James P. Thomson

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit with the possibility of transfer to a General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had absented himself from the hospital for four months before surrendering the day before the appeal hearing.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence of elopement and the resulting flight risk concerns were sufficient to sustain the Board's hybrid disposition, while urging an expedited fresh review by the Board.

The applicants, who had been found unfit to stand trial, sought habeas corpus with mandamus compelling their transfer from jail to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to orders made under s. 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code.

They argued that continued detention in jail while awaiting a hospital bed violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter and that the responsible authorities had failed to comply with the underlying court orders.

The court held that the detention was lawful because the original orders expressly authorized custody in jail until a hospital bed became reasonably available.

The applicants had also been returned to court as required when no bed was available, meaning the orders had largely been complied with.

As a result, neither habeas corpus nor mandamus was available, and the Charter claims were rejected.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant appealed a treatment order but was found fit to stand trial shortly after the order was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the broader issues of principle regarding treatment orders were already under reserve in another case, and the remaining issues were fact-specific.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, arguing that his continued detention as an involuntary psychiatric patient following completion of a criminal sentence was unlawful and violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged the practice of “psychiatric gating” and argued that his detention constituted double jeopardy.

The court held that the detention was authorized under the Mental Health Act following lawful execution of a Form 1 and Form 3 and repeated confirmation by the Consent and Capacity Board that the statutory criteria for involuntary admission remained satisfied.

The court also found that civil committal following a completed criminal sentence does not breach Charter protections against arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment.

The proper remedy for disagreement with the board’s decisions was an appeal, not habeas corpus.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board placing a young person, who was found not criminally responsible, in medium security at its facility.

All parties had jointly submitted that the young person should be placed at a youth mental health facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's disposition unreasonable, as there was no evidentiary foundation for its conclusions regarding medical treatment availability or family support logistics.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for an expedited new hearing.

The appellant appealed a 2007 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

However, a subsequent 2008 disposition was made which the appellant did not appeal, and his concerns regarding the panel's composition were addressed at both hearings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal as moot.

The applicant hospital brought a motion under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board pending appeal.

The Board had ordered the respondent, who was found not criminally responsible, to be detained in a medium secure unit.

The applicant sought to transfer the respondent to a maximum security facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that suspending a Board disposition requires compelling evidence of extraordinary circumstances, which the applicant failed to provide as the evidence on the motion was the same as that considered by the Board.

The appellant, UPI Inc., appealed a Master's order that dismissed its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment dismissing its third party claim against Kemar Mechanical Limited.

The Divisional Court assumed jurisdiction over both the interlocutory and final components of the Master's order.

The court upheld the Master's decision refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim, finding a triable issue regarding UPI's duty to communicate about its furnace maintenance program.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the third party claim, concluding that if UPI were found liable, its right to indemnification from Kemar also presented a triable issue.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision confirming a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a mental disorder, including the use of neuroleptics.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board did not misapprehend the evidence, noting the appellant's denial of his schizophrenia diagnosis and lack of insight into the consequences of refusing treatment.

The Court held that the Board correctly applied the Health Care Consent Act and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent created a deed of donation and trust in 1953 for the benefit of her unborn children as primary beneficiaries, and her sisters as secondary beneficiaries.

She later challenged the validity of the trust, arguing that gifts to unborn children and gifts in contemplation of death were void under the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trust was valid.

The Court found that under Quebec trust law, the trustee holds a sui generis property right in the trust property, removing the need for beneficiaries to exist at the time of creation.

The Court also held that the gift to the secondary beneficiaries was valid and not a gift in contemplation of death, as the donor had irrevocably divested herself of the property.