Frances P. Kiteley

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order setting aside five ex parte injunctions he had obtained against the defendant regarding the proceeds of a real estate sale.

The motions judge had set aside the orders after finding the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, including a $2 million mortgage and other joint ventures, and had admitted to dishonesty in other proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision or her exercise of discretion in assessing the plaintiff's lack of candour.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed their motions to strike summonses to witnesses and a notice of examination.

The underlying motion was to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The defendants argued the proposed examinations were too broad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no matters of public importance, as the scope of examination was properly tied to the broad issues raised in the motion to strike.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order setting aside a default judgment against four defendants.

The plaintiff argued there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, alleging the motions judge failed to find an arguable defence, ignored false affidavits, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motions judge applied the correct legal principles and provided sufficient reasons for the limited purpose of setting aside a default judgment.

The court also held the issues were specific to the parties and not of general importance to warrant leave to appeal.

The motion was dismissed without costs due to the defendants' lack of diligence.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for leave to appeal, the applicant sought costs of $7,603.25 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued the amount was excessive and suggested $2,850.

The court disallowed costs for the applicant's own time as he acted as the client, not counsel, but allowed fees for his counsel's preparation and attendance.

Costs were fixed at $3,150 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decisions not to refer his racial discrimination complaint against his employer to the Human Rights Tribunal, and to uphold that decision upon reconsideration.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness during the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission met the requirements of procedural fairness and that its decisions were not patently unreasonable.

The complainant alleged that a funeral home lost his late wife's diamond earrings.

The Complaints Committee of the Board of Funeral Services declined to refer the matter to discipline and stated it lacked jurisdiction to order compensation.

On appeal, the Licence Appeal Tribunal ordered the funeral home to pay $4,800 in compensation.

The Registrar appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that neither the Complaints Committee nor the Tribunal had statutory authority under the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act to award monetary compensation to a complainant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal confirming the Superintendent's consent to merge two pension plans following a corporate amalgamation.

The appellant argued the merger and subsequent use of the actuarial surplus from one plan to fund contribution holidays for the merged plan constituted a revocation of trust.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and correct.

The court held that the plan documents permitted the merger and that using actuarial surplus to fund contribution holidays while a plan is ongoing does not constitute a revocation of trust.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' request for judicial review of a decision denying them admission to a master's program, the successful university sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court weighed the factors under Rule 57, noting the complexity of the issues, the unfounded allegations of bias, and the applicants' failure to mitigate.

The court awarded the university partial indemnity costs fixed at $15,000 for fees and $8,665.31 for disbursements, payable equally by the three applicants.

A dissenting judge would have awarded a lower quantum of costs with an extended time to pay.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding damages and costs arising from a breach of fiduciary duty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on damages, finding no error in the trial judge's calculation or refusal to award punitive damages.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the trial judge erred in denying costs under Rule 76.13(3) because the action included non-monetary claims and faced a substantial counterclaim, making the ordinary procedure appropriate.

The appellant was awarded trial costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision confirming the final report of a Master.

The Divisional Court found a technical arithmetical error in the calculations, specifically double-counting of a $6,868.21 payment.

The appeal was allowed, and the amount owed in the Master's report was reduced accordingly.

No costs were awarded as the success was based on an arithmetical error.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision allowing a subdivision application to proceed to a hearing.

The central issue was whether the Board had jurisdiction under the Planning Act despite amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act requiring a development permit before any development decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the mandatory language of the amended legislation.

The Court further held that the respondent did not have a vested right to a hearing before the Board.

The appellants appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee of the Ontario Association of Architects.

They argued they were denied a fair hearing because the independent legal counsel retained to advise the Committee effectively took over the conduct of the hearing.

The Divisional Court agreed, noting numerous instances where the Committee's counsel interrupted the appellants' counsel, purported to speak for the Committee, and engaged in heated arguments.

The findings of guilt were set aside and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicants sought judicial review of Laurentian University's decision to deny them admission to graduate studies.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was discretionary and did not attract certiorari or mandamus.

Applying the factors from Khan v. University of Ottawa, the court found that only minimal procedural fairness was required in this context.

The court concluded there was no flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and dismissed the application, rejecting allegations of bias or retaliation.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer her disability discrimination and harassment complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.

The applicant argued the Commission's investigation was incompetent for failing to interview her physicians and relying on potentially biased employee statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the investigation was thorough and not clearly deficient.

The Court held that the Commission's conclusion—that the applicant was accommodated and terminated for progressive discipline rather than discrimination—was supported by ample evidence and was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant sought leave to appeal two orders in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal an order staying the appellant's child support application pending compliance with a financial disclosure order.

However, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal of a case conference judge's order that struck the affidavit of the parties' teenage child.

The Court found the case conference judge erred by striking the affidavit on his own initiative without hearing submissions, contrary to the Family Law Rules, and without providing adequate reasons for exercising parens patriae jurisdiction.

The affidavit was restored to the record.

The Toronto Star made a freedom of information request for data from two police firearms databases, SOURCE and FATE.

The Adjudicator ordered partial disclosure of the SOURCE database but denied access to the FATE database under the law enforcement intelligence exemption.

Both the Ministry and the Star sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision regarding the FATE database but quashed the order disclosing the SOURCE database, finding that the Adjudicator unreasonably interpreted the 'law enforcement matter' exemption.

The applicants, several police officers, brought a motion for a limited publication ban regarding Notices of Hearing and the Chief of Police's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that inadequate notice was given for the relief regarding the Notices of Hearing, and that the applicants failed to satisfy the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban on the Chief's report, agreeing with the prior endorsement of the motion judge.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which upheld the Director's finding that she was not a 'person with a disability' under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Tribunal found her chronic pain did not amount to a substantial impairment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by assessing the appellant's condition on her 'good days' rather than her recurrent 'bad days', and failed to make findings on the frequency and unpredictability of her bad days.

The matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a Director's decision under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act to review the Society's refusal to place Crown ward children with extended family members for adoption.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that the Director's decision to conduct a review was not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because it did not decide or prescribe anyone's legal rights.

In the alternative, the majority found the Director's decision to be reasonable and entitled to deference.