Jaye Elizabeth Hooper

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipal council decision upholding a repair order issued against her for dumping sand on her shoreline property in contravention of a site alteration by-law.

The applicant argued that the alterations were historical, fell under provincial jurisdiction, and that the council breached procedural fairness by not providing written reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Township had concurrent jurisdiction, the decision was reasonable based on the evidence of by-law contravention, and the council's process met the requirements of procedural fairness for an administrative municipal decision.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to screen out his complaint against an OPP inspector.

The complaint alleged the inspector failed to properly investigate the applicant's earlier complaint regarding the seizure of his boat's mooring anchor and a subsequent mischief charge.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the OIPRD's decision not to proceed with the complaint was reasonable and within its statutory discretion.

The court also held that the OIPRD's internal review process met the required duty of procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants sought to prevent the Township of Wollaston from selling a parcel of land, arguing it was subject to a charitable trust established by a will and, alternatively, that the sale was ultra vires as not properly authorized by by-law.

The court found that no charitable trust was created as certainty of intention was not met, meaning the Township held the land in fee simple.

However, the court agreed that the Township's decision to sell the property was ultra vires because it was not authorized by a specific by-law, rendering the agreement of purchase and sale null and void.

The court noted the Township could rectify this by passing a proper by-law.

Due to mixed success, no costs were awarded.

The applicant, representing indirect waterfront property owners, sought judicial review of the Town of Georgina's process for addressing ownership and use of lakeside properties along a municipal road allowance.

The applicant argued the Town unfairly denied building permits and unilaterally determined road allowance boundaries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Town's adoption of an action plan was a work in progress and did not constitute the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The court also declined to grant mandatory relief, noting that the ownership dispute could be more appropriately resolved through other legal processes, such as an appeal under the Building Code Act or an application under the Boundaries Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipality's decision to invoice him $9,445.44 for fire department response costs after he started an open-air fire on his property.

The applicant had previously pleaded guilty to a provincial offence for violating the burning by-law and was fined $250.

He argued the invoice decision lacked procedural fairness and was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the informal process provided was procedurally fair given the emergency context and statutory scheme, and that the decision to issue the invoice was reasonable and transparent.

The appellant appealed an order refusing his motion to change a final order regarding child support arrears.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, the self-represented respondent requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The appellant consented to the adjournment, noting that the parties were involved in another family law proceeding and a global mediation might resolve all issues.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment sine die to allow the parties an opportunity to seek a global resolution.

The defendant, Hala Tabl, brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff, "The Kingdom of Heaven Found a Sean," purported to be an "express trust organization" operated by Sean von Dehn.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity as it was not a natural person, a corporation, or a body granted capacity by legislation.

Consequently, the statement of claim was struck without leave to amend for the stated plaintiff.

The court also noted that certain paragraphs of the claim would have been struck as patently ridiculous and a collateral attack on a prior court order, even if the claim had been brought by Sean von Dehn personally.

Costs were awarded against Sean von Dehn personally.

The appellant appealed orders of the Superior Court to the Divisional Court.

At the hearing, the court raised a preliminary question regarding its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court adjourned the appeal sine die and directed the parties to provide written submissions on the jurisdictional issue and whether the appeal should be transferred to the Court of Appeal.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of an urgent injunction application.

The court considered three hearings: the initial injunction application, a hearing regarding the respondent's breach of undertaking, and a hearing requested by the respondent to vary an interim order.

The injunction was dismissed due to the applicant's failure to provide an undertaking as to damages.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the initial injunction hearing and for responding to the applicant's post-decision attempt to provide the undertaking, but denied costs for the hearings related to the undertaking breach and the failed attempt to vary the interim order, finding them unnecessary.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the respondent's claimed legal hours and hourly rates.

The applicant, Cash Cloud Inc., sought an urgent interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent, BitAccess Inc., from terminating a Master Purchase Agreement, deactivating cloud-based software used for cryptocurrency kiosks, and deleting customer data.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant interim relief despite a mandatory arbitration clause.

The court granted a 60-day order preserving the customer data to allow the applicant to download it.

However, the court dismissed the injunction to restrain the software deactivation because the applicant failed to provide the mandatory undertaking as to damages required by Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement of a professional negligence action.

The plaintiff had offered to settle on a dismissal without costs basis.

The defendants' counsel accepted the offer 'provided that' the plaintiff execute a standard LawPRO release, which contained a confidentiality clause.

The plaintiff refused to sign the release and withdrew the offer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requirement to sign the specific release with a confidentiality clause was an essential term and constituted a counteroffer, meaning no settlement was reached.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an over-80 charge after the trial judge excluded breathalyzer readings based on multiple alleged s. 10(b) Charter breaches.

The appeal court held that the right to counsel was temporarily suspended during the roadside screening stage, rejected findings of pre-ASD and re-consultation breaches, and found that only a 16-minute post-arrest delay in re-reading the right to counsel remained.

Applying the Grant framework afresh, the court concluded that the single informational breach did not warrant exclusion of highly reliable breath evidence.

The acquittal was set aside, a conviction was entered on the over-80 count, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.

The appellant, acting as substitute decision-maker for her incapable mother, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision ordering her to consent to a palliative plan of care.

The Board had found that the mother's condition would continue to deteriorate and that the palliative plan was necessary to allow her transfer to a chronic care facility.

On appeal, fresh evidence demonstrated that the mother had stabilized on continuous ventilation and had already been transferred to the chronic care facility without adopting the palliative plan.

The Superior Court of Justice admitted the fresh evidence, found that the evidentiary foundation of the Board's decision had fundamentally shifted, and quashed the Board's decision as unreasonable.