Frances P. Kiteley

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding damages and costs arising from a breach of fiduciary duty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on damages, finding no error in the trial judge's calculation or refusal to award punitive damages.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the trial judge erred in denying costs under Rule 76.13(3) because the action included non-monetary claims and faced a substantial counterclaim, making the ordinary procedure appropriate.

The appellant was awarded trial costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision confirming the final report of a Master.

The Divisional Court found a technical arithmetical error in the calculations, specifically double-counting of a $6,868.21 payment.

The appeal was allowed, and the amount owed in the Master's report was reduced accordingly.

No costs were awarded as the success was based on an arithmetical error.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision allowing a subdivision application to proceed to a hearing.

The central issue was whether the Board had jurisdiction under the Planning Act despite amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act requiring a development permit before any development decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the mandatory language of the amended legislation.

The Court further held that the respondent did not have a vested right to a hearing before the Board.

The applicants sought judicial review of Laurentian University's decision to deny them admission to graduate studies.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was discretionary and did not attract certiorari or mandamus.

Applying the factors from Khan v. University of Ottawa, the court found that only minimal procedural fairness was required in this context.

The court concluded there was no flagrant violation of the rules of natural justice and dismissed the application, rejecting allegations of bias or retaliation.

The appellants appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee of the Ontario Association of Architects.

They argued they were denied a fair hearing because the independent legal counsel retained to advise the Committee effectively took over the conduct of the hearing.

The Divisional Court agreed, noting numerous instances where the Committee's counsel interrupted the appellants' counsel, purported to speak for the Committee, and engaged in heated arguments.

The findings of guilt were set aside and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer her disability discrimination and harassment complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.

The applicant argued the Commission's investigation was incompetent for failing to interview her physicians and relying on potentially biased employee statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the investigation was thorough and not clearly deficient.

The Court held that the Commission's conclusion—that the applicant was accommodated and terminated for progressive discipline rather than discrimination—was supported by ample evidence and was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant sought leave to appeal two orders in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal an order staying the appellant's child support application pending compliance with a financial disclosure order.

However, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal of a case conference judge's order that struck the affidavit of the parties' teenage child.

The Court found the case conference judge erred by striking the affidavit on his own initiative without hearing submissions, contrary to the Family Law Rules, and without providing adequate reasons for exercising parens patriae jurisdiction.

The affidavit was restored to the record.

The applicants, several police officers, brought a motion for a limited publication ban regarding Notices of Hearing and the Chief of Police's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that inadequate notice was given for the relief regarding the Notices of Hearing, and that the applicants failed to satisfy the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban on the Chief's report, agreeing with the prior endorsement of the motion judge.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which upheld the Director's finding that she was not a 'person with a disability' under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Tribunal found her chronic pain did not amount to a substantial impairment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by assessing the appellant's condition on her 'good days' rather than her recurrent 'bad days', and failed to make findings on the frequency and unpredictability of her bad days.

The matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The Toronto Star made a freedom of information request for data from two police firearms databases, SOURCE and FATE.

The Adjudicator ordered partial disclosure of the SOURCE database but denied access to the FATE database under the law enforcement intelligence exemption.

Both the Ministry and the Star sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision regarding the FATE database but quashed the order disclosing the SOURCE database, finding that the Adjudicator unreasonably interpreted the 'law enforcement matter' exemption.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which upheld the Director's finding that she was not a 'person with a disability' under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to properly interpret and apply all three subparagraphs of section 4(1) of the Act.

The court held that the Tribunal improperly stopped its analysis after finding no 'substantial' impairment under subparagraph (a), without considering the impact of the impairment on activities of daily living under subparagraph (b).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a Director's decision under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act to review the Society's refusal to place Crown ward children with extended family members for adoption.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that the Director's decision to conduct a review was not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because it did not decide or prescribe anyone's legal rights.

In the alternative, the majority found the Director's decision to be reasonable and entitled to deference.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review seeking to quash or adjourn the commencement date of a coroner's inquest, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent coroner and the family of the deceased sought costs against the applicant and his employer, a ski club.

The court found the claimed costs excessive but ordered the applicant and the ski club to jointly and severally pay fixed costs of $7,500 to the coroner and $2,500 to the family.

The applicant sought judicial review of a coroner's orders refusing to adjourn an upcoming inquest into a fatal ski accident and initiating an inquiry into a potential conflict of interest by the applicant's counsel.

The applicant also sought to remove the coroner based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application regarding the adjournment and bias, finding no jurisdictional error or fundamental failure of justice in the coroner's procedural rulings.

However, the court set aside the coroner's order directing the applicant's counsel to disclose information about his retainer, finding the coroner lacked sufficient material to initiate a conflict of interest inquiry on his own motion.