CITATION: Gour v. Gour, 2026 ONSC 1828

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-1791

DATE: 20260325

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Anik Judith Gour

Applicant

– and –

Shaun Robert Gour

Respondent

Stella Hines, for the Applicant

Shaun Robert Gour, self-represented

HEARD: December 1, 2, and 4, 2025

HOOPER j.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1This trial follows years of protracted litigation. Despite the acrimony between the parties, however, the majority of the issues were resolved shortly before trial. The only issues that remain to be decided are:

a. Decision making.

b. The respondent’s claim for financial compensation as a result of the applicant’s unilateral decision to remove him from her employment benefits.

Background

2The parties were married in February 2010 and separated in January 2019. There are two children of the marriage – Simon born June 28, 2014 and Adelynne born July 29, 2016. Both children have special needs. Simon has been diagnosed with autism and ADHD. Adelynne has been diagnosed with ADHD and anxiety.

3After separation, the parties agreed to an informal shared parenting arrangement that eventually became a week about schedule with joint decision making. Unfortunately, communication became problematic. The father refused or was extremely delayed in providing his consent to assessments for the children, notwithstanding these assessments were recommended by medical professionals. He delayed in signing forms for the children without valid reason. In one instance, the father’s delay caused Simon to miss out on an opportunity to participate in a program offered through the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario. As a result of the difficulties the mother was experiencing in obtaining the father’s consent, she brought a motion before the court in December 2023 for a temporary order for sole decision-making authority. That motion was granted.

4The mother now seeks to have that temporary order for sole decision making made final. Her position is that having sole decision making has eliminated unnecessary delay in obtaining services for the children and has also reduced conflict between the parties. She submits that providing her with sole decision making without the need for consultation with the father on a final basis is in the children’s best interests.

5With respect to terminating the father from her employment benefit plan, the mother concedes that she did so without informing the father, but she submits she could no longer afford the premium payment. As the father has his own benefit plan through his employer, the mother argues that he has not sustained any demonstrable loss.

6The father’s position on the benefit plan was that the mother made this decision knowing he was heavily reliant on medical services, exhausting his own plan’s coverage. He relies upon Lambert v. Peachman, 2017 ONSC 7450 (“Lambert”) to seek a monthly amount for the losses he will suffer as a result of the inability to access the mother’s benefit plan.

7As for decision making, the father takes the position that joint decision making should be restored. While he acknowledges he had difficulty in communicating with the mother early in the separation, the father submits that he has changed. He relies on the successful completion of numerous parenting courses on communication. He further submits that allowing him joint decision making would preserve his voice in the children’s lives. In his view, the mother does not respect his role as a parent and continues to exclude him from the children’s lives against their best interests.

8For the reasons that follow, I find that the mother should have final decision making for the children’s health decisions after consultation with the father. For educational, cultural and religious decisions, the parties will make those decisions jointly. With respect to extra-curricular decisions, each party will have the ability to choose one extracurricular activity per child up to a maximum cost. Any additional extracurricular activities must be agreed upon. Day to day decisions will remain the responsibility of the parent who has parenting time.

9The father’s claim for compensation for his removal from the mother’s benefit plan is dismissed.

Law and Analysis

Decision Making Responsibility

10Decision-making responsibility with respect to a child is defined in subsection 2(1) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2ndSupp.) as follows:

decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including in respect of

(a) health;

(b) education;

(c) culture, language, religion and spirituality; and

(d) significant extra-curricular activities;

11Decision-making responsibility in respect of a child, or any aspect of that responsibility, may be allocated to either spouse, to both spouses, to a person described in paragraph 16.1(1)(b), or to any combination of those persons: section 16.3 of the Divorce Act.

12Day-to-day decisions are allocated to the parent who has parenting time unless the court orders otherwise pursuant to subsection 16.2(2) of the Divorce Act.

13There is no dispute that the test to determine decision-making is the best interests of the child: Divorce Act, subsection 16(1). The best interests test is the only test to be applied. Parental rights, interests and preferences play no role in this determination: Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 35-36, 44, 57, and 117.

14In assessing a child’s best interests, the court will give primary consideration to a child’s “physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.”

15The list of factors contained in section 16 of the Divorce Act is not exhaustive: White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41, at para. 174. The court’s assessment of the best interests of the child is to be a holistic one: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480, at para. 47.

16In McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610 at paras 97-98, the court set out the general principles that have evolved in determining whether it is in the best interests of the child to order joint decision-making responsibility in all or some areas respecting the child’s well-being. Those principles include:

• There is no presumption in favour of granting joint decision-making responsibility to both parties in some or all areas (Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 1625 (ON CA)).

• In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the court is required to consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties (Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208 (S.C.J.), at para. 109).

• In order to grant joint decision-making in some or all areas, there must be some evidence before the court that despite their differences, the parties are able to communicate effectively in the areas under consideration for the sake of the child. The rationale for this principle is that the best interests of the child will not be advanced if the parties are unable to make important decisions regarding the child under a joint decision-making arrangement (Kaplanis, at para. 11).

• The court is not required to apply a standard of perfection in assessing the parties’ ability to cooperate and communicate with each other on matters relating to the children. As Quinn J. remarked in the often-quoted case of Brook v. Brook, 2006 CarswellOnt 2514 (S.C.J.), “the cooperation needed is workable, not blissful; adequate, not perfect.”

• In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. The Ontario Court of Appeal has clearly stated that one parent cannot create conflict and problems with the other parent by engaging in unreasonable conduct, impeding access, marginalizing the other parent, or by any other means and then justify a claim for sole decision-making in their favour on the basis of lack of cooperation and communication: (Lawson v. Lawson, 2006 CarswellOnt 4736 (C.A.)).

• The quality of each party’s past parenting and decision-making, both during the parties’ relationship and post-separation, is a critical factor in determining whether an order for joint decision-making in some or all areas is appropriate (Milford. v. Catherwood, 2014 CarswellOnt 7879 (O.C.J.)).

• Evidence as to how an interim parenting order has worked, and in particular, whether the parties have been able to set aside their personal differences and work together in the best interests of the child, will be highly relevant to the ultimate decision regarding the appropriate decision-making regime.

It is the in the children’s best interests for the mother to have final decision making for health decisions with meaningful consultation to the father

17The parties agree that the mother was the primary caregiver for the children prior to separation. In the father’s own words, he did not “step up” to meet his responsibilities during those early years. The mother was also the parent responsible for scheduling medical assessments and attending those assessments with the children. The assessments required for Simon’s autism diagnosis often required the mother to attend with Adelynne in a car seat as the father showed little interest in participating.

18After separation, the parties immediately began a 50-50 parenting schedule. The father concedes that in the months following separation, he struggled with meeting the children’s needs as a single father. He often relied upon the mother or the maternal grandparents to assist him during his parenting time.

19Although decision making was joint, the mother was doing the leg work. She was the one who arranged appropriate assessments for the children and sought out services. Unfortunately, communication between the parties became increasingly problematic. The father would be non-responsive or would delay signing even the most basic of forms. An example was in 2021 when the mother wanted to ensure that Simon, who is asthmatic, received medication at school if needed. According to the mother, it took 3-4 weeks for the father to sign the necessary form to allow the administration of Simon’s inhaler at school. A similar issue arose regarding Simon’s individualized education plan to which the father took almost a month to consent. Therapies were also delayed by the father as he would not sign consent forms if those forms included a paragraph prohibiting the parents from seeking the therapists’ notes.

20In the mother’s view, the father remains incapable of handling ongoing decision making. She further alleges that he has used his consent as an element of coercive control over her. While there is insufficient evidence before me to make a finding of coercive control, the situation the father created by his delay was untenable. This culminated in the court’s March 2024 decision finding it was in the children’s best interests to grant the mother temporary sole decision making. In that decision, the court accepted the history of decision making and the difficulties that the father’s refusals and delays caused in setting up appropriate medical interventions for the children. The father does not refute the court’s findings on that motion.

21On the record before me, it is clear that the major communication problems between the parties have concerned the children’s health care decisions. Although the father has worked to improve his communication skills, I find the children have benefitted from having one parent with final decision-making authority for their health care needs and this continues to be in their best interests, particularly given their special needs.

22I do, however, find that consultation is required. I do not accept the mother’s evidence that she will continue to consult the father even if not ordered to do so. It is clear from the mother’s testimony that she has a very negative view of the father and does not value his role as a parent. I say this for the following reasons:

A) During her evidence, the mother was asked to name positive qualities of the father. Her answer was that he took nice photos of the children. She could not name any other positive attribute.

B) The mother continually diminished the father during her evidence even when it was non-responsive to the question.

C) The mother breached an earlier order of this court prohibiting either party from posting negative things about the other on social media. When first confronted with this social media post during her cross-examination, the mother claimed to not remember making it. Later in her cross-examination she indicated that she did not consider this post a breach given she had posted it anonymously. The failure of the mother to immediately acknowledge the post and accept responsibility for it caused the court concern as to her credibility.

D) The mother has already made two decisions without consultation. The first was placing the children into French immersion. The mother informed the father of registering the children in the French immersion education stream after the fact. Although the father indicated he would have more than likely agreed to the placement, this is a very important decision that was made without him.

The second example of the mother’s exclusion of the father was the change to Adelynne’s therapist. Although the mother testified that she eventually did discuss a change in therapist with the father, she only did so after she discussed it with Adelynne and obtained Adelynne’s agreement to the switch. The mother did not appear to see anything wrong with discussing the change with the child first or that this order of discussion undermined any meaningful contribution from the father.

E) The mother has clearly disparaged the father in front of the children. The CAS records note the children using words to describe their father that the children did not understand. An example is when Simon stated to the CAS worker that his father would “gaslight.” When asked by the CAS worker what “gaslight” meant, Simon’s response was that he did not know the meaning of the word but his mother would. At other times, the children described their father as lazy, greedy and selfish. These are not the type of words that children Simon and Adelynne’s ages would generate on their own. I find it more probable than not that the children heard these words from their mother.

The mother did explain to the court that she has taken her own parenting courses and has realized that her behaviour in validating the children’s complaints may have led to negativity towards their father.

23It is important to note that while I have accepted some of the father’s submissions, I have not accepted all. The father has raised issues with respect to the mother tracking the children through air tags in their backpacks. I accepted the mother’s explanation that she forgot to remove these air tags at the exchange as she only has them in the backpacks while the children are in her care. The father also raised the need for joint therapy between he and the children. There is insufficient evidence to make a finding that this additional therapy would be beneficial for the children, and I decline to order same. While I have concerns regarding the mother’s attitude towards the father, it is clear that the health care decisions she is making are child-focused and in their best interests.

24While I am ordering ongoing consultation for health care decisions, this does not mean that the father can take extensive amounts of time to consider each request or force the mother to continue doing the leg work. When asked about her concern with the obligation to consult, the mother testified her primary concern was that some health care decisions have short windows of time for the decision to be made. To address the history of delay caused by the father, I am placing a time limit of 7 days for the father to respond to communications by the mother on health care decisions, failing which the mother may make the decision without the father’s input. The mother shall not discuss a health care decision with the children in advance of consulting with the father.

25In granting the mother final decision-making authority on health care decisions, I am also granting her the ability to solely administer the funding for Simon received from Autism Ontario or any other government agency. I accept the mother’s evidence that the father has not shown any track record of responsible financial management. His most recent Financial Statement shows considerable debt including a significant amount of arrears in rent. The funding Simon receives needs to be carefully managed and accounted for and that should be done by a single individual. In my view, based on the evidence at this trial, the mother has been managing this very well and should continue to do so.

26The funds for Simon will continue to be managed transparently with the father having access to any documentation regarding the payments received and the expenses incurred on Simon’s behalf. My understanding is that he can obtain this information directly from Autism Ontario. If there is any further issue with the father’s access to information, the mother will facilitate the father having access to this information from third parties.

Decision making on education, religious and cultural decisions will be joint

27With respect to educational, religious and cultural decisions, I find that it is in the children’s best interests to have the parents equally share in decision making for the following reasons:

a) The mother acknowledged in her evidence that major decisions, such as which school the children should attend, should be joint. However, when it comes to other decisions – such as tutors and educational supports – she submits it would be easier and faster to arrange if she could do that on her own. This once again suggests that in the mother’s view, the father is nothing but an impediment. I do not agree.

b) The father has shown an effort to improve his communication skills. The mother acknowledged he has been much more cooperative although she qualified this as only occurring after the court made her sole decision maker.

c) The father is a teacher. His views on education are equally valid to the mother’s.

d) There does not appear to be any disagreement between the parties on religion.

e) With respect to cultural decisions, the only area of dispute is whether the children should be taking Dutch lessons, an activity they participated in prior to separation, and that the father believes is important. I did not completely understand the reason behind these lessons as the parties are not of Dutch heritage, however the father’s wish to continue these lessons with the children can be addressed through my order on extra-curricular activities.

Each parent will decide on one extra-curricular activity per child

28With respect to extra-curricular activities, there is no evidence before me to suggest that it is in the children’s best interests for the mother to control the activities in which the children are enrolled. To avoid unnecessary conflict, however, the following parameters will be put in place:

a) Each parent will be able to choose one extracurricular activity per child. The cost of that activity will not be greater than $150 (which cost will be included in section 7 expenses). If the cost of the activity exceeds $150, the parent choosing that activity may still register the child, but will bear all costs above $150 completely.

The extracurricular activity will not encroach more than 2.5 hours per week on the other’s parenting time without written consent of both parents.

b) Any additional extracurricular activities must be agreed upon between the parties.

Should the mother be held liable for removing the father from her benefit plan?

29The mother agrees that she removed the father from her benefit plan after they had been separated for 2.5 years. She testified that she was no longer able to afford this, earning a relatively modest income as an Educational Assistant with two children with special needs.

30The father suggests that this decision was done to cause him financial harm. He testified that the mother was aware of his dependence on her benefits. He provided evidence to the court that he continues to have the mother on his benefit plan and that she has received coverage for some of her medication as a result of being on the father’s plan.

31When asked about the quantum sought, the father is relying upon the amount ordered in Lambert of $175 per month. No basis was provided for this amount other than this earlier case.

32In Lambert, however, the claimant, Mr. Peachman, was financially dependent on Ms. Lambert, as he had received an award of indefinite spousal support at trial.. Mr. Peachman had no other benefits available to him other than through Ms. Lambert’s policy. In addition, evidence was adduced at trial that to secure private benefits, it would cost Mr. Peachman $350 per month. Based on that evidence, the court awarded Mr. Peachman half of that amount as a monthly payment ($175 per month).

33In the case before me there is no claim for spousal support. The father earns considerably more than the mother. The father has his own medical benefit plan through the school board and there is no evidence he has secured an additional private policy above this coverage. As a result, there is no evidence of any out-of-pocket expense.

34The father’s claim for damages is therefore dismissed for two reasons. First, absent a claim for spousal support or an inability of the father to obtain benefits elsewhere, there is no legal obligation for the mother to keep the father on her benefit plan. Second, no damages have been proven.

Disposition

35The court orders the following:

(a) The parties shall consult each other on all health care decisions respecting the children. Failing agreement, the applicant mother shall have final decision-making authority.

(b) The mother will be the sole administrator of any funding received for Simon’s special needs. The administration of that funding will continue to be transparent with the father receiving all information on monies received and expended.

(c) Educational, religious and cultural decisions for the children will be made jointly.

(d) Each parent has the authority to choose one extracurricular activity per child. The cost of that activity will not be greater than $150 (which cost will be included in section 7 expenses). If the cost of the activity exceeds $150, the parent choosing that activity may still register the child but will solely bear all costs above $150.

Each extracurricular activity chosen will not encroach more than 2.5 hours per week on the other’s parenting time without consent of both parents.

Any additional extracurricular activities must be agreed upon in writing between the parties.

(e) Day to day decisions for the children will be made by the parent with parenting time.

(f) Emergency health care decisions for the children will be made by the parent with parenting time.

(g) Each party shall be entitled to receive copies of all medical, dental, school and other reports related to the children and shall be entitled to consult with the children’s teachers, caregivers, physicians, dentists, and other health care providers concerning the general well-being of the children. Each party shall be listed on all documents pertaining to the children. Both parties are to execute consents or authorizations to all persons, including teachers, doctors, dentists and others involved with the children to speak fully and openly with both parties.

(h) The parties are not to discuss issues between one another with the children. They are not to disparage one another to the children or any third party. This includes anonymous social media posts.

(i) Neither party shall discuss with the children, or with another party in the presence of the children, present or past legal proceedings or issues between the parties related to present or past legal proceedings, including any outstanding property or financial issues relating to the parties or the children, or regarding conflicts between the parties relating to parenting issues. Each parent may respond briefly, in a reasonable manner, to questions with respect to such matters initiated by the children.

(j) The father’s claim for damages is dismissed.

36I shall remain seized of this matter for a period of two years. Any breach of this court order may be brought to my attention on an urgent basis, with notice to the other party.

37As stated in the outset of these reasons, the parties had resolved most of the issues as between them shortly before this hearing commenced. I was advised that there may be some issues with respect to the wording of a final order regarding section 7 expenses. If there are still issues the parties wish to address with the court, they may arrange a brief attendance before me for no more than 45 minutes through trial coordination. That attendance will be virtual and should be coordinated with the Pembroke trial coordinator to be scheduled as soon as possible. If necessary, it may be scheduled at 9:00 a.m.

38On the issue of costs, I view the outcome of this trial as mixed success; however, if either party wishes to seek costs, they may file cost submissions of no more than 3 pages in length (double-spaced) excluding bills of costs and offers to settle by no later than April 7, 2026. The party responding to costs will have 14 days to respond under the same page limit restriction.