction appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding a failed s. 11(b) application and inadequate preparation for testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice.

The sentence appeal argued errors in applying s. 155(2) as a guide, failing to properly weigh mitigating factors, considering defence conduct as aggravating, and imposing an s. 161 order for an over-18 complainant.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, except for setting aside the s. 161 order, which the Crown conceded was inapplicable.

The appellants, Brandon Barreira, Joshua Barreira, and Chad Davidson, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

Davidson had admitted to shooting the victim, Tyler Johnson, but claimed manslaughter, while the other appellants denied party liability.

The appeal primarily focused on the trial judge's jury instructions, arguing a failure to adequately relate the evidence to the issues, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder verdict.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions inadequate for failing to properly summarize and relate the evidence to the specific elements of the offence and party liability.

While the court determined that the first-degree murder verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence, the instructional errors necessitated a new trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder was ordered for all appellants.

The appellant was convicted by jury of possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking and possession of heroin.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a W.D. instruction in the jury charge that would have made clear that a route to acquittal was available even if the jury disbelieved the appellant's evidence.

The appellate court agreed that the curative proviso could not be relied upon.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on counts 2 and 3 of the indictment.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment (less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years) imposed for guilty pleas to possession of a counterfeit mark, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident.

The appellant was a serious serial recidivist with 51 prior convictions spanning 20 years, predominantly for driving-related offences.

The incident involved a high-speed chase through city streets at speeds up to 138 km/h, resulting in a collision that caused serious injuries to the other driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and upholding the sentence as appropriate given the appellant's extensive criminal record, poor rehabilitation prospects, and the need for public protection.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 14 months imprisonment followed by 3 years probation.

The case involved a single issue: whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse.

The complainant testified she was asleep when the appellant penetrated her; the appellant claimed consent.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, accepted the complainant's testimony, and found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including allegations of uneven scrutiny of evidence, failure to consider intellectual limitations, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis and that the sentence was well within the applicable range.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of George Washington Burnett.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his instructions on the elements of second degree and first degree murder, and in his instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation were properly tailored to the live issues at trial, that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was admissible and relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the jury was adequately instructed on the limited use of such evidence.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident following a November 2015 incident in which his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to apply the W.(D.) test, in providing insufficient reasons, and in failing to adequately address the mens rea element of dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and the convictions were clearly supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the trial judge committed no errors of principle.

The defendant, Kunal Bulland, was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm after a trial without a jury.

The collision resulted in catastrophic, permanent injuries to the victim, Ian Godin-Chevrier.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the catastrophic nature of the injuries, the defendant's choice to drive while impaired, a previous careless driving conviction where he promised not to drink and drive again, his driving conduct (failure to brake or take evasive action), and a prior assault conviction.

Mitigating factors included remorse, supportive family and friends, family dependency, and participation in alcohol abuse programs.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing objectives, rejecting the defence's request for an intermittent sentence.

The defendant was sentenced to three years and three months imprisonment, a five-year driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a non-communication order with the victim and his mother.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the trial judge on January 10, 2018.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of a key Crown witness.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the Crown and defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had effectively complied with the spirit of Vetrovec by carefully examining the evidence and considering both confirmatory aspects and frailties.

The court noted that a Vetrovec warning is discretionary and that counsel had agreed at trial that no such warning was necessary.

The court also rejected the argument regarding uneven scrutiny, noting that the appellant was essentially requesting that the court re-weigh evidence, which is the function of the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of 15 years' parole ineligibility.

The victim was fatally stabbed in the head with a screwdriver during a car break-in.

The Crown's case relied on testimony from an associate that the appellant struck the fatal blow, while the appellant claimed the associate was responsible.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: admission of similar fact evidence, failure to give a proper limiting instruction on such evidence, permitting lengthy re-examination of a witness, and admission of an autopsy photograph.

The appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of production of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of the proceeds of crime following a trial before a Superior Court judge sitting without a jury.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the issuance of telewarrants used to search two properties, the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the ITO affiant, the validity of the search warrants, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the trial judge misstated the defence position on bail credit and failed to consider rehabilitative prospects and the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the appeal from sentence.

The accused, Matthew Moreira and Patrick Smith, brought an application to stay charges of second-degree murder, manslaughter, assault, and robbery, pursuant to section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the end of the second trial was 32 months and 16 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically the complexity of the case and a mistrial declared during the first trial, which was deemed a discrete event.

The court found the case to be complex due to multiple accused, voluminous evidence, and challenging legal issues.

It also determined that the mistrial was an unforeseeable discrete event, and the Crown acted expeditiously to mitigate its impact.

Additionally, the court considered the transitional exception under *Jordan*, acknowledging that the system needed time to adapt to the new framework.

Consequently, the application to stay the charges was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed after pleading guilty to multiple offences including break and enter (x2), assault police with intent to resist arrest, possession of stolen property over $5,000, breach of probation, possession of counterfeit mark, and mischief to property under $5,000.

At a judicial pre-trial, the sentencing judge had indicated a range of approximately two and one-half years for the December offences.

However, at sentencing, the judge imposed a longer sentence.

The appellant argued this departure was unfair and sought reduction to 30 months for the December offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant relied on the pre-trial remarks in entering his guilty plea and distinguishing the case from R. v. O'Quinn.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence and set aside victim fine surcharges by agreement with the Crown.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges of driving while disqualified and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences when a joint submission at the pre-trial stage had included a term that sentences be concurrent.

The Court of Appeal found the record unclear regarding the sentencing judge's intention on whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent.

The Crown conceded the ambiguity.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to reflect concurrent sentences.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and her four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for wilful blindness and that the evidence supported his findings.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's difficult background involving serious violence, her rehabilitative potential, and her community involvement.

The Court also found that the trial judge erroneously relied on unrelated criminal conduct as an aggravating factor.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of audio and video statements made to police following his arrest for murder.

The court considered the cumulative effect of persistent police questioning despite multiple assertions of the right to silence, elements of the "Reid Technique" used in interrogation, and the accused's emotional state.

The court found that these factors, taken together, raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, rendering them inadmissible.

The court also stated that it would have exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

The accused appealed convictions arising from an armed bank robbery, arguing the circumstantial evidence did not reasonably establish identity.

The Court held that, applying Villaroman, the evidence as a whole reasonably excluded alternatives to guilt, including in light of DNA found on two key items connected to the robbery and getaway car.

The appeal was dismissed.