Irving W. André

The court determined whether a support payor should be required to obtain additional life insurance to secure ongoing spousal and child support obligations.

The responding party sought $370,000 in additional coverage under s. 34(1)(i) of the Family Law Act, relying on employment uncertainty and anticipated post-secondary education expenses.

The court held existing employment-based coverage, combined with settlement terms requiring irrevocable beneficiary designation and charging the estate with child support, adequately protected the obligations.

However, given the payor's evidence that he opposed insurance for religious reasons, the court ordered that if employment coverage ceased, he must obtain a $200,000 life insurance policy naming the support recipient as irrevocable beneficiary.

No costs were awarded.

A dispute between former cohabiting partners over beneficial ownership of a home registered solely in the respondent’s name.

The applicant relied on a written agreement confirming that the respondent held legal title as trustee for both parties with each owning a 50% beneficial interest.

The respondent argued the applicant contributed little to the purchase and had breached the agreement by failing to pay expenses.

The court accepted the authenticity and effect of the written agreement and found the applicant had made substantial financial contributions including mortgage payments and vehicle payments that offset other expenses.

The court declared the applicant held a 50% beneficial interest and set out terms for buyout or sale of the property, with adjustments for unpaid contributions after January 2014.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 in damages and $4,000 in costs for malicious prosecution and defamation arising from false allegations of sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, relied on stereotypes, and improperly awarded costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence and that the costs award was reasonable given the six-day trial.

The court heard consolidated summary conviction appeals concerning police authority to stop motorists emerging from LCBO stores or licensed establishments to assess sobriety.

One trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence and acquitted an accused after finding that a targeted stop outside an LCBO constituted arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, while two other trial judges upheld convictions following similar stops near bars.

The court held that s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act authorizes random roadside stops related to highway safety, including targeting motorists leaving alcohol-related establishments, even without prior signs of impairment.

Such stops are constitutionally valid under the Charter as reasonable limits justified under s. 1.

The court also held that videotaping detainees in a telephone room did not violate s. 10(b) where conversations with counsel were not recorded and there was no evidence that the accused believed their consultations lacked privacy.

The Crown's appeal from acquittal was allowed and the conviction appeals were dismissed.

Following a lengthy family law trial, the court determined issues relating to custody and access, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

Allegations of child abuse raised by the father were largely rejected, and the court concluded that the parents’ conflict had negatively affected the children.

Applying the best‑interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted the mother sole custody and established a detailed access regime.

Child support was ordered in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines and the father was required to pay limited spousal support based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The court also calculated equalization of net family property and addressed disputes concerning certain assets, including foreign property and household contents.

The defendants moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation registered by the plaintiff over land in Mississauga, arguing that the plaintiff had no interest in the land, that there was material non‑disclosure in the ex parte application for the CPL, and that the plaintiff delayed unreasonably in seeking the certificate.

The plaintiff asserted that the parties had long contemplated the transfer of land for the construction of a Greek Orthodox church pursuant to agreements dating back to 1980.

The court held that the totality of the evidence demonstrated a reasonable claim to an interest in the land and a triable issue supporting the CPL.

The court further found that the plaintiff had provided sufficient disclosure on the ex parte motion and that the delay in seeking the CPL was reasonably explained.

Balancing the equities and the absence of demonstrated hardship to the defendants, the court concluded that maintaining the CPL was just.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the action to another jurisdiction and for leave to amend the statement of claim after discovery evidence revealed additional entities allegedly involved in selling the plaintiff’s musical compositions.

The defendants argued the amendments were statute‑barred, would cause prejudice, lacked particulars, and were invalid because the underlying oral agreement contravened the Copyright Act.

The court held that amendments should generally be permitted under Rule 26.01 unless non‑compensable prejudice would result.

The court found the alleged cause of action arose after termination of the agreement in 2012, rejected arguments that the oral agreement was invalid under s. 13(4) of the Copyright Act, and concluded the proposed amendments raised triable issues.

Leave to amend was granted with limited exceptions, and the action was ordered transferred to Newmarket or Toronto.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant security company after allegedly being struck by a bouncer.

At a status hearing, the defendant requested that the action be dismissed for delay.

The court found that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, which was largely caused by the defendant's desire to locate a third party before scheduling examinations for discovery.

The court also found that the defendant would not suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The request to dismiss the action was denied, a timetable was set, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The moving party sought to set aside two earlier Superior Court orders on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, alleging that the judge who issued the orders should have recused himself due to a supervisory relationship with opposing counsel, who served as a deputy judge in the region.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the issue because the bias allegation had already been raised and determined in prior proceedings before the Divisional Court and in a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Applying the doctrine of issue estoppel, the court found the matter could not be relitigated.

The court also refused the moving party’s request to amend pleadings where doing so would contradict an earlier order defining the issues for trial.

The applicant mother sought retroactive child support, section 7 expenses, imputation of income, property division, and a restraining order following the parties' separation.

The court found the respondent father was intentionally under-employed and had hidden cash income, imputing his income at $40,000.

The court ordered retroactive child support, directed the sale or buyout of a jointly owned property, and issued a restraining order due to the respondent's history of domestic violence and ongoing hostility.

The accused was charged with breach of recognizance, multiple counts of assault, and sexual assault arising from a turbulent domestic relationship.

The complainant alleged repeated physical assaults and non‑consensual sexual activity over a two‑year period.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence regarding physical violence, finding it corroborated by witness observations of injuries and admissions contained in the accused’s letters and statements to a friend.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault allegation due to the timing of disclosure and credibility concerns.

The accused was convicted of breach of recognizance and several assault counts but acquitted of sexual assault.

The accused, a packaging manager employed by a major retailer, was charged with fraud after directing supplier companies participating in a rebate program to issue cheques to a company he controlled rather than to his employer.

Over several years, the accused deposited approximately $3.9 million into his own account.

The defence asserted that a confidential agreement with a company vice-president authorized him to retain rebate funds exceeding a certain threshold.

The court rejected the credibility of this claim, relying on witness testimony, documentary evidence, and the absence of any written authorization.

Applying the framework in R. v. W(D), the court found the defence evidence neither credible nor capable of raising a reasonable doubt and concluded that the accused intentionally deprived his employer of the funds.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce security granted by the defendant over her investment account for a loan advanced to a corporation operated by her brother.

The defendant argued she should not be liable because the plaintiff failed to ensure she received independent legal advice before pledging the security.

The court found the documentary record established the security was knowingly provided for the loan and that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Distinguishing authorities involving vulnerable guarantors and unconscionable transactions, the court held no duty arose to ensure independent legal advice in the circumstances.

Summary judgment was granted and the investment account ordered liquidated to satisfy the debt.

A parenting trial concerning custody and access following separation of the parties.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and exclusive decision‑making authority, while the respondent father sought joint custody and opposed the children travelling abroad with the mother.

The court found evidence that the applicant displayed hostility toward the father and had engaged in conduct that risked marginalizing his role in the children’s lives.

Joint custody was ordered to preserve the father’s relationship with the children, with primary residence remaining with the mother and structured access granted to the father.

The court also refused permission for the mother to travel with the children to Saudi Arabia due to concerns about unilateral decision‑making and potential flight risk.

The support payor brought a motion seeking a refraining order preventing the Family Responsibility Office from suspending his driver’s licence for support arrears and a motion to change terminating child and spousal support obligations.

The court held that a payor seeking a refraining order must demonstrate compliance with support and disclosure obligations and come to court with clean hands.

The payor failed to provide complete financial disclosure required under s. 21 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and did not produce sufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the incomplete financial record prevented assessment of the payor’s income and support obligations.

Both the request for a refraining order and the motion to change support were dismissed.

A housing co-operative applied under s. 171.13 of the Co-operative Corporations Act for termination of a member’s membership and a writ of possession based on alleged nuisance and disruptive conduct.

The court reviewed the board’s decision on a standard of reasonableness and considered whether the co-operative complied with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

Concerns arose regarding the fairness of the process, including scheduling a termination meeting despite the member advising she could not attend and the participation of board members who were directly implicated in the allegations against her, raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the circumstances justified exercising its equitable jurisdiction under s. 171.21(1)(a) of the Act to refuse eviction.

The application to terminate membership and obtain possession was therefore denied.

Following separation, the respondent father brought a motion seeking to reduce child support arrears to zero and to set aside an existing child support order, claiming inability to pay due to illness, unemployment, and financial hardship.

The mother opposed the motion and sought an order requiring the father to contribute to post-secondary education expenses for one child.

The court found the father's evidence lacked credibility and concluded he deliberately attempted to avoid his support obligations, including through financial conduct suggesting intentional underemployment and concealment of funds.

Applying principles governing variation of child support orders and arrears relief under the Divorce Act and Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court held that no material change of circumstances justified cancelling arrears.

The court also ordered the father to contribute 50% of the child's post-secondary education expenses under s.7 of the Guidelines.

An application was brought to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award arising from a contractual dispute involving the supply of agricultural seeds.

The respondent argued the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by ordering repayment of a partial payment after finding both parties had breached the contract and by applying equitable principles outside the contractual terms.

The court held the arbitration clause contemplated disputes relating to breaches of the contract and permitted equitable solutions under the governing arbitration rules.

The arbitrator acted within jurisdiction, and none of the refusal grounds under Article 36 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act were established.

The arbitral award was therefore recognized and enforced.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 34.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order compelling a defendant to answer questions refused during an examination for discovery and to attend for a further discovery.

The action arose from a motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiffs alleged negligence, impairment, and negligent entrustment of a vehicle by the corporate defendant.

The court considered the relevance and proportionality of various refused questions relating to the defendant driver’s licensing history, the corporate defendant’s knowledge of his driving record, alcohol consumption prior to the collision, and identification of potential witnesses.

Applying Rules 31.06 and 29.2.03, the court held that most questions were relevant to the pleadings and properly discoverable.

The defendant was ordered to answer specified questions and provide additional witness information.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution following a fraud charge that was later stayed.

The court held that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The conspiracy allegations lacked the necessary particulars regarding the alleged agreement and overt acts of the conspirators.

The malicious prosecution claim also failed because the pleadings did not adequately allege absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in Miazga v. Kvello Estate.

The statement of claim against the Attorney General was therefore struck.