Helen A. Rady

The applicants sought to rescind a conditional foundation building permit issued by the City of London to the respondent numbered company and Mr. Lavie, arguing non-compliance with applicable law regarding site plan approval and zero-metre setbacks.

The court dismissed the application, finding that site plan approval was not a prerequisite for a conditional permit issued under s. 8(3) of the Building Code Act, unlike a regular permit under s. 8(2).

The court also determined that the zero-metre setback complied with the City's Downtown Area (DA) zoning bylaw, specifically for the DA2 zone.

The decision emphasized that a Chief Building Official's decision, when compliant with statutory requirements, is entitled to deference and should not be influenced by broader land use planning or public policy considerations.

The plaintiff moved for an order to abridge the time for service of three expert reports and to grant leave to call them as experts, also requesting a trial adjournment for the defendants to obtain responding reports.

The defendants opposed, citing prejudice.

The court balanced the plaintiff's disadvantage in not leading expert evidence against the defendants' inability to respond and the case's long history of delays, including previous adjournments and late service of documents by the plaintiff.

Justice Rady, referencing a prior decision by Justice Grace, found that the prejudice to the defendants was irremediable without an adjournment, which had already been refused.

Consequently, the motion was dismissed, and leave to call the expert reports was denied.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert toxicological opinion evidence regarding blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels and signs of intoxication during a trial.

The expert was deemed qualified to testify on BAC levels and their physiological effects based on assumptions.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion on whether an individual exhibited signs of intoxication or others' ability to detect impairment, holding that these are matters of common knowledge for a jury and do not require expert testimony.

The court also cautioned against experts developing hypotheses and sifting through evidence to support them.

At the opening of trial, the plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to plead vicarious liability against the defendant Thomas Bolton for the negligence of the third party, Steve Coulthard.

The Bolton Estate resisted, arguing prejudice due to Mr. Bolton's death and the lateness of the amendment.

The court permitted the amendment, finding it did not raise a new cause of action but rather attached a legal label to existing facts, consistent with Rule 26.01, and that the defence would have understood the basis of liability.

This personal injury action involved a motion by the plaintiffs to appoint a litigation guardian for Elisabeth Reddecopp, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident and found to lack capacity to instruct counsel.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking a further capacity assessment, cross-examination of the initial assessor, and other relief.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, appointing Elisabeth's father, Heinrich, as litigation guardian, finding him presumptively appropriate and without an adverse interest that would preclude his appointment.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, ruling it lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act and the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 to order a further capacity assessment, and that there was no basis to compel cross-examination of the initial assessor or order a second assessment given its comprehensiveness and lack of bias.

This family law proceeding addressed issues of custody, access, child support, arrears, equalization of net family property, and the children's passports following the parties' separation.

The applicant sought sole custody, table child support, and the ability to obtain passports for the children, while the respondent sought joint custody, reduced child support due to hardship, and opposed passports.

The court granted the applicant sole custody, finding that joint custody was unworkable due to the parents' inability to communicate effectively.

The respondent was granted liberal access with a structured schedule.

The court ordered the respondent to pay table child support, rejecting his undue hardship claim, and fixed child support arrears at a reduced amount.

An equalization payment was also ordered, and the applicant was permitted to obtain passports for the children.

The plaintiff moved for judgment to enforce a settlement with Coca-Cola Bottling Company regarding short-term disability benefits.

The dispute centered on the scope of the release demanded by Coca-Cola, which sought to include all future benefits, including group health and pension benefits, arguing it was part of a global settlement.

The court found that the settlement was solely for short-term disability benefits and not a global settlement, thus the broader release was not contemplated or negotiated.

The plaintiff's motion was granted.

BDO Canada Limited, the court-appointed receiver of Delta Logistics Transportation Inc., moved for an order requiring 2337764 Ontario Inc. to deliver possession of seven trucks over which 233 asserted a possessory lien under the Repair & Storage Liens Act (RSLA).

The receiver sought to take possession and sell the trucks for the benefit of creditors, arguing its powers derived from the broad court appointment order under the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act (BIA). 2337764 Ontario Inc. contended that the court lacked jurisdiction, asserting its possessory lien rights and arguing that the matter should proceed under the RSLA's dispute resolution provisions.

The court distinguished the powers of a court-appointed receiver from those of a trustee in bankruptcy, emphasizing the receiver's fiduciary duty to all stakeholders and the supremacy of the court order.

The motion was granted, requiring 2337764 Ontario Inc. to deliver the vehicles to the receiver, with the lien claim to be determined later from the sale proceeds.

Brennan Nicholas, charged with first-degree murder, applied to vary a non-communication order made by a Justice of the Peace, which prohibited him from communicating with his mother and other family members.

The Crown consented to removing siblings and cousins but maintained the prohibition against the mother, Denise Desormeaux, citing past interference with justice.

The court found the original order was made without jurisdiction under s. 516(2) of the Criminal Code, and should have been made under s. 515(12), which is reviewable.

On the merits, the court found no compelling reason to maintain the non-communication order against the mother, noting her protective actions were understandable given the accused's youth, mental health issues, and Indigenous heritage, and that she posed no risk of interfering with the current proceedings.

The application to vary the order was granted, allowing communication with his mother.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff, Mr. Mailloux, and his derivative claimants were barred from recovery under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act and the Insurance Act due to Mr. Mailloux driving without a valid license and insurance.

The court found that Mr. Mailloux was the de facto lessee of the vehicle, knew he was unlicensed and uninsured, and that the insurance policy obtained by Mrs. Mailloux involved material misrepresentations and non-disclosures, rendering it void ab initio.

Consequently, Mr. Mailloux was in breach of the CAIA and barred from recovery, leading to the dismissal of all claims.

The defendants and a statutory third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss a Family Law Act claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Glen Isaac.

The court considered the doctrines of volenti non fit injuria and emergency, and the deceased being the author of his own misfortune.

The motion was granted, finding that the deceased's aggressive actions initiated the confrontation and led to his death, thus precluding the derivative claims.

The defendant, Pizza Pizza Limited, successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for damages.

The plaintiff, Paul Porchak, suffered a radial head fracture after tripping over a bicycle rack outside the defendant's leased premises.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, including unsafe sidewalk conditions and failure to inspect.

The court, applying principles of negligence and summary judgment, found no evidence of an objectively unreasonable risk of harm.

It noted the rack was plainly visible, the plaintiff was aware of its general presence, and there were no prior incidents.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout for his own safety, and therefore, the defendant did not breach its duty of care.

The Crown applied for a ruling on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement made to police during a cautioned interview.

The defendant, Michael Sutton, was charged with assault, sexual assault, and attempted murder.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the interview, including the defendant's state after being awakened and arrested, police conduct, and the absence of threats or inducements.

Applying the confessions rule, the court found that the statement was voluntarily given beyond a reasonable doubt, dismissing the defendant's arguments regarding sleep deprivation, lack of food, an uncomfortable cell, and an oppressive interview atmosphere.

A non-party, 2501427 Ontario Limited, brought a motion for an injunction to prevent the closing of a real estate purchase and sale transaction initiated by the plaintiff, 1943237 Ontario Corporation, under a power of sale.

The moving party, which had purchased the defendants' shares, argued the notice of sale was defective and that they were misled.

The court applied the three-part test for injunctions from *RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*.

The court found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour the moving party.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former band administrator, sued the First Nation and two councillors for wrongful dismissal, mental distress, and defamation.

The defendants alleged just cause for termination, counterclaiming for misappropriation of funds.

The central issue was the authenticity of the plaintiff's employment contract, which she claimed justified her self-reimbursements for vacation pay, CPP, EI, and pension deductions.

The court found the plaintiff's version of the contract to be a forgery, concluding that her actions constituted theft and just cause for termination.

The defamation claim failed due to lack of evidence of publication by the named defendants.

The plaintiff's claims were dismissed, and the First Nation's counterclaim for $18,644.58 was allowed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing an error of law regarding the quantum of rent.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, asserting the Board member made findings of fact, not law, which are not reviewable on appeal.

The court, applying principles distinguishing questions of law from fact, determined that the Board's decision on the agreed rental amount was a factual finding.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction as it did not raise an extricable question of law.

In a motor vehicle personal injury action scheduled for jury trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel brought a motion seeking to be removed as solicitor of record.

The motion arose after disputes regarding fees, allegations by the client that counsel had acted improperly, and a breakdown of the solicitor‑client relationship.

Applying the principles from R. v. Cunningham regarding withdrawal of counsel, the court considered whether withdrawal would harm the administration of justice given the approaching trial date.

The court found that the client had lost confidence in counsel and that the solicitor‑client relationship had irretrievably broken down.

Counsel was permitted to withdraw, subject to providing trial preparation materials to the court, and the trial remained scheduled peremptory on the plaintiffs.

Motion seeking court approval of a proposed settlement and class counsel fees in a securities class proceeding.

The action alleged that a forestry company and its officers issued materially misleading financial statements and prospectus disclosures, contrary to Canadian generally accepted accounting principles, which artificially inflated share prices.

The claims included negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory causes of action under the Securities Act and the Canada Business Corporations Act.

After arm’s‑length negotiations and mediation, the parties reached a $1.9 million settlement funded by the defendants’ insurer.

The court held the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and approved both the settlement and reduced contingency fees.

In a proposed class proceeding, the plaintiffs sought court approval of a third party litigation funding agreement that would bind the plaintiffs and class members.

Notice of the agreement was provided to the defendants and large shareholder members of the class, and no party opposed the motion.

The court considered prior jurisprudence regarding litigation funding agreements and noted that the proposed agreement contained a scaled and capped commission structure addressing concerns previously raised about third party funding arrangements.

The court found the agreement consistent with the principles articulated in earlier cases and noted it represented a cost saving compared with the Class Proceedings Fund.

The agreement was approved.

Following dismissal of an application as abandoned, the respondent municipality sought partial indemnity costs fixed at $750.

The self‑represented applicant opposed costs, arguing that her former solicitor’s conduct caused the abandonment, raising concerns about the court’s earlier reasons, and asserting that she was a public interest litigant.

The court held that the challenges faced by self‑represented litigants are not a recognized basis to avoid cost consequences.

It further found that the applicant’s public interest litigant argument had already been determined and was res judicata.

As the applicant failed to persuade the court to relieve against the deemed dismissal under Rule 38.08(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, costs were ordered to follow the event.