Jennifer Lynne Armenise

B.S., a 31-year-old inmate with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), applied for a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He cited his medical condition and the COVID-19 pandemic as new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances since his initial detention order.

The Crown conceded jurisdiction but argued for continued detention on secondary grounds due to public safety risks, B.S.'s criminal record, and prior breaches of recognizance.

The court, acknowledging the reverse onus on B.S., found that while B.S. was not an ideal candidate for release, his proposed surety plan, combined with his motivation to avoid jail due to his vulnerability to COVID-19, sufficiently attenuated the risk of further offences or interference with the administration of justice.

The court emphasized that reducing prison populations where reasonable and safe is in the public health interest during the pandemic.

The detention order was set aside, and B.S. was released on a surety with house arrest conditions.

The applicant sought a de novo review of his detention order under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, having previously consented to detention.

Facing charges including assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and robbery, and being in breach of a conditional sentence, the onus was on the applicant to justify release.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, noting the applicant's lengthy criminal record and his provision of a materially false affidavit.

Despite the proposed surety and the risks associated with COVID-19 in correctional facilities, the court found the applicant failed to persuade it that he should be released, citing his disrespect for the law and substantial likelihood of breaching conditions.

The application for release was dismissed, and the detention order was maintained.

C.O., charged with serious offences including sexual assault and breach of probation, applied for a bail review after consenting to detention.

The application was based on new evidence, including a proposed surety and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities.

The Crown opposed release due to C.O.'s lengthy criminal record and public safety concerns.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including the new surety plan and the pandemic's impact on detention conditions and trial delays.

Despite C.O.'s significant criminal history, the court was satisfied that the proposed surety plan, offering 24/7 supervision, sufficiently attenuated public safety risks.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor tipping the balance in favour of release, vacating the detention order and releasing C.O. on a $10,000 recognizance with specific conditions.

The accused, charged with violent offences related to a home invasion, appeared for a mandatory 90-day detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought release on a surety plan, arguing that the passage of time and the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities justified release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders established a substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The proposed supervision plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground concerns, and the theoretical risk of COVID-19 did not outweigh the risk to public safety.

Following a judge-alone trial on historical sexual offence charges involving two complainants, the court first addressed the admissibility of one complainant’s police statement and preliminary hearing testimony after she refused to complete cross-examination due to acute psychological distress.

Applying the principled hearsay exception and authorities dealing with unresponsive complainants, the court admitted the prior statements to preserve trial fairness and permit assessment of credibility through prior inconsistent accounts.

On the merits, the court found both complainants’ evidence contained significant and material inconsistencies going to the heart of the allegations.

The Crown failed to prove any count beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on all six charges.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against the accused for "Over 80" due to an infringement of the accused's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, interpretation of a s. 11(b) waiver, and the impact of defence counsel's illness and death.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the three-month waiver period, the seven-month exceptional circumstance for counsel's illness/death, and the two-month counsel preparation time, which resulted in a net delay exceeding the Jordan presumptive ceiling.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of first-degree murder, the Crown alleged that the accused intentionally shot his wife following marital discord and separation discussions.

The defence argued the shooting was accidental, occurring during a struggle over a firearm as the accused attempted suicide.

The court found sufficient evidence of intentional shooting based on the common sense inference from pointing and firing a loaded handgun at close range, forensic evidence regarding trigger force and muzzle proximity, circumstantial evidence of the victim's incapacity at the time of shooting, and evidence of animus.

The court also found some evidence of forcible confinement based on ante-mortem and peri-mortem injuries and the time gap between the victim's final text and the 911 call.

The accused was committed to trial for first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the accused’s s. 8 privacy rights arising from continuous video monitoring of a detention cell while the accused used the toilet.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by finding a sufficient nexus between the Charter breach and the breath samples and by misapplying the Grant framework.

The court held that a causal connection was not required and that a sufficient temporal and contextual nexus existed between the breach and the obtaining of the breath samples.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded the exclusion of the evidence was justified and dismissed the Crown’s appeal.

The accused brought a third‑party records application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of child protection and foster care agency records relating to the complainant in a prosecution for sexual offences.

The accused argued the records were necessary to support a defence theory that the complainant fabricated allegations to facilitate removal from the foster home and to challenge credibility.

Applying the two‑stage framework for production of third‑party records, the court found the records were likely relevant and reviewed them in camera.

After balancing the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the complainant’s privacy and equality interests under s. 278.5(2), the court concluded the records had minimal or no probative value.

Production was therefore refused and the records remained sealed.