Harriet E. Sachs

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision made under the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that certiorari is not available to challenge a decision of a Superior Court judge absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The Court also declined to transfer the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that an application for judicial review is distinct from an appeal and the time to appeal had expired.

The City of Waterloo applied for judicial review of two orders made by delegates of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, which required the City to disclose the total dollar amount of its legal bills.

The City argued the adjudicators exceeded their jurisdiction by failing to find the records were protected by solicitor-client privilege under s. 12 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the adjudicators correctly decided the cases on their facts rather than on inapplicable hypothetical scenarios.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision interpreting a regulation under the Education Act regarding teacher performance appraisals.

The arbitrator found that the regulation did not provide principals with unfettered discretion to conduct extra appraisals, and that being new to a school or division did not constitute 'circumstances' relating to performance under s.6(1).

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation justifiable, transparent, and intelligible.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order requiring the plaintiff to undergo three defence medical assessments by a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and a neuropsychologist.

The appellants did not object to the neuropsychologist but challenged the other two.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the neurologist, finding the motion judge reasonably relied on the neuropsychologist's evidence that a neurological exam was necessary to determine organic brain injury.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the psychiatrist, as there was no evidence explaining why a psychiatric assessment was warranted in addition to the other examinations.

The plaintiffs appealed a decision upholding the defendants' claim of litigation privilege over an expert engineer's file.

Before the appeal was heard, the defendants produced the expert's report and underlying file, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in costs for the appeal, the leave motion, and the appeal below, finding that the defendants' tactical delay in obtaining the report and claiming privilege unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and increased costs, particularly given the defendants' spoliation defence.

The respondents applied to the City of Toronto for demolition permits.

After 19 months without a decision, they appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board.

The City argued the appeal was out of time under section 3 of the City of Toronto Act, 1985.

The Board found it had jurisdiction, concluding that the time limits conflicted with section 33(4) of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the City's appeal, finding no conflict between the statutes but holding that the time limit in section 3 was directory rather than mandatory, and that the appeal was filed in time.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Securities Commission decision ordering the disclosure of his compelled evidence to co-respondents in a regulatory proceeding.

The applicant argued the evidence was privileged based on an undertaking from Commission staff and that the Charter applied due to the risk of quasi-criminal proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's interpretation of the undertaking was reasonable and that the Charter did not apply to the administrative proceeding.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a FSCO Director's Delegate's decision.

The respondent was injured in an accident and subsequently filed an amended tax return reporting previously unreported income.

The Director's Delegate held that under s. 64.1(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, the respondent was entitled to have his income replacement benefits adjusted to reflect the higher income reported in the amended return.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Director's Delegate's interpretation of s. 64.1(2) was both reasonable and correct.

During a summary judgment motion involving a mini-trial, the motions judge ordered that a paragraph in the self-represented respondent's affidavit be treated as a counterclaim for one million dollars against the appellant bank.

The bank appealed this order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as premature, holding that an appeal of a ruling made during a summary judgment motion should normally await the completion of the motion, similar to rulings made during a trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation as a victim of a violent crime.

The appellant sought compensation for nervous shock after learning that her daughter had been sexually assaulted by her husband years earlier.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the common law test for nervous shock, which requires the claimant to have seen or heard the event or its immediate aftermath, rather than simply being informed of it later.

The moving party (the College) brought a motion to quash an appeal by the responding parties (the members) from an interlocutory order of the Discipline Committee.

The Discipline Committee had dismissed the members' motion for the production of additional third-party records.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the statutory right of appeal only applies to final decisions, not interlocutory ones.

The court also declined the members' request to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review, noting that such an application would be premature and that the administrative process should be permitted to unfold.

The Ministry applied for judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision finding that the Ministry breached the collective agreement by failing to create and fill a single Probation Officer 3 (PO3) position.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable and entitled to deference, as a literal interpretation would have led to an unrealistic result with no sensible purpose.

The appellant, a bank employee, sought to certify a class action against the respondent bank for systemic unpaid overtime.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding no common issues that would advance the litigation and that the bank's overtime policy requiring pre-approval was lawful under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge also awarded $525,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims required individual assessments and that the costs award was reasonable.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order certifying a class proceeding in part.

The motion judge had declined to certify claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, and had restricted the class to Canadian purchasers.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of the civil conspiracy claim, finding conflicting decisions and good reason to doubt the correctness of requiring the plaintiff to plead special damages at the certification stage.

Leave to appeal was denied for the misrepresentation claims and the class definition.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside an Anton Piller order that had been granted ex parte.

The motion judge had set aside the order on the grounds that the appellant failed to demonstrate a threat of serious damage and failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure of material facts, including alternative means of preserving evidence and the true reasons for a lost client contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the appellant failed to satisfy the strict conditions for an Anton Piller order and breached its duty of disclosure.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board that ordered it to cease transferring hydro payment obligations to the tenants.

Following the Board's decision, the Ontario Energy Board ruled that the landlord's activities were unauthorized under the Electricity Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that any concerns about implementing smart sub-metering under the new rules should be addressed by applying to the Board for a variation of its order.

The applicants sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions which found that a 1965 Working Agreement did not confer bargaining rights on them.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court upheld the Board's interpretation that the agreement merely bound the employer to abide by the provisions of the collective agreements, rather than binding the employer to the collective agreements themselves.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding a denial of natural justice due to delay, finding no prejudice was demonstrated.

Both applications were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of $35,000 on a partial indemnity basis, which included costs thrown away for two prior adjournments.

The appellant argued the amount was excessive and suggested an award between $18,000 and $22,000.

The Divisional Court found the claimed costs thrown away to be excessive but agreed the respondent was entitled to costs for the adjournments.

The court fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive, to be set-off against the sum owed by the respondent to the appellant under an Ontario Municipal Board award.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board that denied her compensation for mental or nervous shock following the murder of her son.

The Board had found she was a victim and suffered the injury, but erroneously applied s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act to preclude an award.

On consent, the Divisional Court set aside the decision, awarded funeral expenses, and remitted the matter to a new panel to assess the quantum of compensation for nervous shock without considering s. 17(1).