Ian V.B. Nordheimer

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board that summarily dismissed her complaint against her union for failing in its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had previously settled a grievance regarding her termination, but subsequently complained about the union's representation.

The Divisional Court held that the Board was entitled to dismiss the complaint summarily without a hearing, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the plaintiff sought costs of $40,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the offer was not a true compromise and did not trigger Rule 49.10.

Considering the complexity and significance of the litigation, the court fixed costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside an earlier order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The applicant claimed she failed to respond to the earlier notice due to insufficient notice.

The court accepted the lack of notice for the purpose of the motion but found the applicant failed to demonstrate any basis to set aside the order or show that the result would be different if reheard.

The motion was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed an order from the Small Claims Court that struck out his claim against the respondent, a psychologist, based on expert witness immunity.

The appellant had sued the respondent for the return of $21,900 paid for a s. 30 Children's Law Reform Act assessment report, alleging errors, omissions, and failure to address abuse allegations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the law on expert witness immunity in Canada is unsettled, particularly regarding whether it protects an expert from a breach of contract or negligence claim by their own client for recovery of fees.

The court held that such a novel legal issue should not be determined summarily and reinstated the claim.

The respondent landlord brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by the appellant tenant and others regarding a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The tenants argued that rent increase notices were void because they did not include a city-ordered rent reduction, thereby avoiding a one-year limitation period for rebate applications.

The court found that the appeal was devoid of merit as the central legal question had already been conclusively determined against the tenants by the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The respondent, a young person, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from the Danzig Street mass shooting.

The Crown applied under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to have an adult sentence imposed.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's background and progress in custody, and the societal interest in accountability and public protection.

Finding that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the respondent accountable, the court imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for seven years.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order that dismissed her appeal from a Master's order denying leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation.

The Divisional Court found that there were no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, which involved the exercise of judicial discretion.

Furthermore, the issues raised were specific to the facts of the case and not of general importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision that denied his application for a paralegal license on the basis that he was ungovernable.

The applicant argued that the Chair of the Hearing Panel should have recused herself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the Appeal Panel lacked independence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded there was no apprehension of bias and that the tribunal's structure met the requisite degree of independence as directed by the legislature.

The applicant filed a motion in writing seeking a reconsideration of a 2014 Divisional Court decision that dismissed her appeal from a Law Society of Upper Canada appeal panel.

She relied on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan.

The court dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, finding no jurisdiction for a panel to reconsider its earlier decision in these circumstances.

The moving party, applicants, and respondents sought a consent order to add another physician to a judicial review application under a pseudonym.

The court declined to grant the order, noting that notice to the media is generally required before granting any form of publication ban or anonymity order.

The court also raised concerns about the current title of proceedings, which listed the applicants as 'Several Physicians Affected Directly by the Order' without any identifying information in the court file.

The parties were directed to bring a formal motion with notice to the media.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitration award regarding the reduction of hours for regular part-time nurses following a bed closure.

The arbitrator had found that while the hospital was not obliged to schedule part-time nurses to their committed hours if work was unavailable, failing to do so constituted a lay-off under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court held that these two findings were fundamentally inconsistent and led to an absurd result.

The court granted the application, setting aside the arbitration award as unreasonable, and remitted the matter back to the arbitrator.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was exempt from municipal taxes on certain railway lands under s. 315 of the Municipal Act.

The appellant argued the lands were leased to a third party for valuable consideration.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the agreements between the parties created a business relationship akin to a joint venture, not a lease, as they did not grant exclusive possession.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that upheld the employer's prorating of an employee's vacation entitlements due to an unpaid leave of absence.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because it ignored the presumption that vacation entitlements based on service continue to accrue during authorized leaves absent clear language to the contrary in the collective agreement.

The application was allowed, the award set aside, and the matter remitted to a new arbitrator.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissing his appeal of a police discipline hearing outcome.

The Commission had ruled the appeal was filed out of time because, although faxed and received on the final day of the 30-day limit, a statutory deeming provision deemed faxed documents received the following day.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the deeming provision created a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute one.

The provision is intended to protect the serving party, not to act as a trap to deprive them of a statutory right of appeal when actual receipt within the time limit is established.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's claims for damages arising from delayed market entry of a generic drug.

The defendants argued the Patent Act provided a complete code, precluding common law claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting Ontario decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, emphasizing that pleadings motions should rarely warrant appellate review.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside or vary an earlier order dismissing his application for judicial review as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent City of Toronto sought to quash the motion, arguing there was no jurisdiction for a panel of the Divisional Court to review the order.

The court agreed with the respondent, finding that an order under Rule 2.1 is made by 'the court' on its own initiative, not by a judge on a motion, and therefore s. 21(5) does not apply.

The motion to vary was dismissed as being without merit and an abuse of process.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order directing the disclosure of a draft prosecutorial guideline concerning HIV exposure.

The Commissioner found that while the draft guideline originated in solicitor-client privilege, the privilege was waived when an Assistant Crown Attorney shared it with a municipal public health manager.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Commissioner reasonably concluded the privilege was waived because the Ministry and the public health authority did not share a sufficient common interest.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a Director's Delegate upholding an arbitration decision that denied him Loss of Earning Capacity Benefits (LECBs) under the 1994 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued the Delegate's interpretation of s. 20.1 was unreasonable and that the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable and that the applicant did not have a vested right to LECBs.

The Court also upheld the Delegate's finding that s. 20.1 did not create a discriminatory distinction based on age.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had been reinstated by an arbitrator without back pay after a three-year delay in the arbitration decision.

The union initially sought judicial review to compel the arbitrator's reasons but abandoned the application once reasons were provided, concluding it was unlikely to succeed.

The Divisional Court found the Board's conclusion that the union acted reasonably to be reasonable and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario regarding a freedom of information request for police records.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The applicant's response failed to provide an arguable case or clarify the unintelligible grounds for relief.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review.