Golnaz Nayerahmadi

During a trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude a new reply report by the plaintiffs' expert, Dr. John Bradford.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the report to address six questions they claimed arose unexpectedly from the defendants' experts' testimony.

The court reviewed the principles governing late-filed expert reports, noting they are only admissible to address new, unanticipated matters raised by the defence.

The court analyzed each of the six questions and found that only one (Question 4, regarding the difference between segregation in a hospital versus a prison setting) addressed a genuinely new opinion.

The motion to exclude was partially granted, with only Question 4 of the reply report admitted.

A case conference was held following a Supreme Court of Canada decision that limited the class to personal users of the defendants' cell phone services.

The defendants intended to bring motions to enforce a costs ruling and revisit the certification order.

The plaintiff sought to proceed with examinations for discovery, while the defendants preferred to wait until after their motions were heard.

The court ordered that the discovery process proceed in tandem with the motions, as the issues raised by the defendants were primarily legal and would not significantly impact the scope of discoveries.

In a voir dire during a trial, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, a forensic psychiatrist, arguing that a previously undisclosed 2002 draft report demonstrated a lack of independence.

The plaintiffs alleged that the expert's subsequent 2003 and 2019 reports were substantively altered to align with the defendants' legal position.

The court held that while the differences between the reports raised a suspicion sufficient to lift any litigation privilege over the draft report, they did not warrant disqualifying the expert at the threshold stage.

The expert was qualified to testify, with the draft report permitted to be used for cross-examination, and the ultimate assessment of his credibility and independence reserved for the trial judgment.

In a voir dire during a trial regarding historical programs at a psychiatric facility, the plaintiffs challenged the qualification of the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Turrall.

The plaintiffs argued he lacked credibility because substantial portions of his report on the standard of care were copied verbatim from another expert's memo.

The court found the standard of care portion of the report unnecessary and excluded it, but qualified the expert to testify on causation issues regarding specific plaintiffs, as that portion of his report was based on his own review of medical records.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert witness, Dr. Vernon Quinsey, arguing he lacked the requisite independence and objectivity.

Dr. Quinsey was previously employed as a staff psychologist and Director of Research at the very psychiatric facility whose programs were being challenged as unethical human experimentation.

The court found that Dr. Quinsey's integral role in evaluating the contentious programs during the relevant period created a serious doubt as to his objectivity.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of his evidence outweighed its probative value, and disqualified him from testifying as an expert, though permitting him to testify as a fact witness.

The plaintiff pension fund sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act to commence a $3 billion secondary market securities class action against the defendant mining company.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentations in three categories: capital expenditure and scheduling, environmental compliance, and accounting and financial reporting.

The court dismissed the motion for leave regarding the capital expenditure and accounting allegations, finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the public correction requirement.

However, the court granted leave to proceed with one core environmental allegation, finding a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff could establish at trial that the defendant's July 26, 2012 representation about the completion of a water management system was an untrue statement of material fact.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to admit three sur-reply expert reports.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the reports were unnecessary, prejudicial, and served late.

The court admitted two of the reports, finding them to be narrowly tailored responses to specific criticisms raised by the plaintiffs' experts.

However, the court excluded the third report, finding it to be an advocacy piece that improperly introduced new evidence and amounted to case-splitting.

The appellant, Nissa Corporation, inherited a solar power generation lease when it purchased two properties in Napanee from the Business Development Bank of Canada.

The respondent tenant sought declarations that the lease was valid and binding, and that it had the right to connect to the electrical utility system via a transformer located on an adjacent property (60A) and to install inverters in the electrical room of the leased building (61A).

The application judge granted both declarations.

On appeal, the court considered two issues: (1) whether the tenant had the right to connect to the transformer at the adjacent property, and (2) whether the tenant could install inverters inside the building rather than on the roof.

The court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the lease did not extend to the adjacent property but that the tenant could install inverters inside the building.

The applicant, who pled guilty to manslaughter in 1986, sought a post-conviction disclosure order from the Crown in aid of an application for a Ministerial Review under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, claiming he had falsely confessed and was wrongfully convicted.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application for a disclosure order as premature (because the applicant had not exhausted his appeals) and moot (because the Crown had already disclosed all available documents).

However, the court granted declaratory relief, holding that the superior court has jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter to make post-conviction disclosure orders in aid of a Ministerial Review, and that convicted persons do not need the Crown's consent to communicate with public officials regarding their convictions.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude video footage of an interview between a deceased plaintiff and a documentary filmmaker.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce the unsworn footage to demonstrate the deceased plaintiff's sincerity and counter credibility attacks in the defendants' expert reports.

The court held that the video footage did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay, noting that the best available evidence was the deceased plaintiff's sworn examination for discovery transcript and affidavit.

The motion to exclude the evidence was granted.

At a pre-trial conference for a six-week trial, the court provided procedural directions regarding the presentation of evidence.

The court permitted the plaintiffs to use affidavits for their evidence-in-chief to save time, but declined to admit discovery transcripts en masse.

The court also agreed with the defendant that the judge should not read the expert reports until after hearing the plaintiffs' viva voce evidence, to avoid being influenced by the experts' interpretation of the plaintiffs' testimony before hearing it firsthand.

A class action was brought against a telecommunications provider on behalf of approximately two million Ontario residents who alleged they were overcharged through an undisclosed call-rounding practice.

The class consisted of both consumers (protected from arbitration by the Consumer Protection Act, 2002) and non-consumer business customers bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in standard form contracts.

The majority held that s. 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 does not grant the court discretion to refuse to stay claims that are dealt with in an arbitration agreement, and that the first precondition under s. 7(5)(a) was not met because the sole matter in dispute — alleged overbilling — was dealt with in the arbitration agreements.

The business customer claims were therefore stayed, as only the consumers benefited from the Consumer Protection Act's override of the arbitration clause.

Four judges dissented, holding that s. 7(5) confers a discretion to allow the entire proceeding including arbitrable claims to continue in court where it would be unreasonable to separate them.

The Crown brought an ill-conceived motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from the Plaintiffs on the eve of trial in a multi-plaintiff action concerning alleged inhumane experimentation at a mental hospital.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Plaintiffs had made good faith efforts to provide disclosure given their health limitations and the age of the records.

The judge emphasized that the Rules of Civil Procedure are to facilitate, not impede, litigation, and that proportionality and common sense must guide discovery.

Many of the Crown's requests were deemed a "fishing expedition" or sought information the Crown could obtain independently.

The Plaintiffs were awarded $30,000 in substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's conduct in unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding.

The parties appeared before the court to advise that the contested issue of carriage had been resolved by consent.

The court approved an agreed-upon schedule for the proceedings leading up to a certification motion and potential jurisdiction motions, including deadlines for the production of medical and gambling records, delivery of materials, cross-examinations, and factums.

The appellants, survivors and family members of victims of the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, brought a class action against Loblaws and Bureau Veritas seeking damages for negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that Bangladeshi law applied (not Ontario law), the claims were statute-barred under Bangladesh's one-year limitation period, and the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on all grounds.

The court also addressed a costs appeal, reducing the costs award by 30% to reflect the public interest component of the claims.

The defendant, Payman Khanlari, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, Hossein Aboutaleb-Maragheh, under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and was impecunious.

However, applying a holistic approach to the "justness" of the order, the court determined that the action was not plainly devoid of merit and had a good chance of success, and that the plaintiff's financial circumstances were a result of the funds at issue in the action.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed, and the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff $12,500.00 in costs.

This is a trial management endorsement following a Court of Appeal decision that vacated a partial summary judgment and remitted the matter for a full trial.

The court addresses the plaintiffs' request for bifurcation (liability first, then damages) and the defendants' preference for a combined trial.

Given the age of the plaintiffs and the historical nature of the claims (1966-1983), the court emphasizes the need for expedition while ensuring procedural fairness.

The court orders a hybrid trial, combining affidavit evidence with necessary viva voce testimony, scheduled for 6 weeks, covering liability issues, with damages to be determined later.

The trial is scheduled for May-June 2019, despite scheduling conflicts for some defence counsel, prioritizing the need for a firm trial date.