Ian V.B. Nordheimer

The appellant appealed his sentence for flight from police and driving while disqualified.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence with credit for 283 days of presentence custody on a one-for-one basis, refusing enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating violations of federal statutory release with provincial institutional misconduct.

The court held that the loss of early release eligibility alone generally justifies enhanced credit at 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 142 days.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of nine historical sexual offences against his two biological daughters and his step-daughter, and was acquitted of two charges relating to a third biological daughter.

He received a concurrent sentence of six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence across counts; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of uncharged bad conduct; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in methodology and relied on uncharged acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing an administrative error from the ancillary order.

A lawyer brought an application for an interim injunction to restrain a hospital from withdrawing life support from her client without instructions to do so and without notice to the client's family.

The application was granted ex parte but subsequently set aside by the reviewing judge after the client was declared brain dead.

The lawyer then appealed both the substantive decision and the costs award against her personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the lawyer had no authority to bring the application, acted without instructions, and seriously interfered with the administration of justice by misusing the court process during an emotionally sensitive family decision regarding end-of-life care.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants were successful in overturning orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondents had been successful on the main issue regarding whether a possible third party claim constituted a chose in action that vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

However, the appellants were successful in obtaining the right to have the issue of whether they should be allowed to advance third party claims heard and determined within the section 37 application.

The court found divided success on the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault but contested the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including the absence of disclosed injuries to the back of her head despite claims of repeated head impacts, inconsistency regarding the number of times she was punched in the face, and her failure to identify the appellant in a photo lineup.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of sexual assault based on the complainant's testimony that the appellant tugged on her pants attempting to pull them down and made demands for money or for her to remove her clothing.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the weaknesses in the complainant's evidence and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 years for attempted murder, along with 1.5 years consecutive on two counts of failure to comply with probation.

The appellant had repeatedly harassed a female acquaintance, was convicted of criminal harassment, and subsequently appeared at her home armed with weapons and homemade bombs.

During a confrontation, he stabbed a family member multiple times, inflicting serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder sentence as appropriate and within the sentencing range for such offences, but allowed the appeal in part by making the failure to comply sentences concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the overall sentence from 16.5 years to 16 years before credit for pre-sentence custody.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal of a trial judgment in a civil action involving allegations of excessive force during arrest.

The respondent sought to avoid paying the costs of the appeal on the basis that the matter constituted public interest litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the nature of the proceeding did not fall within the recognized categories of public interest litigation.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed his sentence for criminal harassment, careless use of a firearm, threatening to cause bodily harm, and two breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of two years and six months, reduced by 18 months to reflect 12 months actual pre-sentence custody.

The appellant challenged the sentencing decision on multiple grounds, including the failure to give additional credit for interim release conditions, the characterization of the firearm use, and post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on July 6, 2016 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty following a ruling dismissing his Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Charter ruling, which was based on findings of fact.

The appellant raised issues regarding his treatment during arrest and suggested ineffective assistance of counsel, but had not properly pursued such claims.

The court found no basis to conclude the guilty plea was not voluntary and informed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion to review a decision ordering her to post security for costs of $20,000 for her appeal.

The appellant, acting in person, confirmed she had no ability to pay costs and hinted she would refuse to pay in any event.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appeal had scant prospects of success and was frivolous.

The appellant would need to demonstrate palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge on both the limitations issue and the merits of the case.

The court found the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were not undermined by the evidence presented.

The appellant sought to review a decision by Huscroft J.A. denying him the opportunity to act for the corporate appellants pursuant to Rule 15.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no palpable and overriding error in the discretionary decision.

The court determined that the appellant had demonstrated through his filings and oral submissions that he was incapable of adequately representing the corporations or assisting the court in the appeal.

The appellant's material was voluminous but unfocused, and his oral submissions were similarly unfocused and often irrelevant to the core issues.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning equalization amounts, spousal support, and child support.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of a psychiatric report regarding a child's dependent status.

The Court of Appeal declined to consider the fresh evidence on appeal, noting that the appropriate remedy was to seek variation under section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal applied the stringent standard of review for family law decisions and found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge's decision was plainly wrong.

The trial judge's findings regarding income imputation and business valuation were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel on appeal pursuant to section 684(1) of the Criminal Code following his conviction for second-degree murder and life sentence.

The initial application was dismissed on the basis that the applicant had not established insufficient means to retain counsel.

On renewal, the applicant provided comprehensive financial disclosure including tax returns, property assessment, and pension information, along with evidence of a separation agreement executed prior to trial.

The court found the applicant had insufficient means and appointed counsel, conditional upon the applicant entering into a contribution agreement to pay $500 per month toward legal expenses commencing April 1, 2018.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the appellant's testimony that the sexual activity was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant raised six grounds of appeal challenging the conviction.

While the Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds (misapplication of burden of proof, improper use of silence, and improper use of lack of embellishment), it allowed the appeal on three remaining grounds: the trial judge's failure to inspect the complainant's shirt despite defence counsel's reasonable expectation that he would do so; the trial judge's erroneous admission and use of reply evidence from the appellant's roommate to establish a collusion theory without proper foundation; and most significantly, the trial judge's application of markedly different levels of scrutiny to the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court found that cumulatively, these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, Solstice Two Limited, appealed a decision granting relief from forfeiture to the respondent, Valeria Scicluna, who had advanced $293,685 toward the purchase of a condominium but failed to close due to job loss.

The application judge awarded the recovered funds to the bankruptcy trustee rather than to Scicluna.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the relief from forfeiture as appropriate given the grossly disproportionate nature of the forfeiture and confirming that the funds properly vest in the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion to amend its amended statement of claim to add particulars of additional equipment allegedly damaged by defective hydraulic lubricant manufactured by the respondent, Greenland Corporation.

The motion judge had rejected the amendments on the basis that they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in misinterpreting the pleadings and in conflating the discovery of the claim with the discovery of the extent of damages.

The court held that all alleged damage stemmed from a single cause—the defective hydraulic lubricant—and therefore constituted particulars of one claim rather than separate causes of action.

The appellant, a discharged bankrupt, appealed from an order declaring that a default judgment against him was a debt within the meaning of section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and therefore survived his discharge from bankruptcy.

The default judgment was based on the appellant's failure to comply with mortgage payment obligations.

The respondents sought to rely on extraneous evidence showing that the appellant had misappropriated trust funds paid to him by mistake.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in considering extraneous evidence not grounded in the proceedings that produced the judgment debt.

The court held that characterization of a judgment debt under section 178(1)(d) must be based on the pleadings and evidence before the court that granted the judgment, not on new evidence introduced in the bankruptcy application.

Appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim against Lloyd's of London on the basis that the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action arose from a 2000 Greyhound bus accident where a passenger grabbed the steering wheel, causing the bus to roll.

The appellants obtained a judgment against the passenger at trial in 2012 but did not pursue recovery from Lloyd's of London until 2016, claiming Lloyd's was the insurer for the passenger.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the limitation period commenced from the trial judgment date and had expired before the action was commenced.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim for professional negligence against their former solicitors.

The law firm had been retained for nearly five years to represent the appellants in protracted litigation and subsequently sued for unpaid fees.

The appellants counterclaimed for damages, alleging the firm failed to provide a meaningful assessment of potential damages that would have enabled an earlier settlement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no causal link between the firm's failure to obtain a formal damages assessment and the continuation of the litigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law and that genuine issues requiring trial existed.

The respondent was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers on May 24, 2009, near Douglas Creek Estates in Caledonia while carrying a Canadian flag to participate in a flag-raising rally.

The trial judge found the arrest was unlawful and awarded damages for false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and breach of Charter rights.

On appeal, the majority (Nordheimer and Cronk JJ.A.) found the arrest was lawful as a preventive measure to avoid an imminent breach of the peace, but remitted the case for a new trial on the issue of excessive force.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, finding the arrest was unlawful and that the trial judge's findings should not be disturbed.