Heather Pringle

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing a breach of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

Although the total net delay, including retrial time, exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the court found the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The parties had relied on the prior Morin framework when the case was proceeding, and the operative delay under Morin guidelines, while exceeding them slightly, was not so egregious as to warrant a stay.

The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.

Following a finding of a section 8 Charter breach in a prior decision (R. v. Muhammad, 2018 ONCJ 468), the court addressed whether evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant should be admitted or excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The affiant's Information to Obtain contained misstatements regarding surveillance that had not been conducted and omissions regarding the accused's lack of criminal record, despite references to a "lengthy criminal past" involving weapons.

The court applied the Grant test, examining the seriousness of the breach, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that while the breach was serious, it did not rise to the level of egregious conduct, and the reliable evidence (drugs and firearm) was necessary for trial.

The evidence was admitted.

The defendant was found passed out in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with a running engine and breath readings of 217 and 201 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

She was charged with impaired driving and having over 80 mg of alcohol while in care and control of a motor vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's testimony discharged the statutory presumption of care and control.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care and control while impaired.

The court found that the defendant had no intention to drive, had entered the driver's seat only to close the open door and subsequently became ill, and had a credible backup plan to use Uber if necessary.

The court acquitted the defendant on both counts.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on charges of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The evidence included a three-day surveillance of a residence in Pickering, culminating in the execution of a search warrant that yielded significant quantities of cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, cutting agent, and a replica firearm from a basement bedroom nightstand, as well as cocaine from a Mercedes registered to the accused.

The defence challenged committal on the basis that the Crown had failed to establish constructive possession of either the drugs in the residence or the vehicle.

The court found that while the accused had a clear connection to the residence and was the registered owner of the vehicle, the evidence did not establish knowledge of or control over the drugs.

The court rejected the Crown's inferences as speculative and unsupported by an adequate evidentiary foundation, particularly the process of elimination argument regarding bedroom occupancy.

The accused was discharged on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

Police intercepted communications and observed the accused purchasing approximately 2985 grams of heroin with a street value between $600,000 and $900,000.

The Crown sought eight years' incarceration while the defence sought four to five years.

The court imposed a six-year sentence, giving significant weight to the early guilty plea as a mitigating factor equivalent to police cooperation.

The accused received credit for presentence custody of two years, four months, and two weeks, leaving approximately three years, seven months, and two weeks to serve.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application seeking exclusion of all evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant executed at 150 Dan Leckie Way, unit #1701, on July 16, 2017.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential source regarding the applicant's possession of firearms and drugs.

The court conducted a Garofoli hearing to determine whether the warrant could have validly issued.

After excising inaccurate statements regarding surveillance and the applicant's criminal history, the court applied the Debot criteria to assess the confidential source information.

While the information was found to be compelling, the court determined that the credibility of the source was weak and corroboration was minimal.

On the totality of circumstances, the court found the ITO insufficient to support issuance of the warrant and established a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts of robbery arising from eight bank robberies committed over one week in July 2017 while in the throes of a crack cocaine addiction.

The Crown sought six years imprisonment emphasizing general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and separation from society.

The defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less one day, arguing that meaningful treatment in the provincial system would better serve rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of five years less seventeen months presentence custody, resulting in three years and seven months remaining to serve.

The court found that while rehabilitation prospects remained limited, the seriousness of the offences, the vulnerable nature of the victims, the extensive criminal record, and the need for deterrence and denunciation were paramount considerations.

The defendant pleaded guilty to common assault after initially facing a robbery charge.

The assault occurred when the defendant, as part of a group, physically searched a 17-year-old victim on a public street, including forcibly pulling down the victim's pants.

The defendant was bound by two probation orders at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge, citing potential immigration consequences.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 30 months probation, finding that while immigration consequences were relevant, they were minor and did not warrant a discharge given the seriousness of the offence, the defendant's prior record, and the need for denunciation and specific deterrence.

The applicant brought a motion alleging a breach of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant faced charges of impaired driving and driving while over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood dating to November 2014.

He was convicted after a one-day trial in November 2015, but that conviction was set aside on appeal in June 2017 and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought a stay of charges, arguing that the delay in bringing him to retrial breached his constitutional rights.

The court found that the Crown failed to expedite the retrial process despite clear appellate direction to do so and despite the post-Jordan framework requiring timely resolution of cases.

The court granted the stay of charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision.

The defendant advanced a Charter s. 10(b) challenge, arguing she was detained without being advised of her rights to counsel.

The court found the defendant was psychologically detained when police left her in an ambulance stating "I'll be back" thereby breaching her s. 10(b) rights.

The breath test evidence was excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on circumstantial evidence including her alcohol consumption at the bar, the nature of the collision, and expert evidence regarding impairment.

The defendant was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to the exclusion of breath samples.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision on March 5, 2016.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police failure to provide an interpreter to explain the defendant's rights to counsel, given the defendant's limited English proficiency.

The court conducted a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that while the defendant's first language was not English, there was insufficient objective evidence that the defendant failed to understand his rights to counsel or other information provided by police at the time of detention and arrest.

The court rejected the Charter breach argument and admitted the breath sample results.

The court found the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and convicted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for using invalid fare media contrary to section 2.3(a) of the Toronto Transit Commission By-Law.

The original conviction was based on three alleged breaches: failure to take the most direct route, improper re-entry into the subway system, and using the transfer outside a reasonable time period.

The appellate court found that the trial was procedurally unfair because the prosecution introduced a new theory of liability regarding travel time during re-examination without proper notice, and the trial judge improperly prevented the appellant from cross-examining the witness on the evidentiary basis for the travel time estimate.

The court also found that the conviction could not be sustained on the re-entry theory alone due to insufficient evidence.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime based on an agreed statement of facts.

He subsequently brought a motion to stay the charges on the basis of entrapment.

An undercover officer, with minimal training and no reasonable suspicion regarding the target, called a phone number obtained from a confidential source and immediately requested to purchase a specific quantity of crack cocaine.

The accused agreed and supplied the drugs.

The court found that the officer provided the opportunity to commit the crime without reasonable suspicion about the person or the phone number, and that the bona fide inquiry exception did not apply due to insufficient corroboration of the tip.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused, a 23-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record, pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a loaded firearm contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Police executed a search warrant on his residence and discovered commercial quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and Alprazolam in a safe.

A loaded 45mm automatic firearm with a defaced serial number was found in a vehicle in which the accused was a passenger.

The firearm was being used to facilitate drug trafficking.

The accused received strong community support from family and his former employer.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of two years less presentence custody, followed by one year of probation, with various conditions including a lifetime prohibition on possessing prohibited or restricted firearms and a ten-year prohibition on possessing other firearms.

The accused was charged with causing a disturbance contrary to section 175(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for allegedly shouting profane and misogynistic comments at women in a public park.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of a civilian witness who observed the conduct and called police.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations.

The court acquitted the accused on three independent grounds: (1) the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt; (2) material inconsistencies between the civilian witness and the police officer undermined the reliability of the Crown's evidence; and (3) even accepting the Crown's evidence, it failed to establish the legal elements of causing a disturbance, specifically the requirement of an externally manifested interference with the ordinary and customary use of the public place.

The defendant was charged with committing an indecent act in a public place and failing to comply with a probation order.

The Crown alleged the defendant exposed his penis and masturbated inside and outside a coffee shop, and that he breached his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The court found the defendant not guilty of the indecent act charge due to insufficient evidence of harm or substantial risk of harm as required under the harm-based test established in R. v. Labaye.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of failing to comply with the probation order, as his disruptive behaviour in the coffee shop constituted a clear breach of the peace.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial involved conflicting testimony between the appellant and the sole prosecution witness regarding a motor vehicle collision at an intersection.

The appellant was convicted on August 12, 2016, following a trial heard on April 8, 2016.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the reasons for judgment were insufficient in law because they failed to meaningfully explain why his testimony was disbelieved.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's credibility analysis consisted of conclusions alone without meaningful reasoning, constituting an error of law.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (1.59 grams for $240 on March 23, 2016).

The Crown and defence agreed the accused was a drug addict but disagreed on whether he was an "addict-trafficker." The court found the accused was an addict-trafficker who sold small quantities of cocaine to feed his own addiction rather than for profit.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years' probation, finding this an exceptional case where a non-custodial sentence was appropriate given the accused's strong rehabilitative efforts, stable employment, family support, and successful completion of methadone treatment with clean urine samples.

The court also imposed a 10-year firearms prohibition and a DNA order.