Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-21-76 Date: 2023/04/18 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Municipality of Mississippi Mills, Applicant And: Steven Maynard, Respondent

Counsel: James L. McDonald, for the Applicant Self-represented, for the Respondent

Heard: December 9, 2022 and December 14, 2022.

Before: Hooper J.

Endorsement

[1] The Applicant, the Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills (“Mississippi Mills”), has brought an application seeking a declaration that the Respondent, Steven Maynard (“Mr. Maynard”) has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings against it and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner within the meaning of ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). If this finding is made, Mississippi Mills seeks ancillary orders to stay all pending court actions and to prevent Mr. Maynard from bringing further proceedings without leave of the court.

[2] The Respondent does not deny he has instituted numerous proceedings. He does deny that they have been vexatious. He believes he is acting as a responsible citizen in an effort to keep the municipality in compliance with their obligation to conform with Mississippi Mills’ Official Plan, The Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, and the Provincial Policy Statement.

[3] For the reasons set out below, the application is granted.

Preliminary Issue

[4] This application was commenced in 2021. In November 2021, Justice Abrams issued an order with a specific timetable for the delivery of material. Mississippi Mills met the milestones within that timetable. Unfortunately, Mr. Maynard did not. He has sought leave of the court to consider his responding material.

[5] Although Mississippi Mills originally objected to the additional material, at the commencement of argument, counsel for Mississippi Mills consented to the court accepting the material as evidence. As a result, the Respondent’s Record forms part of the evidence before me.

[6] In addition, there is a small claims proceeding that was brought by Mr. Maynard against Mississippi Mills in relation to a slip and fall. Mississippi Mills concedes that any order by this court on this application should exclude that proceeding.

Factual Background

[7] Mr. Maynard was born and raised in Mississippi Mills. In 2016, an issue arose between Mr. Maynard and the municipality in relation to the municipality’s attempt to sell a park that had been named after Mr. Maynard’s father. From this time forward, Mr. Maynard began to see himself as somewhat of a gatekeeper with respect to the Mississippi Mills’ planning decisions. As stated above, Mr. Maynard’s purpose is to ensure that planning related by-laws in the municipality are legal and conform with the Mississippi Mills’ Community Official Plan, the Planning Act, and the Provincial Policy Statement.

[8] At least twenty-three matters that directly include Mississippi Mills as a party, involve its employees, or counsel (including tribunal proceedings, appeals, motions, court applications, etc.) have been instituted by Mr. Maynard since 2017. Eight of those twenty-three matters have been commenced while this vexatious litigant application has been pending. [^1]

[9] Each of these proceedings required a response forcing the municipality to retain counsel. If Mr. Maynard lost a proceeding at first instance, he would appeal. His appeals tied up planning decisions for years.

[10] The following are examples of this litigation:

1. On June 6, 2017, Mr. Maynard initiated an application (Court File No. 30-17) against Mississippi Mills and one of its Council members asking for a declaration she was ineligible to sit on Council and an order that she repay all of her earnings and paid expenses from the time of her election. The application was subsequently withdrawn by Mr. Maynard and he was ordered to pay costs of the proceeding.
2. On May 21, 2019, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (“LPAT”) heard an appeal brought by Mr. Maynard challenging a by-law regarding a 13-unit residential development that he does not reside at or near. The LPAT dismissed the appeal, finding that Mr. Maynard failed to present any expert evidence in support of his argument. Mr. Maynard filed a Request for Review of the Decision with the LPAT, which was dismissed. Mr. Maynard brought a motion for leave to appeal this decision to the Divisional Court which was also dismissed.
3. On October 8, 2019, Mr. Maynard initiated an appeal before the LPAT challenging a minor variance the township had granted to the minimum lot frontage requirement. The difference was approximately one metre. Mr. Maynard does not reside at or near the property in question and did not have any association with it. Mr. Maynard failed to provide submissions by the date ordered and later confirmed with the LPAT that he no longer intended to provide any submissions. The appeal was dismissed on February 25, 2021, holding up the project for sixteen months.
4. In 2020, Mr. Maynard filed four appeals with the LPAT challenging zoning by-law amendments. The appeals were dismissed by the LPAT without a hearing on February 27, 2020 as Mr. Maynard had failed to pay the required filing fee.
5. On March 11, 2020, Mr. Maynard initiated an application in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking to quash these same amended by-laws. He also brought an urgent motion within that application seeking an order that no step be taken under these disputed amended by-laws until the hearing of the application. That motion was heard and dismissed on March 26, 2020 on the basis that Mr. Maynard had filed no evidence. The application was heard and dismissed by Justice James on October 29, 2020 on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Mr. Maynard appealed Justice James’ decision. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal on September 22, 2021.
6. On June 12, 2020, legal counsel for Mississippi Mills received a letter from the Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”) detailing that Mr. Maynard had made a complaint against him, which was dismissed by the LSO.
7. On December 16, 2020, Mr. Maynard initiated an appeal of a zoning by-law to the LPAT. The hearing was held on October 12, 2021. As Mr. Maynard presented no evidence to support his challenge to this by-law, the appeal was dismissed. Mr. Maynard notified the Municipality of his intention to appeal this dismissal to the Divisional Court but it is unclear whether that step was taken.
8. On April 22, 2021, Mr. Maynard commenced a small claims court proceeding against Ken Kelly, Chief Administration Officer of the Municipality. Mr. Maynard is seeking $15,000 for libel, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The grounds for the claim arise from a report Mr. Kelly provided to Council that included information about the legal costs incurred by the Municipality to respond to the various appeals being initiated by him. That litigation is still pending.
9. While his appeal of Justice James’ order of October 29, 2020 was pending, Mr. Maynard initiated another Application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice with respect to numerous by-laws and development projects seeking identical relief he had sought before Justice James. Mississippi Mills moved to dismiss this proceeding under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, on the basis that, as found by Justice James, the application disclosed no reasonable cause of action and had no reasonable prospect of success. In his decision dated December 7, 2022, Justice Abrams agreed and dismissed the proceedings.
10. In relation to the within application, Mr. Maynard brought a motion pursuant to Section 137.1(3) of the CJA. Also referred to as a SLLAP motion, Mr. Maynard sought an order to dismiss the within application on the basis that Mississippi Mills was trying to unduly limit legitimate legal proceedings to hamper participation by the public. In dismissing this motion, Justice Johnston found at para. 20:

[20] This is not a situation where Mr. Maynard has commenced a challenge to the Applicant’s planning decision and there is merit to the objection. As outlined above, the objections made by Mr. Maynard in past litigation have amounted to nothing more than bald assertions, without any substance and in the end, without any foundation. Often, he barely puts forward any case to support his position. The Court recognizes that objections raised by Mr. Maynard do not have to necessarily be upheld or sustained in the end. There must be some merit, or some legitimate issue raised. Mr. Maynard continually uses the litigation process to object and then fails follow through and his ‘case’ has no prospect of success. The Applicant argues that this on-going meritless series of cases cannot be condoned. If there is an established pattern of abuse, the aggrieved Party has the right to seek recourse pursuant to section 140 of the CJA. This is precisely what the Applicant seeks to do in this case. The Applicant’s application is not an effort to stifle legitimate or meritorious public debate or challenge through the legal system. It is to prevent vexatious litigation: The Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills v. Maynard (6 October 2022) (ON SC).

[11] As a result of these various proceedings, not only has the municipality incurred significant legal fees, but development projects have also been delayed for extended periods of time.

[12] When asked current litigation, Mr. Maynard conceded that he has no idea how many of his cases against the municipality are still pending. He has lost track.

[13] It is not just Mississippi Mills that is expending considerable resources in dealing with Mr. Maynard’s relentless challenges of the Municipality’s decisions. In a cost decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal dated February 16, 2022, the Tribunal noted:

[31] It is uncontested that this is the Appellant’s seventh appeal to the Tribunal (or its predecessors) of a planning decision of the Town over the past three years, with four of those appeals being administratively dismissed when the Appellant took no further action beyond filing the appeal, and a fifth appeal, that was to be conducted in writing, being dismissed following the Appellant not filing any material

[32] The Appellant acknowledged in his responding cost submission that this matter was his third hearing and made no claim of having a direct personal interest in any of his previous appeals. The Tribunal finds this pattern of behaviour is, on its face, indicia of vexatious conduct.

[33] If there was any doubt about the Appellant being a chronic litigant, it was erased when he expressly committed himself to carry out future Tribunal appeals against the Town. These intentions were first expressed during the hearing on the merits when he indicated that the “next time” he had an appeal before the Tribunal, he would be better prepared. The Tribunal recognizes that this could have been an off-handed comment that did not necessarily mean he was already anticipating another appeal. However, through his written submissions regarding costs, he left no doubt about his intentions by stating “[t]his is not my first challenge of planning by-laws and it will not be my last”, followed by “[i]f I don’t try to ensure legal conformity and compliance with planning, then who will?”

[34] In addressing these submissions, the Tribunal adopts the Town’s succinct response:

There is no reality to the Appellant’s perception that his appeal was necessary to “ensure legal conformity and compliance with planning.” Council approved the zoning by-law amendment after conducting a public hearing and having received extensive evidence, including planning reports from professional planners, a peer-reviewed Transportation Impact Study, a Market Demand Study, a shadow study, and architect’s designs.

As demonstrated at the Hearing, the Appellant had no evidence raising an apprehension that the amendment was not in “legal conformity and compliant with planning.” Given this, the Appellant’s appeal was unfounded, vexatious, and a frivolous use of the Tribunal’s time and the Town’s resources.

[35] Further, the Tribunal finds that the Appellant sees himself as serving some sort of unofficial gate-keeping role with respect to the Town’s planning decisions, and he uses (and intends to continue to use) the function of the Tribunal to further such efforts. While the Appellant attempts to characterize himself as serving a public interest role, the Tribunal finds the opposite. The Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s baseless appeals cost municipal taxpayers to defend legitimate planning decisions, while also denying projects that serve public interest policy objectives. Given his history of commencing appeals but not following through and/or lacking engagement in the process, failure to prepare and/or not making material contributions in support of his appeals, the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the Appellant’s intent is more than just meddlesome; it is to cause as much trouble and/or annoyance to the Town as possible.

[36] This Tribunal finds such attitude, intent and behaviour to be reprehensible and dangerous, not only prejudicing the Town’s resources and efforts to deal with planning matters efficiently and effectively at a local level, but it also prejudices the Tribunal’s abilities and duties to deal with meritorious matters (bumped down the Tribunal’s schedule in order to deal with the Appellant’s matters) in an efficient and timely manner. This conduct is clearly vexatious and warrants sanctions to not only compensate the prejudiced parties, but also to discourage such conduct by the Appellant or any other person who considers engaging in such practices.

Issues

[14] There are two issues to be determined on the application before me:

1. Is the respondent a vexatious litigant?
2. If so, what reasonable measures are needed to protect the administration of justice from the respondent's vexatious conduct?

Law and Analysis

Issue One: Is the respondent a vexatious litigant?

[15] Section 140 of the CJA provides the following:

Vexatious proceedings

140(1) Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on the application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,

(a) Instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or

(b) Conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner,

The judge may order that,

(c) No further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or

(d) A proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,

Except with leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

[16] In Lang Michener and Fabian Henry J. outlined the following principles for a court to consider when determining if a litigant is vexatious:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

[17] These seven principles are not exhaustive and an applicant need not establish the existence of all of them in any given case: Dobson v Green, 2012 ONSC 4432. In Dobson it was observed that:

[7] Generally speaking, vexatious litigants often share common characteristics. They advance claims that are often manifestly without merit. They tend to ignore adverse rulings and procedural setbacks, such as costs orders against them. They may resort to multiple, repetitive proceedings, often against the same adversary. They will sometimes similarly engage others who present themselves as an obstacle in their path. They often launch court proceedings as if unconcerned about the financial resources invariably consumed by such actions. They tend to be litigants who, with persistence, abuse the court process for their own selfish and single-minded goals. They are typically self-represented litigants who seem intent, through a series of persistent and fruitless proceedings, on wearing down their opponents through an ongoing battle of attrition.

[8] The purpose of s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act is to protect honest citizens and litigants and the overall integrity of the justice system against those who continually abuse the court process by engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation. It is important to appreciate, however, that even the vexatious litigant is not forever deprived of the right to launch court proceedings. Rather, where an order is made under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order merely serves to require a process of judicial supervision over the initiation of such proceedings. The burden is shifted to the vexatious litigant to establish, to the satisfaction of the court, that there is a reasonable basis for the proposed proceedings. Where such justification can be provided, leave to pursue the proceeding may be granted: Dobson v Green, 2012 ONSC 4432 at paragraphs 7 to 10.

[18] The court may consider both judicial and non-judicial proceedings when applying the principles quoted above: Bishop v. Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211 at para. 9, leave to appeal refused, [2011] C.S.C.R. No. 23. At para. 5 of Bishop, the Court of Appeal addressed the inference that may be drawn from a litigant’s conduct in non-judicial proceedings:

[5] … the institution of non-judicial proceedings can, depending on the circumstances, constitute evidence from which a court may infer that court proceedings commenced by the litigant are not bona fide but the product of someone who is unreasonably obsessed with a cause and likely to pursue vexatious court proceedings on an indefinite basis unless stopped.

[19] Mr. Maynard has established a pattern. He starts with a non-judicial proceeding at the LPAT. Many of those proceedings were dismissed for the failure to file any evidence. Others were dismissed for failing to pay the filing fee. Mr. Maynard then appeals the LPAT dismissal to the Divisional Court. Simultaneously, he will commence applications at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking similar relief to what was sought and dismissed before the LPAT. A dismissal in one application or appeal does not appear to affect Mr. Maynard’s determination to bring another.

[20] Mr. Maynard does not appear to have insight into the impact of the litigation he has commenced or the difficulties this has placed on Mississippi Mills. While I understand Mr. Maynard opposes the orders sought within this application, I believe they are likely in his best interest as well. As Brown J. stated in Beard Winter LLP v. Shekhdar, 2017 ONSC 4846 at para. 11:

[11] An Order under section 140 is beneficial to all parties as it ensures that public resources are not wasted on vexatious litigation, protects the targets of vexatious ligation from the time and cost of mounting a defence, and also serves the litigant who is attempting to proceed with vexatious ligation by averting what would inevitably be a costly, time-consuming and futile effort: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali, [1998] O.J. No. 5890 (Gen. Div.) at para. 26.

[21] On the basis of the above, and considering the factors set out in Lang Michener, I find that Mr. Maynard is a vexatious litigant.

Having found Mr. Maynard a vexatious litigant, what reasonable measures are required?

[22] Section 140 of the CJA is the mechanism by which the court prevents a litigant from abusing the civil justice system to cause harm to others. This preventive mechanism does not take away Mr. Maynard’s fundamental right to access to justice; it permits the court to put in place a process by which the bona fides and merits of a proposed proceeding are vetted before Mr. Maynard is permitted to proceed: Goodlife Fitness Centres Inc. v. Hicks, 2019 ONSC 4942 at para. 73 and Diler v. Heath, 2012 ONSC 3017 at para. 34.

[23] The judicial system is a community property and a scarce resource, just like health and educational services. It falls upon courts and judges themselves to ensure the most efficient use of their limited capacity to deal with all sorts of litigants who come before them: Coady v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 154 at para 22.

[24] The courts have finite resources that cannot be squandered. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those who abuse it affects the access of others who need and deserve it: Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42. As stated in Coady at para 24:

[24] Vexatious litigants need not necessarily be acting in bad faith, and do not always mean harm to opposing parties. Sometimes, as in the case at bar, they pursue what in their mind is a legitimate objective and seek to redress what they perceive to be an injustice. This is no less detrimental to the justice system, however, if only because it encumbers the courts and the staff assisting them with meritless proceedings raising issues that have already been decided, and thereby preventing more deserving litigants to access the courts and to have their legal issues resolved.

[25] As a result, I find it is appropriate to stay all of the current court proceedings between Mr. Maynard and Mississippi Mills and/or its employees. For clarity, this order will stay any proceeding at the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice - which includes the Divisional Court and Small Claims Court.

[26] Mr. Maynard will be required to bring a leave application to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for permission to continue any of these pending proceedings. If Mr. Maynard wishes to seek such leave, I urge Mr. Maynard to bring one leave application to include all of the pending proceedings.

[27] I further find that Mr. Maynard may not commence any further court proceedings without first seeking leave from a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

[28] As in Goodlife Fitness, supra, the above does not fully address the problem given the impact Mr. Maynard’s behaviour has had on the LPAT. I note that in Goodlife Fitness, Corthorn J. made the following order at para. 75:

[75] Section 140 of the CJA does not give this court the discretion to issue an order precluding a person from commencing or continuing administrative (i.e. non-judicial) proceedings or complaints. However, some protection can be provided to individuals and entities who are the target of Mr. Hicks’ conduct. This protection is in the form of an order requiring Mr. Hicks to provide a copy of the vexatious litigant order and these reasons to any person or body with whom he initiates or continues a complaint of any kind (Peoples Trust Company v. Atas, 2018 ONSC 58, 295 A.C.W.S. (3d) 42, at paras. 307-08). A term to that effect is included in the order made below.

[29] I agree with Corthorn J. and a similar order will be included against Mr. Maynard.

[30] On consent, the above specifically excludes the small claims court action SC-20-73 involving Mr. Maynard’s slip and fall. That proceeding will be allowed to continue in its normal course.

[31] I am only aware of one other legal proceeding involving Mr. Maynard that is currently pending. That litigation, under Court File CV-21-00000048 involves a claim by Mr. Maynard against Lars Anderson for defamation following social media posts, allegedly posted by Mr. Anderson. I have reviewed the social media posts. I do not know if they were posted by Mr. Anderson, but nothing in this decision should be taken as suggesting that small claims proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, or devoid of merit. That claim does not involve Mississippi Mills and Mr. Anderson is not an employee of the municipality. That legal proceeding will proceed.

[32] Given the circumstances, it is reasonable to dispense with the requirement that Mr. Maynard approve, as to form and content, the order to be taken out pursuant to these reasons. A term to that effect is also included in the order made below.

Summary

[33] The relief requested by Mississippi Mills is granted. I order as follows:

1. THIS COURT DECLARES THAT Steven Maynard: a) has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner within the meaning of ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”); and b) is a vexatious litigation pursuant to s. 140 of the CJA with respect to the Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills;

2. THIS COURT PROHIBITS Steven Maynard, either directly or indirectly, from instituting any proceeding or continuing any proceedings previously instituted in any court as against the Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills and/or its employees and agents, except and until such time as he has obtained leave by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to s. 140(3) of the CJA and as provided for in this order.

3. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT all existent actions, appeals, and applications brought by Steven Maynard against the Corporation of the Municipality of Mississippi Mills and/or its employees or agents be and are immediately stayed except and until such time as he has obtained leave pursuant to s. 140(3) of the CJA and as provided for in this order. This order does not include the small claims matter involving Mr. Maynard’s alleged slip and fall.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT should the Respondent file material seeking to commence or continue a proceeding or any appeal in any court in Ontario without first filing an entered Order permitting him to do so, the proceeding shall be immediately stayed upon any person filing a copy of this Order in such a court.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT Steven Maynard shall deliver a copy of this Order, and of the Reasons for Decision herein dated April 18, 2023, to any person or body with whom he initiates or continues any complaint, including, without limitation, any court, administrative body and/or tribunal, regulatory body, the police, and the Crown.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the requirement for Steven Maynard to approve, as to form and content, this or any other draft order herein is dispensed with.

Costs

[34] Mississippi Mills is entitled to costs. If costs cannot be agreed upon between the parties, cost submissions may be made as follows:

a) Written submissions shall be delivered by Mississippi Mills by 4:00 p.m. on May 5, 2023; b) Written submissions shall be delivered by Mr. Maynard by 4:00 p.m. on May 19, 2023; c) Reply submissions, if any, of Mississippi Mills shall be delivered by May 26, 2023; d) Submissions shall be limited to a maximum of five pages, exclusive of a bill of costs and should comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Justice J. Hooper

Released: April 18, 2023

[^1]: Within the Township’s material, unrelated litigation involving Mr. Maynard was referenced, including, family law litigation with his ex-spouse and estate litigation over his father’s estate. There is no background provided for these decisions. In addition, the municipality is only seeking a declaration for itself and its employees/agents. As a result, I have only relied on the evidence pertaining to cases that directly involve the Mississippi Mills or their employees/agents.