Jennifer Lynne Armenise

The appellant, Dinis DaSilva, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence, which included a lifetime SOIRA order.

The appeal against conviction argued that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by neglecting the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, particularly concerning the complainant's inconsistent testimony (a five-year-old's police statement versus an eight-year-old's trial testimony).

The court found that the trial judge properly applied the criminal standard of proof and adequately addressed the inconsistencies, concluding that the conviction was reasonable.

The appeal against sentence challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should have been for ten years given the summary prosecution.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence, quashing the lifetime SOIRA order and replacing it with a 10-year order.

The accused, N.J., was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent, assessed through the credibility and reliability of the complainant, J.H., and the accused.

The court rejected the accused's implausible testimony, finding it undermined his credibility.

Despite some minor inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, her testimony was found to be clear, concise, cogent, logical, and plausible, corroborated by text messages and a nurse practitioner's report.

The court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and registered a conviction.

The appellant, Patience Meadows, appealed his conviction for Assault Causing Bodily Harm.

The trial judge had found Meadows guilty, relying significantly on an utterance made by Meadows as circumstantial evidence of an intent for "payback" inconsistent with self-defence.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that Meadows made the utterance and that the Crown's failure to cross-examine on it did not breach the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

However, the appellate court found that the trial judge erred by concluding that the utterance had no other reasonable inference than an intent for physical retribution.

The court identified alternative reasonable inferences, such as an intent to pursue legal action or an expression of anger, which were consistent with innocence.

As the Crown failed to neutralize these alternative interpretations, the conviction could not stand beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside.

The appellant, A.I., appealed his convictions for one count of assault and three counts of sexual assault.

The appeal primarily argued that the trial judge misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by finding two breaches where none existed and by failing to allow counsel to respond to these findings.

The court found that the trial judge erred in concluding there were Browne v. Dunn breaches and in giving no weight to defence witness statements based on these erroneous findings.

Credibility was central to the trial, and the erroneous findings undermined the credibility assessment.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He had an extensive criminal record and was facing serious drug and weapons charges, some of which were incurred while on release.

The applicant proposed a new surety and GPS monitoring as a change in circumstances.

The court found the proposed surety lacked sufficient knowledge and influence over the applicant, and the evidence regarding GPS monitoring was inadequate.

The application was dismissed on the secondary ground due to the high risk of reoffence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for child luring and possession of child pornography.

He argued that the search of his home computers violated his section 8 Charter rights, that his section 11(b) rights were breached due to delay, and that the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable steps test and assessing the mens rea for the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the search, no unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework, and that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and possessed the requisite mens rea.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while impaired by drug, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, continuity issues with a urine sample, and improper use of compelled statements.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an automatic deduction for delay without analyzing the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.

The net delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on statements made to a Drug Recognition Evaluator without first holding a voir dire to prove voluntariness.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant, Thomy Baez-Eusebio, appealed his convictions for assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and uttering threats, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient in context and clearly explained the pathway to conviction by rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the Crown witnesses' accounts, which were consistent with video evidence.

The court found the inconsistencies in Crown witness testimony to be minor and peripheral.

The appellant, Robin Titcombe, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample.

He raised four grounds: unlawful breath demand, inappropriate inference of guilt from refusal, misapprehension of evidence regarding reasonable grounds for arrest and demand, and failure to apply the proper test for impaired operation.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the breath demand was lawful, the adverse inference from refusal was properly drawn, reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and demand, and the "slight impairment" test was correctly applied based on the totality of evidence.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for breach of recognizance and resisting a peace officer, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in law by placing the onus on the defence to establish a section 8 Charter breach for a warrantless search.

The appeal judge concluded that the police violated the appellant's section 8 rights by seizing his wallet to obtain identification for a CPIC check during an investigative detention.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the identity evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation against the offender for historical sexual offences committed against his children.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence indicating the offender had pedohebephilia and a moderate risk of sexual recidivism, but found he did not meet the criteria for a dangerous offender as his conduct was not intractable and the risk would decline with age.

The court instead designated him a long-term offender, imposing a sentence of 7.5 years imprisonment (with credit for pre-trial custody leaving 6 months and 1 day to serve) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The applicant, facing multiple charges including sexual assault and attempted child abduction, applied for a review of his detention after spending 911 days in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the significant passage of time, combined with the harsh conditions of pre-trial detention during the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted a material change in circumstances triggering jurisdiction for a review.

The court concluded that a stringent release plan, including house arrest, a $100,000 surety, and GPS ankle monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risks to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated and the applicant was released on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's roadside admission of driving, finding it was statutorily compelled, and subsequently excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to testify only on the Charter voir dire after allegedly agreeing to a blended trial, and challenged the findings on statutory compulsion, adequacy of reasons, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for 'over 80'.

Police officers observed a vehicle stuck in the snow in the side yard of a residence and entered the property to investigate, suspecting an accident or medical emergency.

They found the appellant, who lived at the residence, and formed grounds to arrest him for impaired driving.

The appellant argued the police entry violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the police had lawful authority to enter the property under both the implied licence doctrine and the common law ancillary powers doctrine, and had reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to address a material inconsistency in the complainant’s evidence concerning the existence of a privacy curtain and improperly relied on alcohol abuse as affecting long-term memory without evidentiary foundation.

The appeal court held that the curtain evidence was immaterial to the core allegations and did not require express resolution as a significant inconsistency.

It further held that the trial judge was entitled to assess reliability based on the appellant’s admitted memory problems, demonstrated testimonial lapses, alcohol consumption, and internal inconsistencies.

The factual findings were reasonably supported by the record and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with assault and sexual assault, applied to vary his bail conditions to allow him to leave his residence without his surety.

He had been on strict house arrest for seven months without any breaches, despite 50 police compliance checks.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges, but found that his unblemished compliance and the delayed trial date justified a modest loosening of his conditions.

The application was granted, and the release order was amended to permit the accused to leave the residence on specific days with his surety's written permission.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The applicant, S.Q., charged with serious domestic offences, sought to vary his bail conditions due to improved mental health and an impending return to work.

The Crown opposed significant variations, arguing S.Q. continued to pose a risk to the complainant.

The court found a material change in circumstances, triggering its jurisdiction to review the bail conditions.

Applying the Supreme Court's "ladder principle" from *R. v. Antic* and *R. v. Zora*, the court maintained a non-communication order, two sureties, and a residence condition requiring S.Q. to live with a surety (allowing him to reside at his own home with a new tenant surety).

However, the court removed the electronic monitoring and the requirement for constant supervision outside the residence, deeming them disproportionate and not the least onerous conditions necessary to attenuate the identified risk.

Additional conditions prohibiting weapons, alcohol, and non-prescription drugs were imposed.