COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Bank of Montreal v. Bronfman, 2025 ONCA 85

DATE: 20250205

DOCKET: C70974

Fairburn A.C.J.O., Copeland and Monahan JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Bank of Montreal

Plaintiff

(Respondent)

and

Natalya Bronfman (a.k.a. Natalya Rajevski, a.k.a. Natalia Rajevski, a.k.a. Natalie Rajevski, a.k.a. Natasha Bronfman)

Defendant

(Appellant)

Natalya Bronfman, acting in person

Allyson Fox, for the respondent

Heard: January 30, 2025

On appeal from the order of Justice John M. Johnston of the Superior Court of Justice, dated June 8, 2022.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The motion judge granted the respondent, the Bank of Montreal (“BMO”), summary judgment on its claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit. There is no dispute that BMO advanced the funds to the appellant and that she defaulted on her obligations to repay the debts incurred. The primary issue in the litigation is whether BMO’s claim is barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B (the “Act”).

[2] The motion judge found that the obligations were “demand obligations”, that BMO had commenced its action within two years of having demanded repayment, and that the claim was thus not statute barred.

[3] The appellant appeals on the basis that BMO discovered the claim when she failed to make minimum monthly payments, and that this occurred more than two years prior to BMO commencing the proceeding. Accordingly, she argues the proceeding should be dismissed as statute barred.

[4] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.

A. Background Facts

[5] BMO advanced funds to the appellant through her use of a credit card and two lines of credit (LOC 1 and LOC 2, respectively). The appellant failed to make the required minimum payments on the accounts in January or February 2018.

[6] After issuing several monthly account statements requesting payment of the amounts that were past due, BMO cancelled the accounts in April or May 2018 and demanded repayment of the entire amounts outstanding.

[7] The appellant failed to make the payments demanded and, on April 21, 2020, BMO issued its statement of claim in connection with the debts owing by the appellant. BMO subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment.

[8] The primary issue on the summary judgment motion was whether BMO had commenced the claim within two years of having discovered it, as required by s. 4 of the Limitations Act.

[9] BMO’s position was that it issued its claim in a timely manner since the relevant credit agreements were “demand obligations”. As such, the two-year limitation period provided for under the Act only began to run when the demand for repayment was made,[^1] which BMO argued occurred on the following dates (the “Demand Dates”): (i) May 26, 2018 in respect of the credit card debt, since this was the date the card was cancelled and the demand for repayment was made; (ii) May 14, 2018 in respect of the LOC 1 debt, since this was the date LOC 1 was cancelled and the demand for repayment was made; and (iii) May 10, 2018 in respect of the LOC 2 debt, since this was the date LOC 2 was cancelled and the demand for repayment was made. BMO further maintained that since the proceeding was commenced within two years of the earliest of the Demand Dates, BMO’s claim was not barred by the Act.

[10] The appellant argued that the limitation period began to run when she first failed to make required monthly payments on the various accounts, which occurred in January or February 2018. Since BMO did not commence its proceeding within two years of those dates, she maintained that the claim was statute barred.

[11] The appellant also argued that the precise dates upon which BMO cancelled the various credit agreements were not entirely clear and thus the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment. In support of that position, she sought to tender various documents sent to her by representatives of BMO, as follows: (i) a letter from BMO to the appellant dated April 25, 2018, stating that it was necessary to close her credit card account; (ii) a letter from BMO to the appellant dated April 30, 2018, stating that the LOC 1 account was closed and demanding that the balance be paid in full without delay; and (iii) a letter from BMO to the appellant dated May 1, 2018, stating that the LOC 2 account was closed and demanding that the balance be paid in full without delay.

[12] Finally, the appellant argued that in the materials filed before the motion judge, BMO had mistakenly tendered documents relating to the granting of a security interest over a condominium she had previously owned.

B. Reasons of the Motion Judge

[13] The motion judge found that the matter was appropriate for summary judgment since, based on the evidence before him, he was able to make necessary findings of fact and law and there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

[14] The motion judge found that the obligations created through the various credit agreements were “demand obligations”, relying in particular on clause 11 of the credit agreements for the LOCs, which provided as follows:

11. Without limiting any other of the Bank’s rights, the Bank reserves the right to decline to make any further amounts available to the Borrower, discontinue and make demand on any amount designated to be subject to the ILOC Arrangement at any time, including without limitation in the event that the Account is in default or the Borrower has failed to comply with the terms of this Addendum or the LOC Agreement.

[15] The motion judge regarded this provision as creating a “demand obligation” since the entire amount outstanding would not become due until a demand for repayment was made. Absent such a demand, the appellant would be required to make minimum monthly payments but would continue to have access to the funds advanced.

[16] The motion judge noted that the limitation period under the Act does not begin to run in respect of a demand obligation until a demand for performance is made. Accordingly, the limitation period in this case did not start to run until the accounts were cancelled and demands for repayment were made, which the motion judge found occurred on the Demand Dates.[^2] Since the proceeding was commenced less than two years from the earliest of those Demand Dates, it was not statute barred.

[17] The motion judge also considered, in the event he was wrong in concluding that the credit agreements were “demand obligations”, the issue of “when it was appropriate” for BMO to commence its proceeding, for the purposes of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act. He found that it would not have made sense to commence a proceeding simply due to the appellant’s failure to make a monthly payment, and that commencing an action was only appropriate after the credit agreements were cancelled.

[18] Accordingly, the motion judge granted BMO’s motion for summary judgment.

C. Standard of Review

[19] The determination of whether a matter is suitable for summary judgment generally attracts deference and, absent an extricable error in principle or palpable and overriding error, this determination should not be disturbed on appeal: Baywood Homes Partnership v. Haditaghi, 2014 ONCA 450, 120 O.R. (3d) 438, at para. 30.

[20] Similarly, the question of whether a limitation period has expired is generally one of mixed fact and law for which the standard of review is palpable and overriding error: Longo v. MacLaren Art Centre, 2014 ONCA 526, 323 O.A.C. 246, at para. 38.

[21] However, the motion judge’s determination of whether the relevant credit agreements created “demand obligations” involves the interpretation of a standard form contract largely independent of any specific factual matrix. Accordingly, we proceed on the basis that the motion judge’s finding on this issue should be reviewed on a correctness standard: Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 23, at para. 24.

D. Analysis

[22] In our view, the motion judge made no reversible error in concluding that this matter was appropriate for summary judgment. We come to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that there were certain factual issues in dispute between the parties since, as we describe below, the resolution of those factual issues would not have affected the outcome of the motion.

[23] We see no error in the motion judge’s finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations. Clause 11 specifically provides that BMO may demand repayment in the event that the borrower is in default, but BMO is not required to make such a demand, which may be issued “at any time”. Nor does the requirement to repay the entire outstanding amount automatically arise in the event of a breach of the agreement. Clause 11 draws a clear distinction between a breach of the credit agreements and a demand for repayment, with the former not necessarily leading to the latter.

[24] This interpretation of the credit agreements is supported by the various account statements issued by BMO between February and April 2018, which indicated that several monthly payments were “past due” and requesting minimum payments that would bring the accounts back into good standing. Notably, the account statements did not demand repayment of the entire balance outstanding, with such demands only being made when the accounts were cancelled in late April or May 2018.

[25] The motion judge’s interpretation is also consistent with the Divisional Court’s decision in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Mazin, 2010 ONSC 5827, which dealt with the commencement of the limitation period in respect of a debt due on a credit card. The Divisional Court found that the credit card debt became due and the limitation period began to run only when the credit agreement was cancelled and the entire outstanding debt became immediately payable. A mere failure to make a required payment on time did not trigger the running of the limitation period.

[26] Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in accepting BMO’s position that the credit agreements established “demand obligations” within the meaning of s. 5(3) of the Act. As a consequence, the limitation period for each loan account only began to run when BMO issued a demand for repayment of the entire outstanding balance, and not when the appellant began to miss her monthly payments.

[27] The remaining question is whether the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that, in this particular case, the demands for repayment were made on the Demand Dates proposed by BMO.

[28] As noted above, documents tendered by the appellant suggest that the relevant credit agreements were cancelled a few weeks earlier than the Demand Dates proposed by BMO. The credit card appears to have been cancelled on April 25, 2018, thereby triggering the requirement to repay the outstanding balance, while demands for repayment of the amounts outstanding on the LOCs were made on April 30 and May 1, 2018, respectively. Although the appellant did not produce these documents in advance of the hearing and they were not introduced by way of affidavit, they appeared genuine and to have been created by BMO. Even if they had been admitted into evidence, though, they would not have affected the outcome. This is because the earliest date upon which any of the accounts were cancelled was April 25, 2018, when the credit card was cancelled. BMO commenced the proceeding on April 21, 2020, less than two years later.

[29] We also note that the concerns raised by the appellant relating to the security interests granted over a condominium she no longer owns are immaterial to this litigation, which involves the enforcement of the loan agreements themselves as opposed to mortgages granted as security.

[30] Given our conclusions in this regard, it is unnecessary to consider the alternative finding of the motion judge relating to when it became appropriate for BMO to commence its proceeding pursuant to s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act.

[31] Accordingly, we would not disturb the motion judge’s finding that BMO’s claim was not statute barred and that it was appropriate to grant summary judgment on the claim.

E. Disposition

[32] The appeal is therefore dismissed. In accordance with the agreement of the parties, costs are awarded to the respondent in the amount of $2,500, all-inclusive.

“Fairburn A.C.J.O.”

“J. Copeland J.A.”

“P.J. Monahan J.A.”

[^1]: This results from the combined effect of ss. 5(1)(a)(i) and 5(3) of the Act, the latter of which provides that “the day on which injury, loss or damage occurs in relation to a demand obligation is the first day on which there is a failure to perform the obligation, once a demand for the performance is made.”

[^2]: At the hearing, the appellant attempted to tender the letters from BMO referred to above in paragraph 11. The motion judge refused to admit the documents into evidence since they had not been filed in advance and were not adduced by way of an affidavit. As we explain below, even if they had been admitted into evidence they would not have altered the result on the motion.