Freya Kristjanson

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment to the respondent bank for a credit card debt.

The appellant argued that the bank's failure to provide a signed account agreement was fatal to its claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as the appellant had received and not disputed monthly credit card statements setting out the debts and interest rates over many years.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of an arbitrator's interpretation of schedules to two expired collective agreements.

Prior to the hearing, the parties ratified new collective agreements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the matter moot as there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, emphasizing that it does not provide advisory opinions and that the applicant had an obligation to bargain scheduling issues rather than await a court decision on expired agreements.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to post $30,000 in security for costs and a subsequent order striking his pleadings for failing to do so.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in principle by ordering security for costs based on past non-compliance with costs orders, as Rule 24(13) of the Family Law Rules requires an order for costs that remains unpaid at the time the order is made.

As there was no unpaid costs order when the motion was heard, the court lacked authority to make the order.

The appeal was allowed and the orders were set aside.

The plaintiffs moved for an order staying or adjourning the defendant's motion for leave to appeal a case management judge's decision on a Rule 21 motion.

The Rule 21 motion was heard together with the first stage of a bifurcated certification motion in a proposed class proceeding arising from a mass shooting.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the stay, finding that the balance of convenience favoured postponing the leave motion until after the second stage of the certification motion was decided to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The moving party employer sought to quash the responding party employee's appeal of an order staying his wrongful dismissal action in favour of arbitration.

The employer argued the appeal was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act.

The employee and an intervener argued the arbitration clause was void for contracting out of the Employment Standards Act, meaning the initial stay decision was made without jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the appeal was not completely devoid of merit and raised important questions of law regarding the intersection of the Arbitration Act and the Employment Standards Act.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, arguing the appeal lacked merit and the tenants failed to pay rent.

The court found it would be unfair to proceed with the motion to quash given the short timeframe and the tenants' need to obtain transcripts.

The court adjourned the motion to quash to be heard with the expedited appeal, subject to strict conditions requiring the tenants to pay ongoing and arrears rent, order transcripts, and perfect the appeal.

The applicant condominium corporation sought judicial review of a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) decision regarding an accessible parking dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under the Condominium Act.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review is not available where an adequate alternative remedy, such as a statutory appeal on questions of law, exists.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court deputy judge's interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment and awarding $400 in costs to the respondent.

The applicant argued the costs award exceeded the $100 limit under Rule 15.07 absent special circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the deputy judge had jurisdiction under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and provided adequate reasons for the higher award.

Furthermore, the Court exercised its discretion to decline relief, emphasizing that judicial review of Small Claims Court interlocutory orders should only be granted in exceptional circumstances to preserve the informal and cost-effective nature of the process.

The applicant veterinarian sought judicial review of an interim suspension order made by the Discipline Committee pending a hearing into allegations of professional misconduct involving the sexual assault of a minor.

The applicant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction to make interim suspension orders and that the decision lacked a proper evidentiary basis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that section 16.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act reasonably provided the Committee with jurisdiction to make substantive interim orders.

The Court also held that the Committee's decision to impose the suspension was reasonable given the serious nature of the allegations and the applicant's prior discipline and criminal history for similar conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order on a motion to change child support, arguing errors of fact and law regarding imputed income and the application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the appellant's persistent failure to provide financial disclosure.

However, the Court found an error of law in the trial judge's application of the 2017 Guidelines instead of the 2011 Guidelines for the period prior to November 2017.

The appeal was allowed in part to correct the child support calculations using the 2011 Guidelines, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal, granted a stay pending the appeal, and ordered the hearing of the appeal to be expedited.

Costs of $5,000 were left to the discretion of the appeal panel.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that reclassified its student residence from the residential property class to the multi-residential property class.

The Board's decision relied on a previous ruling to interpret the term 'self-contained unit'.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding there was reason to doubt the legal correctness of the Board's statutory interpretation and that the issue was of sufficient importance, as it affected over 80 properties and established a new approach to defining self-contained units.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order that awarded her five weeks' pay in lieu of notice for wrongful dismissal and dismissed her other claims of improper conduct by the employer.

On appeal, she argued the notice period was insufficient, the motion judge ignored her amended employment agreement, and there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law in the motion judge's application of the Bardal factors or dismissal of the other claims.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed as the evidence could have been obtained prior to the summary judgment motion.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dunphy J. dated May 13, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed in the amount of $5,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of D.E. Harris J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

No costs were ordered because the responding party failed to file a Costs Outline.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Carpenter-Gunn J. dated June 25, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding defendants in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board declining to void an eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The Board had found that the tenant failed to pay all arrears, costs, and enforcement fees under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Board erred in law by including enforcement fees in its determination of whether the tenant met the requirements of s. 74(11) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's decision declining to reactivate her application after a workplace grievance was withdrawn.

The Tribunal found she failed to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay in requesting reactivation, as her medical evidence did not establish she was prevented from pursuing her legal rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable, its assessment of the medical evidence entitled to deference, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellants appealed two orders made by a case management judge authorizing the sale of an estate property and setting the terms of the sale.

The respondent Estate Trustee During Litigation brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the orders were interlocutory and leave to appeal had not been obtained.

The Divisional Court held that the orders were interlocutory because they did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties to the net proceeds of the sale.

The court further held that leave to appeal is required for interlocutory orders under s. 10(1) of the Estates Act.

As the appellants did not seek leave, the appeal was quashed.

The court also noted that the appeal would have been dismissed on the merits in any event.

The applicant initially sought an order of mandamus compelling the respondent Minister to make public proposed accessibility standards reports.

After the reports were released, the applicant amended the application to seek a declaration that the respondent breached his statutory duty under s. 10(1) of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 by failing to release them upon receipt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as moot, noting the live controversy had disappeared.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding that the required analysis of what constitutes reasonable steps prior to release is highly contextual and would not provide meaningful guidance for future cases.