Holly Loubert

The appellant, a long-term offender, appealed his conviction and sentence for breaching his long-term supervision order by consuming a pill held out to be Dilaudid.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable as it relied solely on his unconfirmed hearsay admission to his parole officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to conclude the admission reflected the appellant's acceptance of the truth of the supplier's statement.

The Court also upheld the one-year sentence, finding it proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, despite the trial judge's error in failing to consider rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month sentence for assault causing bodily harm following a bar fight where he sucker-punched the complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof and erred in assessing credibility regarding his self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's core findings were supported by a sober, independent witness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-month term fell within the appropriate range given the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred by failing to explain its rejection of a conditional discharge in its reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety was reasonable.

The Court held that while it would have been better for the Board to explicitly explain its rejection of a conditional discharge, the omission was not a reversible error as there was no air of reality to such a disposition on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to his testimony.

He also argued the sentence failed to account for his unblemished character and charitable works.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the record did not support the appellant's claims.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and the trial judge had properly considered the mitigating factors.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for arson of his own property.

The Crown argued the offence should have been designated a serious personal injury offence (SPIO), making a conditional sentence illegal, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the SPIO argument as it was not raised at trial.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding the sentencing judge properly balanced the gravity of the offence with the respondent's attenuated moral blameworthiness due to mental health challenges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence, permitting improper cross-examination about whether he found the complainant attractive, and failing to properly apply the W.D. principles for assessing credibility.

Both parties also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearsay evidence was properly used to infer state of mind, the cross-examination was permissible to rebut the appellant's assertion of good character, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The youth pleaded guilty to offences arising from two armed robberies where a co-offender used a sawed-off shotgun.

The sentencing judge declined the Crown's application to designate the offences as serious violent offences (SVO) under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, finding an insufficient nexus between the youth's actions as a party and the serious psychological harm suffered by the victims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the standard criminal law test for causation applies to the SVO definition and that the youth's conduct was a significant contributing cause of the harm.

The SVO designation was made for the second set of offences, rendering the deferred custody sentence illegal, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant, who suffers from schizoaffective disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at a mental health facility rather than granting an absolute or conditional discharge.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned his request for a conditional discharge and sought only an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant presented a significant threat to public safety and that continued detention was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available.

The appellant appealed the three-year probation term of his sentence, having already served the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the three-year term was not excessive given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the rehabilitative objectives of probation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for five counts of robbery, possession of prohibited ammunition, and possession of stolen property, as well as his seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict was supported by ample circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, video evidence, and similar fact evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; despite the appellant being a youthful first-time offender, the court held that the seven-year sentence was fit given the gravity of the armed robberies, and the trial judge did not err in prioritizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after biting off part of the victim's finger during a fight.

The trial judge, upon learning a conditional sentence was unavailable for a serious personal injury offence, imposed a probation order with six months of house arrest.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a disguised conditional sentence that circumvented Parliament's intent.

Taking into account the respondent's status as a youthful first offender and the house arrest already served, the Court varied the sentence to 21 days of intermittent custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a young complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny, and erred in admitting the complainant's statements to his parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and that the statements were properly admitted under the Khan exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to order the respondent to register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on impermissible speculation about the impact of registration on the respondent.

The respondent failed to meet the high statutory threshold of demonstrating that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

A 20-year SOIRA registration order was imposed.

The appellant was charged with various offences arising from three alleged incidents involving his ex-spouse.

He was acquitted on counts relating to the first and third dates and convicted on two counts relating to the second date.

On appeal, he argued the convictions were inconsistent with the acquittals because the central issue was the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence and acts alleged were different for each date, and the jury was entitled to convict on some counts while acquitting on others.

The appellant's conviction for first degree murder was previously overturned by the Court of Appeal and a verdict of second degree murder was substituted.

The Court of Appeal then determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 12 to 15 years, while the appellant sought the minimum 10 years.

Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitation in custody, his lack of prior violent offences, and the circumstances of the offence, the Court applied the general rule from Shropshire and set the parole ineligibility period at 10 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historic sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the limited use of evidence that the complainant's mother kicked him out of the apartment, and regarding potential collusion between the complainant and her brother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's limiting instructions were adequate and a special instruction on collusion was not mandatory.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that he should be transferred to a medium security facility, that his liberty interests were not respected, and that an independent assessment should have been ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the record.

The Court noted the appellant was making progress in his treatment program and that his liberty interests were currently less restricted at his current facility than they would be in a medium security facility.

The Court also declined to remove family members from the appellant's no-contact list.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in using her false statements in a Family Court affidavit as circumstantial evidence of guilt and misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant concocted portions of her affidavit to cast suspicion away from herself.

The court also found no material misapprehensions of the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after stabbing a man during an altercation.

On appeal, he challenged the Crown's re-examination of a key witness and the trial judge's jury instructions on provocation, post-offence conduct, and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict of first degree murder was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal definition of planning and deliberation, particularly given the tenuous factual basis for first degree murder.

The court set aside the first degree murder conviction and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of eight and a half years imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting lay opinion evidence, relying on bank photographs for identification, and accepting photo line-up evidence that did not strictly follow the Sophonow protocol.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's identification analysis or reliance on the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was measured and within the range suggested by trial counsel.