D. Bains

During a trial for a shooting that resulted in one death and two injuries, the Crown sought to introduce photographs of a mark on a hallway baseboard taken seven years after the incident, along with related property manager testimony and expert opinions from a forensic video analyst and a firearms expert.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in determining whether the accused fired a weapon and in assessing witness credibility significantly outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The expert opinions met the threshold requirements for admissibility.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to re-open its examination-in-chief of a witness to refresh her memory using a prior statement, after having closed its examination but before cross-examination began.

The witness had given testimony inconsistent with her prior statement regarding the actions of the accused after the shooting.

The trial judge granted the request, applying the Coffin procedure and finding that allowing the Crown to refresh the witness's memory would not cause prejudice or trial unfairness, as the defence could cure any prejudice through cross-examination.

During a second trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied under section 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the prior trial testimony of a key witness who had left Canada for Ghana just before the trial commenced.

The court reviewed the principles from R. v. Potvin and subsequent jurisprudence regarding the principled approach to hearsay and the Crown's obligation to make reasonable efforts to secure testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to establish necessity as it had not pursued alternatives like commission evidence or offered to fund the witness's return, and that admitting the evidence would operate unfairly against the accused.

During a trial for sexual interference involving a child complainant, the accused brought an application to introduce expert opinion evidence from a cognitive psychologist regarding memory, misinformation effects, and the reliability of children's recollections.

The Crown opposed the admission.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey framework for expert evidence and concluded that the proposed evidence was unnecessary, as the frailties of memory are within the normal experience of a trier of fact.

Furthermore, the court found the expert's report improperly touched upon the complainant's credibility.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought a pretrial motion seeking permission to pose a race‑based challenge for cause question to prospective jurors using a multiple‑choice format designed to detect conscious and unconscious racial bias.

The Crown did not oppose a race‑based challenge for cause but objected to the proposed form of questioning.

The court reviewed jurisprudence including the Parks question and later cases considering expanded questioning formats.

The judge concluded that while a race‑based challenge for cause was appropriate, there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the established Parks formulation in favour of a multiple‑choice question.

The court held that the standard Parks question, modified to refer to judging the evidence “fairly,” adequately addressed concerns about potential juror bias without unnecessarily complicating the jury selection process.