James P. Thomson

The moving party physician brought a motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act for authorization to administer anti-psychotic medication to the respondent pending his appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The respondent, who was found not criminally responsible and detained at a psychiatric hospital, suffered from a delusional disorder and exhibited threatening behaviour.

The court found that the statutory criteria were met, as the respondent's condition was deteriorating, the treatment would likely improve his condition, the benefits outweighed the risks, and it was the least restrictive option.

The motion was granted.

N.J., a patient found not criminally responsible, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment for a delusional disorder.

Dr. Corriveau, N.J.'s attending physician, brought a motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, seeking authorization to administer anti-psychotic medication pending the appeal.

The court granted the motion, finding that the statutory criteria for urgent treatment were met, including a likelihood of substantial improvement with treatment, deterioration without it, benefits outweighing risks, and the treatment being the least restrictive and necessary before the appeal's final disposition.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for offences including break and entry, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, escaping lawful custody, and robbery, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at a forensic mental health facility.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing the Board unreasonably concluded detention was necessary and improperly considered the risk of illicit drug use and the ease of readmission as factors in its decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that supervision of housing and readmission capability are relevant considerations for the Board in determining appropriate dispositions.

The defendants (except FCMI) brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff had invested $1,000,000 in a mining exploration venture and claimed damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful conversion.

The plaintiff consented to dismissing the conversion claim against the moving defendants.

Regarding the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against the defendant Brodsky, the court found genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning credibility and whether the plaintiff was misled into believing it was purchasing shares in FCMI rather than Sillenger.

The court declined to use its enhanced fact-finding powers, concluding a trial was necessary.

The motion was granted in part on consent for the conversion claim, but dismissed regarding the misrepresentation claim.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay a costs award.

The plaintiff provided uncontested affidavit evidence demonstrating ownership of two properties in Ontario with a combined net worth of $291,000.

The court found this sufficient to pay the defendants' costs if required and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the release of $500,000 held in escrow following a share purchase agreement.

The defendants brought cross-motions seeking an interpleader order and a portion of the funds for uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to bring their motion after setting the action down for trial, finding it was an efficient step.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate as the issue could be resolved on uncontested facts.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under the escrow agreement, entitling the plaintiffs to the return of the full escrow amount plus interest.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to antipsychotic and mood stabilizer treatment.

The board had granted an adjournment to allow the appellant to obtain counsel, but when the hearing resumed, the appellant appeared without counsel.

The majority held that the board did not breach procedural fairness because the appellant did not refuse legal representation but rather indicated he was prepared to represent himself.

The dissent argued the board failed to follow its own guidelines requiring a mini-inquiry to determine whether the appellant was making an informed decision to proceed without counsel, and that the board should have intervened when the appellant's condition deteriorated during the hearing.

The applicant, who was found not criminally responsible, brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus with mandamus in aid to review his detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care and order his immediate transfer to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The Ontario Review Board had ordered his transfer to CAMH 'forthwith', but he had been waiting seven months due to a shortage of secure forensic beds.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not established a deprivation of liberty caused specifically by the delay, and that the ORB order provided lawful authority for his continued interim detention at Waypoint until a bed became available at CAMH.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendants to fulfill undertakings and answer questions refused at discovery.

While most issues were resolved prior to the hearing, the plaintiffs continued to seek production of the defendant accountant's working papers related to the 2014 financial statements of a business sold by the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the motion for production of the working papers, finding they were the property of the accountant and not relevant to the issues in the action.

However, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to conduct further examinations for discovery regarding the recently produced financial statements.

The appellant appealed a March 2016 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the March order had been overtaken by a subsequent order made in August 2016, which the appellant had also appealed.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its action for unpaid legal fees under a contingency fee retainer agreement.

The client had accepted the law firm's repudiation of the agreement and directed the firm to take no further steps.

The Court of Appeal held that by accepting the repudiation and directing the firm to stop work, the client cancelled the services within the meaning of the agreement's termination provision, thereby becoming liable to pay the value of services performed to date.

The appeal was allowed and judgment granted for the law firm.

The College of Nurses of Ontario appealed a discipline panel's decision regarding a nurse who was found guilty of professional misconduct following criminal convictions for child pornography offences.

The nurse had resigned prior to the hearing, and the panel concluded it lacked jurisdiction to revoke his certificate of registration because it was 'non-existent'.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the panel's interpretation unreasonable and contrary to the broad, purposive intent of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Court held that the College retains continuing jurisdiction to impose sanctions, including revocation, on former members to protect the public.

The Court set aside the panel's penalty and ordered the revocation of the respondent's certificate.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who suffers from a primary psychotic disorder, argued he was capable.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's application of the two-part test under the Health Care Consent Act.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the court upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision due to his lack of insight into his illness.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a prior proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the unsuccessful party.

The successful defendants sought costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered factors including indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the fairness and reasonableness of the time and rates charged.

The court awarded the Drabble defendants the full amount claimed, finding the costs reasonable and reasonably anticipated, but reduced the costs sought by the Webb defendants after concluding their time spent was excessive in the circumstances.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a negligence and breach of contract claim against financial advisors on the basis that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged negligent investment advice relating to a 2010 flow‑through investment that generated significant capital gains tax.

The court applied the discoverability principle under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and held that the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known the material facts when he received and approved his 2010 income tax return in May 2011.

The plaintiff’s failure to carefully review the return did not postpone the commencement of the limitation period.

As the action was commenced more than two years later, the claim was barred.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications and mood stabilizers.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence to uphold the finding and that his procedural fairness rights were infringed when he represented himself at the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own testimony corroborated the treating physician's evidence that he did not believe he had a mental illness, rendering him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The Court also found that the Board properly followed its policy guidelines for unrepresented litigants and safeguarded the appellant's procedural fairness rights.

A law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees of $427,891.57 following termination of a contingency fee retainer relating to a civil action for wrongful prosecution.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim, arguing the firm repudiated the retainer agreement by refusing to pursue a necessary appeal unless the client funded outside appellate counsel.

The court held that under the contingency fee agreement the firm was required to conduct “any and all proceedings,” which included the appeal, and could not characterize appellate counsel’s fees as disbursements payable by the client.

The refusal constituted a repudiatory breach of the retainer agreement, which the client accepted.

As a result, the client was discharged from any obligation to pay fees or disbursements.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of perceived mental health disability after a physician refused to order an MRI for her.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the Consent and Capacity Board had already determined the applicant had an actual mental health disability, a finding she could not reasonably challenge before the Tribunal.

Because her entire case rested on the assertion that she did not have a mental health disability, the application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing the appellant's detention in hospital, while permitting community living under hospital supervision.

The sole issue was whether a conditional discharge could adequately replace the detention order for an NCR accused who required ongoing antipsychotic medication and rapid rehospitalization if non-compliant.

Relying on the treating psychiatrist's evidence, the court held that the Board reasonably found detention to be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition under s. 672.54 because a conditional discharge would not permit sufficiently prompt apprehension and return to hospital.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that conditionally discharged him rather than granting an absolute discharge.

The appellant, who had been found NCRMD for assault offences, had recently been diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder and his recovery remained unclear.

The Court of Appeal held that the board applied the proper test for significant risk of harm and that its decision was reasonable given the appellant's partial insight and the short time since his new diagnosis and treatment regime.

The appeal was dismissed.