James P. Thomson

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a secure unit.

He sought an absolute discharge, conditional discharge, or transfer to a general unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that an ongoing six-month review by the Board would soon provide a decision based on current medical information.

However, the Court emphasized the Board's obligation to properly determine whether the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety and expressed deep concern over the hospital's delay in transferring the appellant to the secure unit as ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the Board to accept the treating physician's opinion evidence that substance abuse would lead to a deterioration of the appellant's mental stability and a return to conduct similar to the index offences.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his conditional discharge.

He argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to order a Community Treatment Order (CTO) instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably relied on psychiatric evidence that the appellant would stop his medication and become a threat if absolutely discharged.

The Court also noted the Board lacked jurisdiction to order a CTO, as only a physician can issue one under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit with the possibility of transfer to a General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had absented himself from the hospital for four months before surrendering the day before the appeal hearing.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence of elopement and the resulting flight risk concerns were sufficient to sustain the Board's hybrid disposition, while urging an expedited fresh review by the Board.

The applicants, who had been found unfit to stand trial, sought habeas corpus with mandamus compelling their transfer from jail to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to orders made under s. 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code.

They argued that continued detention in jail while awaiting a hospital bed violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter and that the responsible authorities had failed to comply with the underlying court orders.

The court held that the detention was lawful because the original orders expressly authorized custody in jail until a hospital bed became reasonably available.

The applicants had also been returned to court as required when no bed was available, meaning the orders had largely been complied with.

As a result, neither habeas corpus nor mandamus was available, and the Charter claims were rejected.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant appealed a treatment order but was found fit to stand trial shortly after the order was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the broader issues of principle regarding treatment orders were already under reserve in another case, and the remaining issues were fact-specific.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, arguing that his continued detention as an involuntary psychiatric patient following completion of a criminal sentence was unlawful and violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged the practice of “psychiatric gating” and argued that his detention constituted double jeopardy.

The court held that the detention was authorized under the Mental Health Act following lawful execution of a Form 1 and Form 3 and repeated confirmation by the Consent and Capacity Board that the statutory criteria for involuntary admission remained satisfied.

The court also found that civil committal following a completed criminal sentence does not breach Charter protections against arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment.

The proper remedy for disagreement with the board’s decisions was an appeal, not habeas corpus.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board placing a young person, who was found not criminally responsible, in medium security at its facility.

All parties had jointly submitted that the young person should be placed at a youth mental health facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's disposition unreasonable, as there was no evidentiary foundation for its conclusions regarding medical treatment availability or family support logistics.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for an expedited new hearing.

The appellant appealed a 2007 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

However, a subsequent 2008 disposition was made which the appellant did not appeal, and his concerns regarding the panel's composition were addressed at both hearings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal as moot.

The applicant hospital brought a motion under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board pending appeal.

The Board had ordered the respondent, who was found not criminally responsible, to be detained in a medium secure unit.

The applicant sought to transfer the respondent to a maximum security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that suspending a Board disposition requires compelling evidence of extraordinary circumstances, which the applicant failed to provide as the evidence on the motion was the same as that considered by the Board.

The appellant, UPI Inc., appealed a Master's order that dismissed its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment dismissing its third party claim against Kemar Mechanical Limited.

The Divisional Court assumed jurisdiction over both the interlocutory and final components of the Master's order.

The court upheld the Master's decision refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim, finding a triable issue regarding UPI's duty to communicate about its furnace maintenance program.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the third party claim, concluding that if UPI were found liable, its right to indemnification from Kemar also presented a triable issue.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision confirming a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a mental disorder, including the use of neuroleptics.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board did not misapprehend the evidence, noting the appellant's denial of his schizophrenia diagnosis and lack of insight into the consequences of refusing treatment.

The Court held that the Board correctly applied the Health Care Consent Act and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant union alleged that the respondent general contractor, Dalton, violated the subcontracting clause of the provincial collective agreement when the project owner, Rumble, contracted directly with a non-union demolition contractor.

The union also sought a related employer declaration under subsection 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Board found that Rumble, not Dalton, engaged the non-union contractor, and therefore Dalton did not violate the collective agreement.

The Board also declined to exercise its discretion to issue a related employer declaration, finding that doing so would extend rather than preserve the union's bargaining rights.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Board under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging the respondent employer violated the provincial collective agreement by employing a non-union member as an oiler without first calling the union's hiring hall.

The Board denied the respondent's request for an adjournment pending a judicial review application.

On the merits, the Board found the respondent breached the union security clause, ordered compensation for lost wages and benefits to be paid in trust, and issued a cease-and-desist order.

The respondent created a deed of donation and trust in 1953 for the benefit of her unborn children as primary beneficiaries, and her sisters as secondary beneficiaries.

She later challenged the validity of the trust, arguing that gifts to unborn children and gifts in contemplation of death were void under the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trust was valid.

The Court found that under Quebec trust law, the trustee holds a sui generis property right in the trust property, removing the need for beneficiaries to exist at the time of creation.

The Court also held that the gift to the secondary beneficiaries was valid and not a gift in contemplation of death, as the donor had irrevocably divested herself of the property.