Fairburn

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre with conditions, arguing he should have been conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, medication non-compliance, and intimidation of his treatment team.

The court also rejected the argument that a recent appellate decision setting aside a prior conviction undermined the Board's disposition, as the Board relied on the appellant's own testimony regarding the underlying incident.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the opportunity to clarify the legal framework for courtroom seating.

The Court held that an in-custody accused is presumed to sit in the prisoner's box, though trial judges retain discretion to permit alternative seating based on security, trial fairness, and the ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court found the trial judge's decision was reasonable and that standard jury instructions adequately mitigate any potential stigma associated with the prisoner's box.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a 2013 consent dismissal and settlement agreement, as well as the dismissal of a new 2023 action claiming the same relief.

The motion judge found the appellant's motion and the new action were transparent attempts to relitigate issues that had been settled over a decade prior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the doctrine of abuse of process prevents the relitigation of settled issues and that the interests of finality prevail absent contractual problems like fraud or duress.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants brought actions in Ontario against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian police at a mine in Tanzania.

The motion judge dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdiction and alternatively stayed them on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding Tanzania to be the clearly more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in his forum non conveniens analysis by misapprehending the location of Barrick's head office, applying the wrong evidentiary standard, and failing to properly assess the risk of unfairness in Tanzania.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, particularly given that the vast majority of witnesses and evidence were located in Tanzania.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in giving a restrictive corrective instruction.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could not find a key Crown witness fabricated her evidence about the appellant's confession because defence counsel did not explicitly put that suggestion to her in cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no breach of the rule occurred as the tenor of the cross-examination made the defence's position clear.

Furthermore, the corrective instruction erroneously usurped the jury's function by prohibiting them from considering whether the witness fabricated the confession.

The curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime after over $1.2 million in cash was excluded from his criminal trial under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown subsequently applied for forfeiture of the cash under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, admitted the evidence, and ordered forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant argued that his acquittal created an issue estoppel preventing the trial judge from finding his possession was unlawful or conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal did not logically necessitate a finding of lawful possession, and that a s. 24(2) analysis in a forfeiture proceeding involves different considerations than in a criminal trial.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in requiring proof that the offence occurred within a specific one-hour window after the accused raised an alibi defence.

The accused cross-appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the exact time of the offence was not an essential element and the alibi did not freeze the Crown's case to the time estimated by the complainant in cross-examination.

A conviction for sexual assault was substituted.

The accused's cross-appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's treatment of the defence evidence was not inconsistent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance, as well as his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the 20-month net delay was justified by the exceptional circumstance of case complexity, given the 10 complainants, multiple charges, and extensive pre-trial applications.

The Court also dismissed the conviction appeals based on alleged misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The sentence appeal, challenging a four-month term for breach of recognizance and a 20-year SOIRA registration order, was also dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of firearms offences, applied for a review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown consenting to release, the bail judge had denied bail based on the seriousness of the offence and the perceived weakness of the sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to consider the merit of the conviction appeal and the numerous public safety factors supporting release.

The application was granted and bail was ordered on the terms proposed by the parties.

The respondents purchased a property in 2021 and discovered significant foundation defects in a dwelling constructed between 1986 and 1987.

They sued the appellant municipality in 2022 for negligent supervision of the construction.

The motion judge dismissed the municipality's summary judgment motion, finding that the municipality had an ongoing duty to monitor the open building permit, which constituted a continuous omission tolling the 15-year ultimate limitation period under s. 15(6)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a continuous act or omission requires successive or repetitive actionable conduct, which was absent here.

The claim was therefore statute-barred by the ultimate limitation period.

The Court also noted the motion judge erred in recognizing a novel duty to monitor without conducting an Anns/Cooper analysis.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief arising from a lengthy relationship with the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by requiring corroboration, improperly relying on bad character evidence, and misapprehending evidence regarding his motivation for lying to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not require corroboration, did not engage in propensity reasoning, and made no material misapprehension of evidence.

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank's claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the bank discovered the claim when she first missed minimum monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations, meaning the limitation period only began to run when the bank cancelled the accounts and demanded full repayment.

As the action was commenced within two years of the earliest cancellation date, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order dismissing his application for a declaration regarding the allocation of surplus funds from a power of sale.

The application had been dismissed without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring a fresh application with proper notice and evidence.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order determined no substantive rights and was therefore interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing a motion for a declaration that a debt arising from a 2016 default judgment survived the respondent's bankruptcy discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

While it was undisputed that the respondent fraudulently embezzled funds from their shared corporation, the motion judge found no evidence that the respondent owed the appellant a fiduciary duty as a co-director or shareholder.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no power imbalance requiring absolute loyalty, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action for adverse possession and compelling her attendance at a judgment debtor examination.

The motion judge dismissed the action despite the respondent not requesting that relief at the hearing and without giving the appellant notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the dismissal of the action due to procedural unfairness, but upheld the order compelling the appellant's attendance at the judgment debtor examination.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of sexual assault involving six complainants who worked at his adult massage parlour.

The trial judge dismissed the Crown's similar act evidence application but failed to instruct the jury against propensity reasoning and the cross-count application of evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that these limiting instructions were mandatory to prevent the jury from improperly using the evidence across counts.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that even if the similar act evidence should have been admitted, the lack of proper jury instructions meant there was a reasonable possibility the verdicts would have been different.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The City of Ottawa appealed a remittal decision that found various provisions of a 1981 Agreement and related contracts governing golf course lands to be inoperative.

The Court of Appeal had previously struck down conveyancing provisions in the agreement for violating the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge held that without these provisions, the remaining obligations to operate a golf course in perpetuity fundamentally altered the parties' original bargain and were therefore inoperative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the removal of the conveyancing provisions frustrated the balance of the agreement, rendering all provisions relating to the golf course lands void.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault relating to two complainants at a house party.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and provided insufficient reasons for her factual conclusions regarding his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, available on the record, and supported by clear reasons.