Jaye Elizabeth Hooper

The applicants, four great-grandchildren of the deceased, sought a declaration that funds placed in four RESPs by their great-grandfather were impressed with a trust for their post-secondary education.

The respondent, their great-aunt and the subscriber of the RESPs, argued the funds were a gift to her and she had sole discretion over them.

After refusing to release funds for one applicant's tuition and subsequently closing two of the RESPs to take the funds for herself, the applicants brought this application.

The court found the three certainties of trust were met, the claim was not statute-barred, and the respondent breached her fiduciary duty.

The court ordered the respondent removed as subscriber, replaced by a neutral third party, and ordered her to repay the misappropriated funds with investment growth.

The applicants sought adverse possession of a 16-acre parcel lying within adjoining owners' registered boundaries, relying on a fence line, historical cattle pasturing, and seasonal hunting use between 1955 and 1965.

Applying the adverse possession framework under s. 5(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act, the court found open, notorious, and continuous use during the relevant ten-year period, but held the claim failed because the applicants did not prove the use was adverse to the title holder or establish a shared mutual mistake about the boundary.

The court also rejected the submission that a payment under the respondents' title insurance policy affected the merits of the possessory title analysis.

The application was dismissed, the cross-application was granted, the respondents were declared to hold absolute title without restriction, and the applicants were ordered to remove their chattels from the disputed lands at their own cost.

Following a protracted family law dispute, the parties proceeded to trial on the remaining issues of decision-making responsibility for their two special needs children and the respondent's claim for financial compensation after being removed from the applicant's employment benefits.

The court granted the applicant final decision-making authority for health care decisions, subject to a consultation requirement, due to the respondent's history of delaying medical interventions.

Educational, religious, and cultural decisions were ordered to be made jointly.

The respondent's claim for compensation regarding the benefit plan was dismissed as he had his own coverage and proved no damages.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien action for delay, return its security, and alternatively for security for costs.

The court declined to dismiss the action for delay, accepting the plaintiff's explanation and commitment to proceed, and therefore refused to discharge the lien.

However, the court ordered the plaintiff to post $190,000 in security for costs due to evidence of financial instability.

Notably, the court discovered the plaintiff's counsel had used artificial intelligence to generate a factum containing fake case citations and failing to comply with Rule 4.06.1, leading the court to disregard the factum and reserve the right to impose further sanctions in costs.

A motor vehicle accident occurred on April 25, 2015, on Scenic Road in Renfrew County involving two vehicles traveling in opposite directions, resulting in serious injury to a passenger.

Damages were resolved prior to trial.

The sole issue at trial was whether the driver of the oncoming vehicle (Prince) bore any liability for the accident.

The defendant driver (Vandenheuvel) admitted to crossing the centre line.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish any liability against Prince, dismissing the action against him.

The court found that Prince was driving in his own lane at a reasonable speed and took appropriate evasive action upon discovering the oncoming vehicle.

This costs decision follows a motor vehicle collision case in which the plaintiff, Ronald Busch, suffered serious injuries and sued the defendant, Cristy Mitton.

Mitton brought a third-party claim against the Ministry of Transportation for Ontario and Carillion Canada Inc. The main action settled for $210,000 plus interest, with costs to be determined.

The court found the Ministry's refusal to accept the settlement as reasonable to be entirely unreasonable, resulting in additional costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $282,251.79 in costs and the third parties $155,739.31, with reductions applied due to lack of evidence of actual legal rates charged.

The decision clarifies the approach to costs where third-party claims and late settlements are involved.

The Township of Greater Madawaska brought a motion to bifurcate the trial, seeking to separate the determination of an easement from the remaining issues, or alternatively, to separate liability from damages.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that bifurcation would not save time or costs, would prejudice the property owners, and that the issues were not clearly severable, particularly regarding punitive damages.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the property owners.

The trial concerned a third-party claim by the defendant, Cristy Mitton, against the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and its contractor, Carillion Canada Inc., alleging negligent winter maintenance of Highway 41.

Mitton had previously settled the main action with the plaintiff, Ronald Busch, admitting 1% liability.

The court found that Highway 41 was in a state of non-repair due to being partially snow-packed, and this condition caused Mitton to lose control.

However, the MTO successfully discharged its onus by proving its winter maintenance operations were reasonable, including the decision to use salt despite low temperatures, as it was a judgment call aimed at achieving bare pavement.

The court dismissed the third-party claim, finding no liability on the MTO.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a Mareva injunction freezing their cryptocurrency assets, which was initially granted without notice in a proposed class action alleging fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale of non-fungible tokens (NFTs).

The court found that the plaintiff had made full and frank disclosure and met the test to continue the injunction against the corporate defendants and one individual defendant, citing a strong prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation and a serious risk of asset dissipation.

The injunction was set aside for one individual defendant due to insufficient evidence of personal involvement.

The court also exercised its discretion to waive the undertaking for damages for the representative plaintiff, recognizing the public policy benefits of class actions.

This motion for summary judgment concerned an oppression claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the Condominium Corporation, its property manager, and superintendent.

The owner alleged oppressive conduct stemming primarily from the Corporation's decision to charge him for remediation costs after he left eggs cooking unattended, leading to smoke damage, and subsequently registering a lien on his unit for unpaid common expenses, which ultimately resulted in the power of sale of his home.

The owner also raised ancillary claims regarding cleaning product contracts, parking, and water leaks.

The court found that the Corporation acted reasonably and within its statutory powers in remediating the damage and registering the lien.

It was determined that the owner's own negligence and unreasonable refusal to mitigate his losses were the cause of his home's sale.

The court dismissed all of the owner's claims, granting summary judgment in favour of the Corporation.

The plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction to enforce non-solicitation and confidentiality agreements against a former shareholder, alleging breach of contract and misuse of confidential information.

The court dismissed the injunction motion, finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favored the defendants.

The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate actual breach or imminent harm, and that the requested relief was an overreach that would unfairly impact the defendant's livelihood.

A 17-year-old student, Josh Alexander, sought to appeal suspension and exclusion decisions by his school principal to the Renfrew County Catholic District School Board.

The Education Act requires a parent or guardian to appeal for a student of his age unless the student has withdrawn from parental control.

Josh asserted he had withdrawn from parental control, a position supported by his parents, but the School Board refused him standing, citing insufficient objective evidence.

The court found that Josh Alexander had indeed withdrawn from parental control as of December 22, 2022, and therefore had the necessary standing to advance his appeals to the School Board.

The decision clarified that financial independence is not a prerequisite for withdrawal from parental control, especially when parents voluntarily continue to support their independent adult children.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation against a property owned by the respondents.

The appellant had sued one of the respondents for defective construction work and alleged that the subsequent sale of the respondent's home to his daughter and son-in-law was a fraudulent conveyance.

The Divisional Court found that while the motion judge erred in law on the second branch of the test for issuing a CPL, she made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed.

This was a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement.

The respondents argued the agreement should be set aside due to duress, misrepresentation, and mistake of fact, contending a full hearing was required.

The court found the matter suitable for summary judgment under Rule 20 and Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court dismissed the respondents' arguments, finding insufficient evidence for duress, no fundamental mistake regarding the agreement's terms (including CPP, EI, and taxes), and no basis for negligent misrepresentation.

Summary judgment was granted to the moving party, enforcing the settlement agreement, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the respondents.

The applicant sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over the respondent's property for access to a rear parking lot, which was necessary for the rezoning of her mixed-use building to fully residential.

The respondent denied the existence of the driveway and the easement.

The court found that the applicant successfully established the requirements for a prescriptive easement under section 31 of the Real Property Limitations Act, including continuous, open, peaceful, and non-permissive use for the requisite twenty-year period prior to the property's conversion to Land Titles in 1999.

The court explicitly disbelieved the respondent's evidence regarding the driveway's existence.

The application was granted, and the Land Registrar was directed to amend property records to reflect the easement.

The respondent/moving party, Mr. Godin, brought an interim motion to terminate spousal support payable to the applicant/responding party, Ms. Vesters.

Ms. Vesters argued that the issues required a full hearing and could not be determined solely on a written record.

The court dismissed the interim motion, finding insufficient evidence to determine the appropriate relief, particularly regarding Mr. Godin's retirement, Ms. Vesters' earning capacity, and the valuation of pensions to address "double-dipping" concerns.

A full hearing was deemed necessary.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's judicial review application, the court issued a supplementary endorsement fixing the respondent's partial indemnity costs.

On consent of the parties, costs were fixed at $30,000, payable by the applicant.

The Municipality of Mississippi Mills brought an application seeking a declaration that Steven Maynard is a vexatious litigant under ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

C.43, due to his persistent and groundless court proceedings and vexatious conduct.

The Municipality sought orders to stay pending actions and prevent further proceedings without leave.

Maynard denied his actions were vexatious, claiming to act as a responsible citizen ensuring municipal compliance with planning laws.

The court granted the application, finding Maynard to be a vexatious litigant, and imposed orders to stay existing proceedings and require leave for future actions, with a specific exclusion for a slip-and-fall small claims case.

The appellant appealed two orders of a Family Court judge that directed the release of proceeds from the sale of a matrimonial property to the respondent and dismissed the appellant's claim for an equitable interest in the proceeds.

The Divisional Court raised a preliminary issue regarding its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court determined that it had jurisdiction under s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the orders under appeal were made only under provisions of an Act or regulation of Ontario, specifically the Family Law Act and the Family Law Rules, and did not involve federal legislation.

The applicant law firm was the victim of a wire transfer fraud, resulting in trust funds being erroneously transferred to a corporate bank account controlled by the respondent.

The bank froze the remaining funds.

The applicant brought an application for the return of the funds paid under a mistake of fact.

The court found that the funds were paid under a mistake of fact, the applicant did not intend for the respondent to receive the funds, and there was no consideration.

The respondent failed to establish a change of position defence.

The court ordered the bank to release the funds to the applicant.